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
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THE

TRUISMS OF STATECRAFT

TO THE YOUTH OF AUSTRALIA,
IN WHOSE RESTLESS HANDS
LIES THE DESTINY OF THE
"NEWER" WORLD.

THE TRUISMS OF STATECRAFT

An attempt to define, in general terms, the Origin, Growth, Purpose, and Possibilities, of Popular Government.

BY

THE HON. BRUCE SMITH, K.C.

NINETEEN YEARS MEMBER OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

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PREFACE

NO one who is familiar with the writings of the best-known thinkers on political economy can have failed to be impressed with the lack of human interest, that the subject-matter of their treatises seems to afford to the popular reader, by reason of the abstract nature of the discussions involved. It has always seemed to the present writer that, inasmuch as the real starting-point in all such studies is man himself; his nature; his needs; and the means (in the shape of laws and administration) by which his activities, in obtaining those needs, are best encouraged and regulated; it would help to popularise the study of an otherwise dry subject, if writers could, as a preliminary to, or essential part of, their discussions, show the general bearing of it all on the people's personal interests, and so make them feel that sound economic views in their legislators would contribute to the domestic and personal happiness of everyone. If man and his needs, as a member of any community, be the true starting-point in such a study, his nature becomes a matter of the first importance; in order that his weaknesses may be guarded against, and his qualities, that make for the good of himself and his fellow-men, may be encouraged and guarded, for the general welfare.

Even Adam Smith, the father and pioneer of all the systematic economists, starts his epoch-marking treatise

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with an abstract examination of the results of the "division of labour," and, whilst dealing with every aspect of trade and commerce, as bearing on human welfare, does not devote any part of his treatise to the study of the nature and needs of man, for whose edification this great body of economic doctrine is designed. For it must be always remembered that but for man's presence in the world, political economy would be a needless and non-existent study; and nature would go her own uninterrupted way in regard to the production and distribution of the world's fruitfulness.

John Stuart Mill again opens his widely known treatise on Political Economy with an examination of the conditions of "production," and then passes on to "distribution" and "exchange"; and it is only in the latter portions of his work that he deals with the "Influence of the progress of society on production and distribution," and with the "Influence of Government," as if they were subordinate topics. It may be truly said that Political Economy, considered scientifically, is only concerned with "the nature of wealth, and the laws of its production and distribution"; but, nevertheless, Mill himself includes, in the latter portion of his work, among the factors of the study, several more personal aspects of human affairs.

It is sufficiently evident that he considered that the study of human nature was involved in Economics; for, in his opening chapter, he says that the subject "includes directly or remotely the operation of *all the causes* by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of human beings . . . is made prosperous or the reverse."

The work of Ricardo (one of the world's greatest Economic thinkers) is even more closely confined to trade and commerce than those of Adam Smith and Mill; whilst Professor Fawcett breaks fresh ground, and follows Mill, in dealing with such personal problems as "socialism" and "strikes."

I quite recognise that it has been the custom to confine the subject of political economy to the operation of these laws, which, as it were, play round human society in connection with human needs and human activities; but I cannot help thinking that, inasmuch as political economy has its very root in human nature and human needs, it is not only pertinent to such an enquiry, but directly essential to its clear and comprehensive understanding, and certainly to its being popularly studied, to ascertain and explain of what this element of "human nature" consists, and what are the best methods of treating it, in most successfully ministering to its needs, when its units are grouped in co-operative communities.

These thoughts are the justification I respectfully offer for my departure from other writers; although, as I am dealing with Statesmanship in general, in matters outside as well as bearing on Economics, I consider I am entitled to claim a wider scope.

Now, as to my title. By "Truisms" I mean to convey to my readers that I am not professing to propound any new truths, but only to be presenting, in something like comprehensive form, the various factors that go to qualify a man to take an intelligent part in public life—in short, collecting and collating old truths that every well-read man already knows.

"Statecraft" has been defined as "The art of conduct-

ing State affairs; State management; Statesmanship"; and the simpler word "craft," taken alone, has acquired two regular meanings; the one being "art or skill"; the other being "cunning; art or skill in a bad sense, or as applied to bad purposes."

Hobbes, the learned author of *Leviathan* (who wrote in the 17th century), speaks of "that crooked wisdom which is called 'craft' "; but that is only another way of stating the second part of the above definition, the synonym for which is "cunning," which is not the sense in which I am using it in the title of this little work.

"Statesmanship" is defined by others as meaning the qualifications, duties, and employments of a statesman; whilst the word "Statesman" is defined as "a man versed in public affairs, and in the principles and art of government."

The statesmen of ancient times, in such long extinct polities as Persia, Egypt, Rome, and Greece, were a mixture of the priest, the soldier, and the politician, but later ages have brought changes. In Lord Macaulay's essay on Lord Bacon, there are some interesting pages, on the origin and development, in England, of the "professional statesman"; that is, the type of public men who first devoted themselves to the life-occupation of statesmanship; not as a money-making calling, but as affording a self-satisfying and useful career for men of independent means and intellectual parts.

Macaulay considers that that special type of men began with Sir Nicholas Bacon (Lord Chancellor in the reign of Elizabeth), the father of Lord Bacon, and that they afterwards became a distinct class of public men, who followed no other regular occupation. He shows

that, prior to that period, statesmanship was in the hands of two classes of men, "warriors" and "priests." Of the former, he says that their "rude courage was neither guided by science, nor softened by humanity." Of the latter, he says that their "learning and abilities were patiently devoted to the defence of tyranny and imposture." In the social evolution of that period, continues Macaulay, "the nobles ceased to be military chieftains, and the priests ceased to possess a monopoly of learning." It was then that what Macaulay calls "a new and remarkable species of politicians appeared." Some interesting references are made to the prevailing characteristics of this new class. "They were (he says) free from that childish love of titles which characterised the successful courtiers of the generation which preceded them, and of that which followed them. . . . Their fidelity to the State was incorruptible, their households were sober and well governed."

The true test of sound, as distinguished from showy, statesmanship was well focused in the motto which Sir Nicholas Bacon inscribed over his hall, "*Mediocra firma*": "the middle course is safe." This sound maxim at once suggests to the reader of history, or the thoughtful observer of current events, that rash class of politicians who are ever seeking the "limelight" of notoriety, by trying to "cut figures" on the thin ice of political novelty or popular experiment, and so jeopardising the stability of the community, in which, in many cases, they have little or no stake.

This little work is designed to place on record, and so remind the average man and woman of, the fundamental principles of human nature, upon which that

"middle course" rests; and I have used the term "truisms," because I claim no novelty for my little treatise; as the principles laid down in it are well known to every wide reader of history and close observer of human affairs: such as read between the lines of history. Nature is fixed, regular, and unrelenting in its operations; and so is human nature, if only studied in its broader and deeper aspects, and over a sufficiently wide field of human records, as pointed out by Buckle in his *History of Civilisation*. Unfortunately for the few, the many prefer amusement to instruction, showiness to soundness, the novel to the familiar; and the word-conjurer, who can excite the imagination of his audience, is always more attractive than the sage, who recites and emphasises home truths, that lie in the tried and "middle way," and so constitute a more sound footing for the community and the individual alike. We all recognise that knowledge, wisdom, and sagacity are more often associated with age than with youth; for the truth of things comes with years; whereas, the young insist on "finding out for themselves," and often go stumbling over hurdles and pitfalls, that the experienced traveller knows and avoids. But, unfortunately for the body-politic, in which we all—old and young alike—have an interest as shareholders, every fresh generation yearns for excitement and novelty; and, inasmuch as youth prefers to "find out" by personal experience, rather than to "be told" by those who have already found out before them—sometimes after many wasteful mistakes—the process of experiment away from what the before-mentioned motto calls "the middle course" seems inevitable in every generation.

As I have already said, the subjects of both "nature" and "human nature" are inextricably involved in politics; they afford the data or raw material from a knowledge of which politics must be framed into Acts of Parliament. How, then, can a citizen become useful as a politician, unless he first acquires a knowledge, and a wide knowledge, of society, in its political sense, and of men and women in their individual and collective activities? To do that, involves an understanding of their physical, mental, and moral nature; their needs, as distinguished from their wants, which are quite different things; their capabilities; their vices and their virtues; their instincts, and their susceptibilities to outside influences, for good or for ill; their tendency to think and to provide for the present, only, and to lose sight of the future and its necessities; their inclination to attach too much importance to what they can see, and too little importance to what they cannot see, of the things and the movements around them, and ahead of them.

Then, man in general must be studied in relation to nature itself, to its laws, to the regularity and unrelenting nature of those laws, as also to man's dependence upon those laws, and their operations upon his present and future welfare.

If all these subjects of study, and a hundred others, which are subordinate to them, have to be understood by the politician, so as to prevent him from becoming a menace, instead of a benefactor, to his fellow-men and women, when he is entrusted to lay down rules or laws for their conduct; how essential is it for the welfare of any community that those who select the makers of

those rules or laws, which all of us have to obey, should be versed in a knowledge of those subjects!

Many of the facts which are thus necessary to be known to the statesman or wise politician are what we call self-evident to the thoughtful man or woman; they are what I have called "Truisms"; but, unfortunately, thousands of those who choose, or "elect," the men who govern us are not thoughtful, but sometimes utterly careless or thoughtless; and the only hope of avoiding harmful rules or laws is by inducing such people at least to recognise their political short-comings, and allow others, older and wiser—or wiser, though not older—than themselves, to be the better judges of the men who are most fit to be entrusted with political power.

This little work has been written in the hope that by laying down the elements or axioms—or truisms—of the political art, many of those, who do not know, may come to recognise and acknowledge the limits of their qualifications for choosing the men who are properly equipped for managing the public affairs of portion of this complex world, and the increasingly complex social conditions operating in it. The customs or laws necessary in a state of primitive society, in which personal possessions are tangible and few, in which needs are simple, and the occupations of life limited in number and nature—in such a society, the wisdom or unwisdom of a rule that says "you must do this," or "you must not do that" (which are the essence of all laws) can easily be judged and criticised. But in the twentieth century, in which "property" takes a thousand, not only material, but invisible forms; in

which the needs of our daily life have become multiplied and involved in a thousand details, and in which man's occupations have become not only practical, but theoretical, technical, analytical, artistic, intellectual, microscopical, experimental, statistical, and scientific, in a thousand forms; who can say, with any degree of certainty, and without long and careful study, what effect a law or regulation is going to have on every class of society, or on a whole community? Who, but those who have made it a special study, can honestly claim to be able to make wise laws for a community, so complex as that type which the twentieth century has evolved?

It must be remembered, too, that men and women differ in character and capacity for different professions or occupations, as widely as do the different forms of vegetation around us in their special power of productiveness. One tree or plant bears grapes, out of which we make wine as a drink, another produces wheat which we use as a food, a third produces tobacco which we smoke, a fourth cotton, with which we clothe ourselves, another india rubber, which we use for a hundred and one purposes, and so on. In a similar way, men differ in their aptitudes and capabilities. One man finds a congenial vocation in mechanics, another in the exactitude and controversy of the lawyer, a third in the microscopic work of the botanist or the chemist, a fourth in the æsthetic rôle of the artist, a fifth in the anatomical and physiological investigations of the surgeon or physician, a sixth in the out-door life of farming, and a seventh in the study of human nature, human needs, history, economics, and sociology, as

required in the expert politician or statesman. Just as it is impossible to find a thistle capable of producing figs, a vine that can produce apples, or a rose bush that will produce cotton; so is it impossible to get learned legal work from a mechanic; scientific chemistry from an artist; inspired pictures from a chemist, or a skilful surgical operation at the hands of a farmer.

It is equally disappointing to look for sound and wise law-making from a man who has not studied history, economics, and sociology, but who has devoted his life exclusively to brick-making or sheep farming. Man is, in some instances, a versatile creature; and it is quite possible for a fencer (as in the case of Abraham Lincoln) to become, by reading and thinking, a statesman; for an engineer (as in the case of Herbert Spencer) to become a great authority on theoretical statecraft and law-making; for a cotton printer (as in the cases of Cobden and Bright) to become a statesman; but an examination of the biography of these men will show that while, and though, they followed their several vocations, as means to the "main chance," they were close and earnest students of the subjects that are involved in statesmanship.

It is chiefly with a view to inducing men, no matter what their everyday vocation, to study the various subjects essential to the higher politics or true statesmanship, that this little work has been written.

It will be seen that in order to make each chapter as complete as possible under its own head, some repetition or overlapping of the subjects was inevitable. That must be allowed and excused for completeness' sake.

"There can be no understanding of social actions, without some knowledge of human nature; there can be no deep knowledge of human nature, without some knowledge of the laws of mind; there can be no adequate knowledge of the laws of mind, without some knowledge of the laws of life. And in order that knowledge of the laws of life, as exhibited in man, may be properly grasped, attention must be given to the laws of life in general."

HERBERT SPENCER

"Study of Sociology."

INTRODUCTORY

The empirical stages in politics.

THE written political history of the world now covers so long a period, and comprehends such an infinite variety of social conditions, that it is almost impossible to conceive a theory of government that has not, at some period of history, been tried in the fire of experience. In the history of every civilised race, and under almost every possible set of social circumstances, experiments in human government have been proposed and practically tested, in the hope of securing an increased diffusion of worldly happiness for those who were at the time deemed entitled to have their welfare considered by the governing power. Such experiments in social regulation have not been the outcome of genuine thinking minds only, but have proceeded, in innumerable instances, from mere theorists or empirics, who were incapable of working out their conceptions to their logical conclusion, before subjecting hundreds or thousands of their fellows to incalculable inconvenience and economic loss, by their fallacious theories.

Surplus of reformers in every age.

We see frequent instances in our own day, in every self-governing community, of enthusiastic men and women, possessing the smallest knowledge of human history, and the most superficial and biassed acquain-

tance with human nature in general, who are ready to impose and re-try every variety of legislative prescription upon their fellow citizens, without possessing the industry to study carefully the results of similar experiments as recorded in history, or to respect the opinions of others who have done so, as to the consequences which must follow upon the practical application of their ill-digested schemes. Many of these proposals are, possibly, honestly conceived, with the view of adding to the sum of human happiness; but many others are projected recklessly, in regard to consequences, as the outcome of personal vanity, seeking public recognition and applause.

Unfortunately, there is no recognised method of visiting upon these ill-informed and thoughtless would-be reformers the consequences of their reckless social experiments upon others; and, even if there were, the evil consequences which flow from their reforming activities are so difficult to trace into and through all their innumerable channels of near and far-reaching influence, that the promoters, in most cases, escape retribution.

Grote, in his monumental history of Greece, tells us of one of its innumerable colonies, in which this temptation to try fresh legislative experiments had been so abused—doubtless, at considerable inconvenience to their many citizens—that at last means were adopted to check further social annoyance and injury of the kind. Some of the ancient Greeks, however, who recognised the impossibility of tracing all the consequences of such short-sighted and injurious attempts at human regulation, would not permit such meddlesome tyros to

await results and so escape. They hinged the punishment, not on the effect which will probably follow when the author has been forgotten, but on the bare proposal of a stupidly-conceived law. According to the historical authority named, the people of Lokris adopted a social regulation which provided a check on what we now call "over-legislation," by requiring the advocate of any new law to make his proposal in public, with a halter round his neck; and, in the event of his failing to persuade the people to adopt the proposal, the halter was employed to strangle the proposer! This drastic method had the advantage of compelling every tyro, who was disposed to put his hands, recklessly, on the starting gear of the legislative machine, seriously to review his own qualifications for such an important work, even before engaging the attention and involving the welfare or otherwise of his fellow citizens. Without some such method, there was no means of impressing upon the would-be reformer the importance of ascertaining, by prior thought and study, the limitations of his own knowledge.

The same situation confronts us to-day in the midst of our theoretical belief in the equal political wisdom of all men and women. Mr. Frederick Harrison has well said, in addressing a working man's club: "In every occupation, whether it be a profession or a trade, man is acknowledged to require some years of practice or apprenticeship to become an expert—what is called a qualified practitioner or a 'tradesman'—but in the making of laws, one of the most complex of all studies and occupations, every man is supposed to be born ready equipped for its performance."

Serious consequences of legislative errors.

Modern society is literally infested with would-be millennialists, who have just enough knowledge to be dangerous to everybody, especially if, at the same time that they are obsessed with the reforming fever, they are endowed with sufficient fluency and self-confidence to hold out to the average man and woman a prospect of universal happiness, as likely to flow from the adoption of their particular nostrum. It has been frequently shown by the more widely recognised thinkers of the English-speaking world (Spencer, Mill, Maine, Sidgwick, and many others) that the effects of a wrongly conceived law, applied universally in any community, are, not merely those which immediately result from its enactment, the consequences of which can probably be seen and traced, but innumerable others of a more remote and untraceable nature, which extend themselves into remote times, and remote avenues of social activity, beyond the eye or the mind of the keenest critic or investigator.

Difficulty of tracing legislative consequences.

In an age such as the present—one essentially, and at bottom so largely commercial, financial, and industrial—human affairs have become a wide-spreading labyrinth of economic forces, interweaving their influences so as to make it impossible to demonstrate, even if we can trace, the relationship of cause and effect. If the world knew of, and took to heart, but a proportion of the entire array of legislative experiments which have been essayed in different ages, so as to be able to dis-

criminate between those which have produced good, and those which have produced injurious, consequences; the communities of to-day would be considerably benefited by noting the one class for repetition, and the other class for avoidance.

The possibility of a code of acknowledged principles.

It cannot be doubted that a wide study of universal history, not in a vain search for specific precedents, but with the legitimate aim of coming to understand the more abiding characteristics and tendencies of human nature, as keys to failure or success in all attempts at social regulation—such a study would enable those who aspire to help in the political work of their time and country to avoid the failures, and note for future guidance, the successes of the past.

Every earnest student of history, and of its bearing on sociological problems, has, consciously or unconsciously, laid down in his mind a more or less systematic and accurate body of general principles or axioms, illustrated by personal observation of his own times, as guides to future legislative attempts to drill society into an ultimately just and harmonious recognition of the rights and responsibilities of all its units.

That such a code or body of axioms is possible of general settlement no one can doubt, who is familiar with the writings of acknowledged thinkers in political science; for on many of the broader principles those authorities are already fairly unanimous; but the statements of these principles are so scattered, through a variety of abstract writings, that a mental collection

of them by every individual student involves a wide study of history, philosophy, anthropology, economics, and political science, generally, constituting a formidable obstacle, such as few people, or even professing politicians, would be able to surmount.

Nevertheless, just as the leading economists are more often agreed on the main principles of their science; so such a code of a wider scope—which we may call "political science"—could be ultimately built up by competent hands, out of the general principles accepted by the world's thinkers on the various branches of knowledge involved in the art of nation-building and nation-upholding. Just as the science of jurisprudence, for instance, as a code of generalisations in regard to the basis of just laws, is gradually acquiring definiteness, and is coming to be accepted in an international sense, notwithstanding the differences of opinion on many outlying questions of detail; so might, and in time probably will, be built up a body of general principles, bearing on the political science, which would, and will, come to be accepted as authoritative.

It is not suggested that such a code or body of principles could be reduced to a set of concrete guides for the practical legislator; since no two politicians of average ability would consent to accept the identical inferences drawn from such a code by others. That would be attempting an impossibility; but, nevertheless, there is no good reason why general principles, more in the form of guides of a less didactic character, should not be set out under each of the heads of knowledge that bear on the ultimate problems of the legislative art, leaving their application to particular sets of

circumstances, open to all who chose to make use of them.

Such a code could stand and be referred to, as being generally accepted by advanced students of the art, as a body of principles, which everyone should be at least acquainted with, before professing to be equipped for doing practical legislative work. To-day there is no such body of acknowledged principles; and, as a consequence, the numerous political empirics, who mistake fluent utterance for legislative genius, and rapidity of superficial thought for deep thinking, cannot be referred to any recognised code of principles, a perusal of which would impress them with their own limitations, and possibly set them on to a line of thought and study, of a sounder and more thorough nature than that which they had formerly followed.

Scope of statesmanship.

One of the most obvious and fatal objections to any sanguine attempt to lay down a body of didactic guides for practical legislators—guides, that is, in the nature of advice as to the wisdom or unwisdom of this or that particular kind of legislation—is the varying scopes which men's minds adopt in regard to the functions of statesmanship. There have been statesmen of acknowledged ability, who, consciously or unconsciously, limited their consideration of the public welfare to the people of the present or approximate generations; whilst there have been others who directed their more far-reaching attention to the welfare of the race, and objected to legislation, which, though benefiting the generations of their own time, did so at the expense of

gradually enervating the generations which were to follow, so as ultimately to undermine the character and stamina of their own nationality, in the racial competition of the world. The former class in some cases openly claim that the living generations are, and should be, the first care of the politician or the statesman; and that, though their immediate welfare, beyond a certain point, can only be secured at the cost of the generations that are to follow, posterity should be left to look after itself. The latter class, on the other hand, have sometimes contended that it is to the interest of the generations of to-day and to-morrow, that they should be disciplined in the practice of self-help and self-discipline, in order to "harden" the race, on the supposition that the international struggle for racial supremacy is ever going on, however slow and imperceptible in its progress.

This fundamental difference in the scope of legislative aims would, in some cases, entirely shift the logical pivot upon which the desirability or undesirability of a proposed legislative measure would turn; and it is upon this same pivot that the broader distinction, between the two extreme policies of socialism and individualism, would, on full discussion, be found to hinge. It would be out of place to enter upon such a discussion here; but it is proper to observe that each of those extreme policies is in itself a generalisation, drawn from a variety of data, which would come under such heads of knowledge as "human nature," "human needs," "obstacles to human progress"; and it would be quite feasible for each class of politicians or statesmen, in any discussion, to espouse their own particular

policy, though they acknowledged it to be deducible from some or other of the same data. In some cases there would be scope for scientific compromise, as to how far the State was justified in "leaving future generations to look after themselves."

The people's attitude and estimate.

It has long since and repeatedly been acknowledged by the world's deeper political thinkers that there is no subject of study that is more profound or less possible of rapid and superficial treatment than that of true statesmanship: such as involves an acquaintance with, and the espousal of, the truths of political science. It has, too often, been the practice, in ancient, as well as modern, times to admit that, ultimately, the statesman should do, by way of legislation, whatever the people require him to do; and no doubt he is so bound, if the people so resolve; but the absurdity of this universal acknowledgment as to the wisdom of such a principle must be apparent, when we consider the relative positions of a professor of any other branch of knowledge, and of the general calibre of the people who look up to him for advice on his special subject. In the case of an eminent physician, who has devoted the greater part of his life to a study of his profession, and acquired an extensive reputation; the world would consider it ridiculous, if his patients were to form themselves into a body in the event of some epidemic, and demand that he should recommend a particular prescription or course of treatment that they thought desirable. The physician's attitude in such a case—presuming he were a man of individuality and self-respect—would be one

of quiet but decided protest; because he would know that, whereas he had, by years of study and practice, made himself a master of his science, his body of patients had contented themselves with a superficial knowledge, and a narrow outlook as to the consequences. Such an attitude on the part of the body of patients towards the physician would seem, and be, equally absurd, since they would, as a body, be helpless to advise themselves. A physician of ability and self-respect would maintain his opinions, and allow his patients to go their way. By parity of reasoning a statesman of position and self-respect would, if allowed, refuse to be dictated to by the people on a subject concerning which he felt he was better informed than they; and if he were as true to principles as the physician, he would, rather than sacrifice his matured convictions and his political self-respect, allow the people to "call in" another adviser, as many eminent English statesmen have done in the past.

Unfortunately, that principle is not now widely practised under democratic government; and the world is being constantly afforded the humiliating spectacle of the "political physician" tearing up his own prescription, reversing his own honest course of treatment, and adopting an entirely new prescription, dictated by his patients, lest those patients should appeal to some competing practitioner who stood by (in opposition), offering to prescribe just what the patients themselves desired to take.

Comprehensive scope of statecraft.

To bring together such a code of principles or axioms (as distinguished from a policy for any particular

community or juncture), as here suggested, involves a reference to branches of human thought, many of which may at first sight, as already pointed out, seem to be as much in the domain of philosophy and science as in that of politics; but further consideration will show that all these more abstract subjects are indirectly involved in the more practical one of politics proper; and that the scientific study of man, his origin, nature and history; the philosophic consideration of his purpose in the world, and the political study of the best means of securing his happiness as a member of a civilised community, are closely interwoven as subjects of study.

It will be observed, too, that the various heads, under which the principles hereafter enunciated are classified, have been limited to those which are thought to have a direct or indirect bearing on the numerous and various sociological problems which arise from time to time in history, as subjects of statesmanship.

There is this advantage in presenting a body of isolated principles on any branch of knowledge, instead of that which professes to be a systematic treatise on the same subject—that many political readers would be more ready to acknowledge their soundness, where they themselves could seem to be the authors of the political conclusions which are deducible from those principles, treated as data or premises.

Rotation of historical data unimportant.

In formulating any code of principles, which seem to involve a series of historical steps, as, for instance, under the head of social evolution; it is not necessary to insist on any particular sequence in the events or

stages recorded; as they may have resulted in different societies, in quite different rotation, and yet remain perfectly sound as historical generalisations. It may have happened, for instance, in the repeated oscillations of human opinion, that certain communities in the history of the world passed through alternate experiments in socialism and individualism with the regularity of the swinging of a pendulum, though at long intervals, extending over centuries; yet the conclusion would be sound, that ultimately those communities abandoned the socialistic form, and settled down to the individualistic form, which now—subject to various modifications—obtains, more or less, in all civilised communities. It may be also, that many transitional states of society intervened between those which are enunciated with definiteness; yet that fact would not interfere with the correctness of the statement as to the ultimate preference, to which a long and wavering course of experience had ultimately led.

Bearing of headings on study of statecraft.

The bearings of the various groups of principles, under the different chapters which follow, may seem to some to need general demonstration, in order to maintain the proposition that they should be understood by all who profess to be qualified to take a useful part in the public affairs of their community. But that should not require any laboured argument, although something is said by way of introduction to each group.

"Human nature," as understood from a wide study of man's origin, characteristics, biological history, and mental and bodily capabilities, must be admitted

to constitute the tap-root of all discussion as to the most successful way of regulating human activities. If there is any value in human history, as a means of recording, for the advantage of subsequent generations, the successes and failures of ages of effort to solve the problems of human government; then "Human records," whether read by the dim and distant light of archæology, or in the variously-tinted, but, nevertheless, clearer light of written records, must have an important relevance to statesmanship, as also must a knowledge of that written history's various forms, and of the lessons of experience in construing and applying them to the affairs of our own times. Inasmuch as "Human needs" comprehend all the real wants of men and women, under a system of "social organisation"; and as "Liberty" and "Property" constitute two of the most important pillars upon which the edifices of society and civilisation seem to rest; the principles brought under these several heads must also have direct application to the study of statecraft. Equally obvious must it be that one who professes to assist intelligently in the political work of his time, should have acquainted himself with all the leading "Obstacles to Human Progress," which have operated in the past, and are operating in his own time; in order that he may appreciate the importance and advantage to his community, of reducing their number or altogether surmounting them.

Popular Government demands an acknowledged cult.

In every branch of scientific knowledge, experts have laid down in their writings, in more or less definite

language, a body of generally accepted principles, in the nature of axioms; and that fact becomes known and acknowledged; so that any confident empirics, who would otherwise revive a discussion of the "alphabetical truths" of that science, are likely to be silenced or caused to halt in arriving at final conclusions, by being confronted with such a body of established testimony. The science of politics, and the art of statecraft, have, within the last half-century, by reason of a constantly extending franchise, become the subjects of discussion among hundreds and thousands of citizens, many of whom know little more about the scientific side of political study than they do about the higher mathematics, or the inner spirit of classical studies. Such people are susceptible to the glowing promises and attractive probabilities held out to them by men, whose chief merits are the fluency of their utterance and the rhetorical plausibility of their reasoning, which are natural results of a limited acquaintance with the subject-matter of their opinions. Although it is generally—one may say almost universally—acknowledged that sociology is a science, few writers have dealt with it in a popular form—as so successfully accomplished in Spencer's *Study of Sociology*—so that those who study, or profess to study, it, even in a superficial way, may be confronted with a widely recognised literature, having the effect of impressing such students with their own limitations. There never was a time when this was more necessary than now, when so many, and such completely uninformed aspirants to statecraft, are offering themselves as representatives of the people. If a scheme for producing and publicly

acknowledging a growing body of first principles, such as is here suggested, were adopted by all those who have entered upon the subject seriously and thoroughly, the political science would in time come to be more widely and accurately understood; and a collection of those first principles would serve as a standing reminder to all who seek to engage in the art of statecraft, how much there is to be learned, before they can justifiably profess to be equipped for such an enterprise.

It is not improbable that, in time, chairs of sociology will be established in most of the world's universities, and that in each case a sociological academy will be inaugurated; so as to give a definite place and reputation to the science, and thus raise the standard of knowledge supposed to be sufficient to qualify a man as a practical politician.

BOOK I.

THE STUDY OF HUMAN NATURE

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UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

CHAPTER I.

THE STUDY OF HUMAN NATURE
Its Bearing on the Art of Statecraft

IT is generally, if not universally, recognised that a modern civilised community is not a mere "mob" of men, women, and children, brought together indiscriminately, and suddenly called upon to live peaceably with one another. Every informed person knows that what is politically called "Society" is an organised body, that has been gradually evolved or developed over a long period, possibly centuries, of time, from primitive life; and that it has been built up, by slow degrees, out of individual men and women, and bound together by laws and regulations, which have the same effect on the units as mortar or cement has upon the bricks or stones out of which a great building is erected, and so converted into a substantial edifice. If society were a mere disorganised mob, without laws and regulations to control its members, and a general understanding as to what each one was allowed, or not allowed, to do; what we call "life" would be a lawless scramble; for there would be no means of checking or regulating the strong and the cunning in their attempts to do as they liked; and the weak, the simple, the peaceful, and gentler individual members of it would be overwhelmed, and literally trampled under foot by the rough, the reckless, and the selfish. All the laws and restrictions

which serve in a well-regulated community, to prevent such a human scramble, have been built up, law upon law, regulation upon regulation, custom upon custom, tradition upon tradition, until a more or less definite code of conduct has been established; and the community has reached the "civilised" condition in which it stands to-day.

There is this great difference between a building of bricks or stones and a community of human beings; that, while the former is built up of inert matter, which rests where it is placed, and may be counted upon to remain where it has been so placed; the human units, out of which a community is built, are constantly dropping out, and being replaced by others; and, while some are satisfied with the places in which they find themselves in the community, others, unable to hold up the weight of their own nature, drop down to a lower level; and, still others, who have found themselves placed low down in the human structure, are constantly endeavouring to get out of their original position, and to work their way up into a higher social level, or a higher story in the social edifice.

The community is thus built up of live and restless units or materials, differing in body and in mind, in desires and in purposes, in ambitions and in needs, in energy and in outlook. In short, no two units are exactly alike; and the problem of reconciling them all to their present positions, or enabling them to reach new ones, or to change with one another, so as to satisfy their desires, and satisfy their needs, whilst allowing others the same privileges—all without friction—this is one of the chief provinces of the politician or statesman.

It is, therefore, self-evident that, before anyone can be considered qualified to assist either in the building up of a well-organised community, or in facilitating and superintending the multiplicity of changes that are everywhere and always going on in its establishment and maintenance; he should become, not only acquainted with, but well versed in, the character and composition of those units out of which the community is built. He should know something of their origin, their nature, their habits, their needs, their aptitudes, and their disqualifications, as units of types; so that he may be able to take a wise and unbiassed part in the peaceful ordering and regulation of their activities, as individuals in the complicated structure of the social and political organisation.

As every community is built up of individual citizens, each composed of the varying attributes of human nature, the characteristics of that human nature become, not only an indispensable, but also the primary, study of the would-be statesman; for, without man and the human nature of which he is composed, there would be no community; and there would be no need for parliaments, statesmen, laws, regulations, customs, or any of the other incidents of the social and political labyrinth, that is interwoven with man's activities in the world's ever-changing panorama.

CHAPTER II.

HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS

MAN, considered as a political unit, is but a bundle of appetites—some of the body and some of the mind; of the first, hunger and thirst, freedom of locomotion, etc.; of the second, curiosity, ambition, freedom of thought, of conscience, of belief, etc.

The mind and the body may seem, when superficially regarded, to be capable of working quite independently of one another; but in the end they are found to be interdependent; that is to say, an unhealthy body disturbs the regular and balanced workings of the mind; and a deranged mind disturbs the digestive organs and the nervous system, which react on the mind.

The body is man's more immediate connecting link with nature; and, when it ceases to live, the mind also dies, as would the activities of a clock, when the source of its motive power runs down; although the body can survive the conscious, capable, and balanced mind, in which case it becomes a mere flesh-casing to a deranged thinking organ.

The mind is the guide or pilot of the body, prompting its locomotion, directing its movements, and, through the medium of the will, checking and regulating—more or less according to the individual power—its various and varying appetites.

The first law of human nature is self-preservation, in fulfilling which law, both mind and body are involved.

Next to self-preservation, is the desire to preserve or protect other human beings or things, upon whose welfare or safety our own happiness or welfare seems to depend.

Man's activities are therefore exerted, primarily and necessarily, on behalf of, or in defence of, himself and those whose existence he cherishes, next to his own; more particularly the members of his family.

Man is undergoing gradual but numerous changes in body and mind; although the transition is so slow and gradual that human records have been too imperfect, or too perishable, to afford a complete or even detailed history of the extent of the changes.

Man's mental development has enabled him to increase and concentrate his control over nature, so as to modify or gradually dispense with the more strenuous exercise of some of his bodily functions; which, where not exercised for other purposes, are therefore gradually becoming, and will continue to become, atrophied by disuse.

As this gradual disuse of his bodily activities thus leads to atrophy, many of his former bodily provisions are gradually losing their vitality and disappearing; and, as the persistent activity of mind or body leads to increased capability, many of man's once crude mental powers are gradually acquiring increased force and dexterity.

The key to man's bodily and mental vitality is activity and exercise of all the functions that contribute to homogeneity; for decreased activity and exercise are

followed by gradual but sure atrophy; and men die in parts of body or mind, while they are yet alive as a whole, as trees die in some of their outlying branches, whilst the trunk is still flourishing.

There is a natural tendency or inclination in human nature to avoid bodily or mental exertion, and to fall back into a state of inactivity and inertness. Only a small minority of men and women acknowledge Ruskin's plea for the nobility of labour, or realise that continued activity of mind and body is a personal investment, the reward of which is improved health and added years of life to the investor; and it is only by reason of such spurs as hunger, thirst, excessive cold or heat, or by the infliction of some form of pain, that the lower types of human nature are stirred into activity, in the effort to satisfy the appetites, or to remove the particular forms of pain or discomfort, from which they are suffering. In the case of the more civilised, or more reflective types of men and women, the energies and activities of body and mind are spurred by such influences as ambition, pride, self-respect, and a desire for continued health and ultimate longevity, to practise various forms of bodily and mental activity. Otherwise, these types would be as liable to the natural tendency to inertness, as in the lower and less reflective types.

From all of which it follows, that one of the legitimate objects of statecraft is the discouragement of the tendency to idleness of the one type, by avoiding the offering of undue encouragement to inactivity, and by checking all possible causes through which the incentives to activity in the higher types may be discouraged.

Man's mind is more capable of developing further

appetites or desires than is his body; so that his aims, ambitions, and aspirations are, by cultivation, almost limitless in number.

As a general rule, to which there are exceptions, the appetites of the body consume what they desire; whilst those of the mind do not affect the materiality of the things sought after, but, on the contrary, frequently have the effect of adding to the existing store, by developing new creative tastes or desires.

The progress of the more civilised types of man is in the direction of reducing the bodily appetites to their minimum, consistent with the preservation of bodily health, and the maintenance of the fullest mental and physical vigour.

Mankind, in its highest forms of civilisation, is cultivating, multiplying, and elaborating innumerable new forms of mental desires, and thus tending more and more to individualise, instead of grouping, themselves, in their efforts to acquire happiness.

Happiness, in its most universally accepted form (as distinguished from the more ephemeral state, known as "pleasure"), is that condition of human existence in which men and women approximate most closely to a complete realisation of their more abiding mental desires.

The general happiness of a group of human beings (termed "society") is most surely promoted by social organisation, which permits every responsible unit to pursue his or her own aims to attain to that condition, in any direction, and to whatever extent he or she may desire, up to that point at which any further extension would interfere with the equal freedom of others in a similar direction.

That limit is the point at which compromise must be exercised, to preserve social harmony in the group (society), and obviate conflict of interests among the units.

The limits to which the units of the group (society) can, without conflict, extend their exercise of liberty, depend upon the density of the social group; for, whilst one human being, living alone, as on an island, could do no wrong, each additional unit necessitates the restriction of the area—whether in concrete or abstract matters—within which the other units can exercise their individual freedom; until, as with physical freedom, in a dense crowd, there may be no liberty or "elbow room" possible.

The extent of liberty among the units of a community is more rapidly limited where uniformity in tastes or activities is enforced; for, in such case, each is exercising his tastes or activities in the same or similar directions, and covering a larger area; whereas, where greater freedom is permitted and exercised in more varied directions, the exercise of it will dovetail with, instead of overlapping, the exercise by others; and, thereby, a greater number can find satisfaction in a more limited area, and, as a result, a greater aggregate of satisfied desire will be possible in a similar area.

It follows from this fact, that the fullest amount of individual liberty that can be allowed to the units of society, is, in the end, the most economical for all; inasmuch as it encourages versatility of taste and desire among the units, in directions so varied as to involve less possible points of impingement.

Where men and women have enjoyed greater freedom in the development of their personality, they have more

rapidly acquired the habit of self-analysis or introspection, and, in time, have come to classify their desires and estimate their relative moral values and capabilities of producing lasting satisfaction, or in other words, happiness.

There comes a time, in ethical evolution, when men and women recognise the distinction between benefits bestowed on themselves, which may there end as Dead Sea fruit, and benefits conferred on others in whom they have a general or particular interest; in which latter event there is frequently a return effect, as in "bread cast on the waters."

At a later stage in ethical evolution, the satisfaction or pleasure, resulting from a benefit conferred on grounds of dependence (as in the case of offspring), on grounds of affection (as in the case of a wife), on grounds of parental sympathy (as in the case of a child to a parent), comes to be extended to friends, congenial companions, and ultimately the stranger, who seems to need and merit it (as in the case of philanthropy).

In this way there is a tendency, in free and highly civilised groups, for egoism to find an outlet in altruism or philanthropy, which comes to be recognised as a higher form of egoism, because of its concurrent effect in benefiting others, and, simultaneously, affording satisfaction to the benefactor.

Further detailed comments in regard to the characteristics already generally enumerated will be found to fall in place under other special heads.

CHAPTER III.

HUMAN EVOLUTION
(As Bearing on Man's Progress)

IF the doctrine of universal evolution—as a law operating throughout nature—be true, then man has developed, on an ascending grade, through untold and unrecorded ages.

But, irrespective of the scientific question as to man's biological origin, there can be no difference of opinion that, in the primitive forms, man must have undergone untold vicissitudes, including famine, disease, and disastrous conflict with his fellow men, by one or other, or all of which, those that were least "fit" for the struggle have disappeared, in numbers too vast for notation.

In his less animal but savage stages, man's coarse foods were taken direct from nature; his covering was no more than that which nature provided; his habitations consisted of caves and hollow trees; his social customs were little above those of the animals around him; whilst his religion was based on fear and superstition, produced by the sounds, forces, appearances, and other phenomena of nature, which he had not yet the knowledge to understand or account for.

Warfare of the most primitive character, against individuals and families who trespassed beyond their tribal limits, was then their highest calling throughout

life; and the making of weapons, the search for food, and the adornments, for purposes of warfare and personal vanity, were their chief industries.

The oft-repeated recurrence of nature's phenomena, such as thunder and lightning, storms, floods, disease, and famine, spread over centuries of time, gradually led to a modification of fear, and taught man various lessons of self-protection, leading to improved dwellings, more effective methods and appliances for the supply of foods, and a growing though primitive knowledge of the simpler human ailments. Tribes, hitherto antagonistic, in time softened their hostile feelings towards one another, and developed a practice of mutual exchange of their particular local products; the medicine man came into being with a special study of herbs and treatment, though still steeped in suspicion and superstition, and using his craft and its mysteries for personal or tribal ends; the economy of cultivation, and the domestication of animals, came to be recognised as a provision against famine; and a rough sort of tribal government, controlled by the recognised chief, was gradually developed.

During all this slow, primitive, possibly sometimes spasmodic, but, looked at over a long period of time, steady progress; the relentless principle of "the survival of the fittest" was operating, in weeding out those tribes which failed to solve the problem of social regulation, who either died out, through failing to combat nature's forces, or were decimated by stronger or more capable groups.

The operation of this principle of the survival of the fittest thus made more territorial room for those most

capable of meeting and combating the hostilities of neighbours, or of avoiding conflict with them; of providing against famine by enterprise and foresight; of averting the calamities of the extremes of climate and weather, by the invention of improved dwellings; of discovering the best means of coping with destructive diseases as they occurred; and, last but not least, of avoiding internal dissension, by adopting some methods of social organisation, and peaceful adjudication in tribal disputes.

At a later stage, there was developed a recognition of the right of individual property in the fruits of individual effort (at first in regard to ornaments and weapons, afterwards of more substantial, if less personal belongings, such as houses, canoes, etc.), and of the importance of securing to every unit in the community the fullest allowance of personal liberty, compatible with the equal liberty of other units of the tribe.

The recognition of the right of each individual or group to the liberty to pursue personal enterprises, and of the right of each individual or group to enjoy the fruits of his or their labour, involved the establishment of some rough untechnical tribunal of justice, probably consisting of one or more chiefs, whose decision must have been respected.

The work of such a tribunal, consisting of a chief or body of chiefs, in enquiring into and deciding the rights and wrongs of a tribal or individual dispute, constituted the germ of our modern law courts, as well as that of our legislative bodies of to-day; for it would, as a law court, have decided between conflicting units or groups as to the merits of the particular dispute, and would, simul-

taneously, be laying down, in however rough a manner, some general principle for the future guidance of the members of the tribe; thus gradually building up a crude code of laws or traditions.

A time would come when the tribe had developed into clans, a group of which, having put aside war as a primary occupation, would, instead, occupy themselves primarily over the cultivation of the soil, the domestication and breeding of stock, and the beginnings of industries required for the community. Thus the elements of a small nation would have been formed.

At a later stage the population of so successful a community would have spread over a wide area; so that a chief or body of chiefs would be unconditionally accepted as the best form of tribunal for making laws, and settling disputes which had already arisen. Then there would be (as we know there were) meetings of the people in the fields, to discuss public matters; and resolutions would be come to by the people as a whole, in co-operation with, or independently of, a chief or king, in order to lay down a satisfactory code for the guidance of members of the community. These would be the laws of the country; and, by this time, special provision would be made for hearing disputes or actions, as they arose, between units of the community.

At a later stage, when the community had grown too large to meet as a whole in the fields (as is done in some parts of Asia even to-day, and in an earlier age, in the old Anglo-Saxon communities), there was a movement to elect representatives, to devote special attention to the questions of tribal or national interests requiring to be dealt with; and when this stage of representative

government was reached, the people would be on the road to the conditions of a modern community. The principles laid down in the old adjudications of the community would continue to be respected, where applicable to existing conditions, and would exist as a body of traditions or precedents, similar to the common or "customary" law of England; the new laws, made by the Parliament, being as the Statute law of our own time.

CHAPTER IV.

MAN'S ORIGIN
(As Bearing on the Study of Human Nature)

THE study of man's biological origin has, in the past, been seriously discouraged, and even materially checked, by the fear of its leading to conclusions inconsistent with the traditional tenets of various religions, as to his unchanging and unchangeable nature.

The traditional beliefs regarding man's origin are not now regarded as unchallengeable, even by leading modern churchmen and theological authorities, who admit that strictly scientific investigations and conclusions must be respected.

Without entering further into this vexed philosophical and theological problem as to man's inherent spiritual nature; this can be said—that the scientific study of the truths of nature, including human nature, can never lead permanently to conclusions inconsistent with any religion, which itself is based on truth.

If that be so, the scientific study of man's origin, as a means of understanding his real nature, natural tendencies, and legitimate place in the order of the world's economy, should be pursued, irrespective of all forms of religious and superstitious embargo.

Man's obvious superiority over all other types of existing animal life is not in itself conclusive proof of

the absolute permanence, in the past, or in the future, of his present form and characteristics, or of his being the result of a separate and distinct act of creation, differentiating him from all other types.

If it were so, and, from any possible cause, all existing human nature and its traces were suddenly obliterated, the same process of reasoning might be used to establish the fixity or permanence of form and characteristics of the next highest type of animal life.

It is, nevertheless, the universal verdict of all recognised biologists, that the bodily characteristics of man, and of other forms of animal life, are, in their embryonic stages, practically undistinguishable, and only cease to be identical in later stages of their development.

Light is thrown on the problem of man's origin by the fact, universally recognised by all leading biologists, that he is now undergoing slow and gradual, but distinct physical and mental changes, and losing, by a process of gradual atrophy, many of his physical characteristics, which have, in the past, identified him with many other forms of animal life.

Modern scientific opinion is unanimous also that man, in common with many other forms of animal life, is undergoing a gradual process of evolutionary development, from a less to a more complex form.

Human remains have been found and traced through a number of "links"—sufficient for scientific demands—in the chain of development, from the stage which allies man with certain advanced animal forms up to the recognised civilised form.

The period required for such a process of evolution is not regarded as a logical difficulty; since scientists

of the more conservative and less speculative *a priori* school, such as Lord Kelvin, have estimated the period of the world's history, since life of any kind could have first existed on its cooling crust, at many hundreds of millions of years ; and numerous scientists of reputation have estimated the ages of well-known human remains, found in different parts of the world, in calculable geological strata, at at least many hundreds of thousands of years.

Such periods are so far beyond human comprehension that the ratio of steady progress, over the few thousands of years covered in the oldest of human historical records, would be almost infinitesimal.

It may be said to follow from these premises that man is not a "fixed" quantity in his nature and characteristics, as a distinct and differentiated branch of creation, but has advanced from a primitive and inferior form up, through a long succession of evolutionary steps ; and, further, that he is now undergoing a slow but steady and continuous "ascent," in both mind and body, not even vaguely anticipated in the present day, by the generality of men and women. Nor need this interfere with the outlook of the more rigidly orthodox school of thought as to man's origin ; for the possibility of further ascent of human nature, into higher regions of civilisation, culture, and altruism, is in no way incompatible with the beliefs of that orthodox school as to man's separate creation and distinct spiritual nature.

The conclusion that man, as we know him, in the twentieth century, has gradually developed or evolved from an extremely low form, in which "self" was the

dominant note of all his activities; and that the same process, by means of which he has reached his present condition of civilisation, gives every promise of his future ascent to a still higher level—these conclusions are all-important and inspiring, as factors in the high calling of true statesmanship; by which civilisation may be further promoted, and society, in its political sense, may be further uplifted hereafter, in all the best interpretations of the term.

These characteristics and physical and mental possibilities in man, depending largely for their evolution upon his own efforts to acquire further knowledge of his own nature, and of the nature of the world and universe around him, demonstrate the need for the maximum measure of personal freedom, for each and for all alike; so that every facility may be afforded to those by whom the mysteries of nature may be probed, discovered, and utilised, in every possible way open to ingenuity and invention; so as to obtain for mankind the greatest possible control over the hidden forces of nature, capable of contributing to his individual and collective welfare.

The conviction is that man has not travelled, in his development, along a horizontal line of progress since he was created, thus retaining the identical bodily and mental characteristics, with which he started, though in a more cultivated form; but that he has come up from a much lower plane of being to his present altruistically-inclined nature and character, from a lower form of animal life, in which the motives of "self" and self-preservation, dominated every activity. This conviction surely affords a powerful argument in support of a theory of man's

prospective continuous ascent, and supplies a splendid note of encouragement for philanthropists and humanitarians, to go on and help the human race to reach a higher and still higher plane of civilisation and mental and moral cultivation: having in view a time to come, when each unit of society shall recognise and acknowledge that the welfare of all is involved in the egoism or rational self-interest of each.

CHAPTER V.

HUMAN GOVERNMENT

THE acme of human government, according to anarchical ideals, is that a man should govern himself, which means that he should be allowed to "do as he likes," with no law or influence, but those of nature, to restrict him in his activities. But this would only be possible where, as in the case of Defoe's hero—Robinson Crusoe—one person lived alone on an island. Where there are many men and women who desire, or are forced, to live together, this anarchical state of things would obviously be impossible, for it would inevitably result in struggle and conflict, and ultimate mutual destruction, if reason did not prevail. The nearest approximation to it would be a mutual arrangement, by which each one was permitted to do as he or she wished, subject to the equal right of every other person to do as he or she wished, subject, again, to the same restriction or limitation; and this would involve an all-round mutual curtailment of individual rights, according to which each would enjoy the fullest freedom, up to the point at which the extended exercise of that freedom would bring the one individual into conflict with another.

Therefore, where men and women are grouped together in a modern democratic community, they must, if they

wish to remain members of it and enjoy its advantages, be reconciled to limit their activities to a sort of series of circular areas, within which circles they are satisfied to limit the exercise of their freedom; and, if they wish to live peaceably and harmoniously together, they must so arrange among themselves as to avoid allowing the edge of any one circle to overlap another. This is a sort of diagrammatic illustration of the social, political, or legal needs and limitations of human society.

Therefore, the legitimate scope and province of statecraft, as I have endeavoured to define it; that is to say, the "whole duty" of the politician, comprehensively considered, is reducible to two general heads.

1. So to use the regulating or law-making powers which a community vests in him, as one of its governing body, that, whilst preserving harmony in the relation of its members towards one another, each individual member should have guaranteed to him or her the fullest possible measure of individual liberty, in the pursuit of his or her own ends, and in the solution of the problems of life in his or her own way: compatible, always, with an equal measure of freedom being enjoyed by each and all of his or her fellow citizens.

2. So to organise and maintain the defensive forces of the community, and so conduct the community's relations with other communities, that its corporate interests and peaceful progress may be secured against the danger of aggression from without.

A detailed examination of any legislative or regulating proposal, whether of a socialistic or individualistic character, will prove the soundness of these two generalisations; for the socialist and the individualist are alike

in their aims in this one respect: that they both profess to champion the cause of the individual or social unit of the community, though the former advocates a more restricted limitation on the activities or exercised liberties of each unit, in order to lessen the struggle for existence of the "less fit" in their competition with the "more fit," when on equal terms.

The fact that this championship by the socialist, wherever successful, is to discourage, and ultimately lessen, the energy and enterprise of the "more fit," and, in the end, lead ultimately to *lowered racial standards*, does not disprove the contention that the individual or unit is ultimately the professed concern of both schools of political thought.

The art of regulating the conduct of the members of a community, so as to secure the before-mentioned results, involves a full knowledge of the particular type or types of human nature, of which the community to be governed is constituted; that is to say, the stage of civilisation of its people, their history and traditions, their national characteristics, their religious convictions, their superstitions, their habits and customs, and their national aspirations; and it equally involves a knowledge of the national character, national aims, national prejudices, and national capabilities of those outside communities, against whose possible aggression precautions may need to be taken and maintained.

Human nature in general, therefore, in regard to both its abiding characteristics and its possible developments, under abnormal but feasible circumstances, becomes one of the primary studies of all who desire to become versed in the art of statecraft.

The art of statecraft, more particularly defined, further involves a study of the most successful method of regulating and co-ordinating the activities of the individuals who co-operate in the formation of a civilised community, so as to offer the fullest encouragement to the cultivation and development of the various and varying talents and capabilities, which are most successfully nurtured in an atmosphere of freedom. Generally speaking, no citizen of a modern society is bound to remain as one of its members; for he may, if he wish, and if he possess the means, go forth to some other portion of the world, and live apart from his fellows. But, if he choose to remain in any particular civilised community, he tacitly agrees to fall in with the code and limitations of conduct laid down by the governing power of that community, for regulating the relationship of one citizen to another, or of one class of citizens to other classes. Those codes of conduct or laws vary from time to time, in accordance with the growth and progress, or in some cases, the decadence, of the community; or in accordance with the desire of those who happen to direct the governing power for the time being. For it should be remembered that, under unwise government, in which the less law-abiding citizens are overindulged in their disregarding of the law; the decadence may be so gradual as to be unnoticeable to the less reflective in any one generation; and yet the standards of national character may, to the more observant, be surely sinking; so that, in a few generations, the national tone may be lowered to the point of possible national danger, and certainly national inferiority, in comparison with other communities.

The art of statecraft, in another aspect, is the art of regulating the activities of a community, so as to facilitate each of its units in his or her individual capacity, as well as the community as a whole, in attaining to the largest measure of security and happiness, compatible always with the equal opportunity for enjoyment, in a like measure, by all other members. In order to secure this end, it is obviously essential that the statesman should understand the nature and average morale of the individual citizens who form the community which he is called upon to assist in governing; and the wisdom of his actions and advice in that respect will depend upon the accuracy and extent of his knowledge of the actual nature and law-abiding susceptibilities in the matter of government, of those individuals who compose the community. Human nature, therefore, in whatever aspect the province of statecraft be viewed, becomes one of the first and most indispensable subjects of study, in order that the characteristics of man in all his varieties may be fully taken into account.

If man were so altruistically constituted that his first thought was always for others, and his last thought for his own welfare; he would need to be schooled by his governors to consider his own self-preservation, as the basis of his continued existence; but, if, on the other hand, he is so egoistically constituted that self-preservation, even to the extreme of self-indulgence, is one of the first impulses of his nature, involving, frequently, disregard for the welfare of others; then the governing power needs to consider the best means of allowing him to preserve and develop himself and his individuality, whilst, at the same time, constraining him,

as far as it is necessary, in regard to his tendency to subordinate the interests of his fellows to his own. If the governing power recognises that the members of the community to be governed are but the latest links in a long chain of human evolution and ascending development, in which man's selfish characteristics were originally restricted only by the physical superiority of his competitors; then that innate tendency may require to be carefully and judiciously checked by the governing power, though, possibly, in such a way as not to prevent him from doing full justice to himself as an individual, in the direction of his own legitimate betterment and uplifting. In this way, the origin and development of human nature generally, so far as it can be investigated, becomes an important, if not a primary factor in the art of government; and, in the same way, it becomes necessary to closely study man's many other characteristics, egoistic as well as altruistic, in order, not only to avoid the tendency of a weak governing power to allow him to abuse his personal liberty, but also to avoid nurturing him so as to encourage him to neglect to discipline himself, and become dependent on his fellows, individually or collectively.

Whatever may be the statesman's view of man's origin in a biological sense, the study of human characteristics involves an investigation of the process by which he has, by slow stages, developed from a lower and less civilised condition; and, if it be possible to find in his nature certain tendencies which will enable him to ascend to a still higher plane of civilisation and social culture than he has yet reached; the attention of the governing power should be ever watchful of them,

and of the necessity for avoiding any undue interference with their cultivation; so that they may stand out as guides or object lessons for the aspirations of their fellows, and as factors in the uplifting of the moral standards of the particular community, whose successful government is under consideration.

CHAPTER VI.

MAN'S ASCENT

THE title of this chapter might, for a moment, lead the reader to suppose that an attempt was about to be made to invest human nature with ethereal attributes that would unfit him for this workaday world; but it will be seen, by what follows, that no such impracticable purpose is intended, and that nothing more is sought than to show that man's worldly career is, apart from the almost universal belief in his spiritual nature, an ever-upward one, in regard to strictly mundane characteristics alone; and that, far from having reached the top note in human culture and worldly improvement, he has still before him an upward course, with as steep a vertical slope as that along which he has travelled in past ages from the lowest type of barbarism to the highest form of mind culture and moral achievement.

Man, like every other form of animal life, is and has ever been, undergoing ceaseless changes in body and mind. That may be accepted as the uniform and universal conclusion of all the world's greatest scientific thinkers; and it has become a fundamental truth of human knowledge, whether we accept or reject the doctrine of human evolution from the lower forms of animal life.

The line of man's evolution has been one of gradual ascent—one movement being upwards, in regard to greater complexity of organisation, and consequent increased capabilities, and another and contemporaneous movement being lateral, in regard to time ; so that if his career in the past be reduced to diagrammatic form, his resultant course of progress has sloped diagonally across the ages : as time has passed horizontally, man has moved vertically, so that the resultant is oblique, if viewed across the chart of universal history.

The ascent to a higher form has been in the direction of an increased dexterity in the functions most frequently and actively exercised, and of gradual atrophy of the functions consciously or unconsciously allowed to fall into disuse.

The best biological authorities of the twentieth century enumerate upwards of one hundred functions of the body that are slowly but surely undergoing this process of atrophy; and the latest and most outspoken of these authorities is Metchnikoff, who succeeded Pasteur as head of the scientific institute that bears that great man's name ; and that estimate is fully set out in his (Metchnikoff's) work on *The Nature of Man.*

The conviction is now almost universal among thinkers of scientific temperament, that man has not moved along a horizontal line of progress since he was created ; and that he has not retained his original bodily and mental characteristics, but has come up to the level of his present altruistically-disposed nature and character from a much lower form of animal life, in which the motive-elements of "self" and "self-preservation" originally dominated every activity. This conviction, if it be

sound, affords a powerful logical support to the hopeful and elevating theory of man's prospective and continuous ascent, and supplies a splendid note of encouragement—quite independently of the larger problem of man's strictly spiritual attributes—for philanthropical and humanitarian minds to push on and help the human race in its yearnings and aspirations for a higher and nobler plane of civilisation, refinement, and moral uplifting, having in view a time to come when each unit shall recognise and acknowledge that the welfare and abiding happiness of all is involved in the rational egoism—which connotes altruism—of each.

Whatever be the view entertained, in regard to the actual origin of man; the aim is the same; except that those who accept the theory of evolution, in its universal sense, have a more scientific ground for believing in the theory of "ascent," to almost unlimited heights, in man's intellectual and moral improvement.

Sir John Herschel was of opinion that "in whatever state of knowledge we may conceive man to be placed, his progress towards a yet higher state need never fear a check, but must continue till the last existence of society." And that supremely-balanced logician, John Stuart Mill, in his *Autobiography*, considers that "poverty in any sense, implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and providence of the individuals." He was so sanguine in regard to the future of man, that he thought that "most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits."

One important aspect of man's progress has been in the direction of acquiring increased knowledge of nature and the working of the laws of nature, and of obtaining greater control over their forces; also in relieving the mind and the nervous system of much of their wasteful expenditure, resulting from such disturbing influences as fear, superstition, anger, and useless intellectual speculation concerning problems clearly beyond man's present solving powers.

It must ever be remembered, in pursuing such studies, that human progress is not observable in regard to individual men, over the short space of time of which human records have been preserved; but it is observable in regard to the average condition of the masses of the people, when we compare the physical comfort, the extended liberties, and the improved social status of the least intelligent and least civilised classes of the twentieth century with those of ancient Egyptian, Grecian, or Roman times, or even that of our own painted and skin-clad British ancestors of 2,000 years ago, with the average British citizen of our own time.

Human progress in social economy is observable in the now almost universal abolition of slavery; in the comparative cessation and more humanitarian methods of national warfare among the truly "higher" ranks of nations; in the slowly-growing use of arbitration, now apparently spreading to international proportions, as a substitute for conflict; in the widespread cessation of unauthorised punishment; in the diminished arbitrary power of monarchs, and in the corresponding gradual assumption by the people of the government of themselves; in the widespread education of the people; in the marvellous

progress of science in relation to medicine, surgery, and sanitation; in the purification of foods, in the increased economy, safety, and rapidity of traffic by land, sea, and air; in the scientific multiplication and increased penetration of human sight, in the microscopic purposes of astronomy, biology, mineralogy, anatomy, physiology, botany, and zoology; and in the consequent increase and rectification of human knowledge and intellectual perspective, bearing on every department of human welfare; and, generally, and almost most important of all, in the *sanctification of truth* as the goal of all scientific investigations.

In moral philosophy, thinking men and women have discovered the egoistic and satisfying value of altruism, and come to understand the danger to man's racial progress, of relieving enervated human nature of the invigorating and vitalising effects of the discipline of self-help, self-reliance, and self-dependence.

In mental philosophy, thinking men and women have discovered the paralysing intellectual effects of bias and prejudice upon the mind, in the search for the truth of things, and have come to recognise the higher intellectual plane of tolerance towards other races, other religions, other philosophies, other national standards of art, literature, morality, music, and manners.

In philosophy, thinking men and women have come to realise the futility of the avaricious struggle for wealth; the degrading influence and reflex results of wasteful and vulgar expenditure and ostentatious personal decoration. The health-giving and life-prolonging results of simple rational living; and the incalculable superiority of abiding forms of happiness, that come without calling,

as compared with the garish and palling pleasures and ephemeral gratifications that need to be pursued.

In political science, thinking men and women have discovered that the scientific study of the history of the past is as a lantern, to light the way to the solution of new and future problems, and that the most truly progressive form of government is that in which the units of society are disciplined, by freedom carefully guarded in all directions, to govern themselves, under a judicious system of checks upon the abuse of equal rights in others ; that the most complete social economy is that which leaves human enterprise as much as possible to find its own channels, and to travel along them as the people's requirements seem to demand, so long as the equal liberties of others are similarly respected ; that it is beneficial to interfere by laws and regulations, as little as possible, compatible with the equal freedom of all ; and to afford the utmost liberty to each and all to work out their own careers, their own individual tastes, and their own destinies, as they may think best.

It is inevitable that the widespread distribution of the governing power among the people, will, as it has already done, lead to errors of judgment, crude misconceptions, superficial miscalculations, and hasty and injurious legislative abuses on matters of government ; but they will be what Macaulay calls the "back wash" of human progress ; whilst the general movement, as the result of accumulated political experience, will, notwithstanding, be in a forward direction, towards a more enlightened condition of human well-being.

Although the evolution of the institution of self-government may produce many vicissitudes, and many

of them result in stupendous social cataclysms by the way, such as the French Revolution; the general trend of the future of man may be relied upon to be in an ascending line, in which the highest and most far-seeing types will, as ever, stand out from the rest of mankind, as mountain peaks rearing their heads above the hills and valleys of ordinary human beings; but the general level of those hills and valleys will be found to have risen above that which they occupied in the past; and, when studied closely, the units will be found to have acquired a larger degree of self-respect and altruistic consciousness.

The following propositions must be carefully borne in mind, in judging as to the soundness and feasibility of the optimistic prospect presented in this chapter: First, that, in it, no more is anticipated than the "bridging" of the chasm that now separates the lowest and most degraded forms of human nature to be found in the world to-day, from the morally noblest, most cultivated, and rationally altruistic types to be found in its most civilised communities. Those who accept the doctrine of social evolution will readily acknowledge that the more or less remote ancestors of the cultured and ethically nobler classes of to-day were at one time on the same plane as the now lowest and most degraded class, from which they and their progenitors have emerged in an ascending scale; and if it were possible for that ascent to have taken place from certain units of the lowest known types, to the highest as indicated; it requires no stretch of conjecture to recognise the feasibility of *all* future generations reaching the same plane of character and conduct of the present-highest. Before that

transformation of the world's population has had time to be realised—and it may involve centuries to complete—the theories surrounding the doctrine of eugenics will have been put into practice; so that the world will be saved the perpetuation of the more impossible lineages.

If the soundness of the preceding line of reasoning be admitted; it is not difficult to realise a whole world of men and women of the highest known types of our own day—a world freed from avarice, vulgar ambition, unreasonable self-seeking, and from an overwhelming desire to single themselves out from their fellows by ostentation and other forms of vainglory and display. A world, made up of men and women who earnestly joined in the making and careful observance of wise and scientific laws, could and would, in due time, reduce to a minimum, if not put an end to, all forms of trespass on the equal rights of their fellow beings—whether in regard to tangible things or in abstract matters of opinion and taste. Then would be reached a condition of things in which it would be realised that, as Herbert Spencer once said, the object of all laws was to render laws ultimately unnecessary. The biographies of many remarkable men and women, whose whole careers proved that their happiness was found in their own inner sense of modest contentment, will, if carefully studied, show that their wants were simple, and free from the aggressive spirit; and that they always readily surrendered, in their own individual natures, all desires that involved conflict or interference with the rights, feelings, or tastes of others, who reciprocated the same spirit.

It will be seen that such natures fully and openly admitted in all directions the rights of others to find an

outlet for their own particular tastes, however varied they might be: practising the tolerance and the spirit of "give and take" in every channel of mental and bodily activity, and in all things recognising and practising justice and goodwill to those who moved about them. If all the world can some day reach that happy and chivalrous state of things—all of which is feasible and practicable—then the future will indeed be a time in which many of us would desire to live.

The great European War, through which the world has just passed—the greatest, the most decimating, and the most wasteful that human history has ever chronicled—is, apart from the terrors and the anguish with which it has been accompanied, one of the greatest tributes to the raised moral attitude of our collective human nature. It has been, if viewed in a broad spirit, a mammoth struggle between gross egoism, on the part of a nation inflated with its own sense of superiority, and practically the rest of the civilised world, imbued with a fine sense of national duty and altruistic disinterestedness, which found almost universal expression in a determination to resent the selfish domination of a powerful war-worshipping race over smaller peace-loving races and communities, which, without the world's help, would have been swallowed up in a maelstrom of blood and iron.

The nature of the international settlement that has been arrived at shows that neither of the salving nations sought personal or national aggrandisement, but only wished to punish appropriately the selfish peoples who attempted to perpetuate an inherited code of "might" dominating "right." The world has now, at

incalculable loss, vindicated the principle of the superiority of "right" over "might" and brute force, and so reversed, in regard to human affairs, a cruel law that hitherto and to-day rages rampant among the lower forms of animal life. It may be well and truly said that the millions of justly disposed people, who gave their lives in aid of so righteous a conflict, died not merely for their country, which is compatible with an unjust war-purpose, but in vindication of the greatest and most widespread moral issue that the world has ever known.

BOOK II.

HUMAN RECORDS

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CHAPTER I.

HUMAN RECORDS
Their Bearing on the Art of Statecraft

WHETHER man be considered as a fixed and unchangeable portion of creation, distinct from all other forms of animal life, or as one only of its innumerable forms, undergoing, like the rest, a continuous evolution or exfoliation through the ages, from a lower to a higher type; this fundamental truth is universally acknowledged in all thinking communities: that there are certain human characteristics that have been common to all races, in all ages: characteristics that spring from the principle of life itself; from the needs imposed by the everlasting struggle for existence, and from the indispensable needs upon which human existence itself depends.

These universal characteristics have caused man's progress in all ages, and under all circumstances, to present many similar results of a general character, in regard to his struggle with nature; his native curiosity; his more deliberate search for truth; his uncountable successful and unsuccessful attempts at social organisation; his material aims, and his vaguer and more remote aspirations.

In this slow but gradual progress towards a more enlightened solution of life's problems, man has left behind him many records in many forms, from which we can learn of his successes and failures in these various

struggles towards higher planes of knowledge, and improved conditions of life.

We speak of "a man of experience," of "an expert," of a "specialist," of "a wise man," of "one who knows"—all expressions of a recognition of the value of individual knowledge of what has happened in the remote or immediate past, as a means of throwing light on the possibilities and probabilities of the future. We can speak with equal truth of human history, which, if accurately recorded, correctly read, and properly interpreted, throws light on the probabilities of the future in regard to human affairs.

Professor Stubbs, the famous constitutional historian —one of the most accurate and acute students of human records—has forcibly expressed this latter thought. He says: "The history of Institutions presents, in every branch, a regularly developed series of causes and consequences, and abounds in examples of that continuity of life, the realisation of which is necessary to give the reader a personal hold on the past, and a right judgment of the present."

To attempt to solve the sociological problems of our own generation, without availing ourselves of a knowledge of the successes and failures of other generations and other peoples, would be to ignore the experiences of all others but ourselves ; to refuse to follow the successful examples of those who have preceded us, and to persist in the sociological blunders that have been demonstrated in the world's groping for the truth of things.

History therefore ; that is, human records of all kinds, whether in the form of pre-historic data, written history

in its various forms, or history, such as can be read in the practical activities of man, about and around us—all these throw important lights on the problems of to-day and of to-morrow, and are therefore part of the proper and indispensable study of those who seek to become versed in the art of statecraft. For, inasmuch as the true aim of politics is to devise means for preventing a repetition of past sociological blunders, or for securing, wherever possible, a recurrence of events that have proved beneficial to other communities ; the records of those past blunders, and of their causes ; as well as of the beneficial events of the past and their causes also, are like lanterns to lighten a doubtful way. And, apart from this form of guidance for immediate purposes, many historical events throw floods of light on the less immediate problems, as to the origin, nature, and future of man, and so teach us more of the unit—man—with which statesmanship is concerned. As Lord Acton has said, in his *Study of History :* "The knowledge of the past, the record of truths revealed by experience, is eminently practical, as an instrument of action, and a power that goes to the making of the future." History then ; that is, recorded human experience of all kinds, is, or ought to be the "bible" of the politician ; and to that extent to which he studies it, and the lessons it affords, does he approach the higher planes of "statecraft" or "statesmanship" as distinguished from mere "politics."

There is no royal road to the true understanding of history. There is no such thing as an inherent knowledge of it ; though mental activity, the faculty for concentration, and the advantages of a clear and logical mind render its understanding more readily attainable. John

Stuart Mill said that "No political conclusions of any value for practice could be arrived at by direct experience." The mind that "jumps at conclusions"; that is "impatient of details"; or that mistakes verbal fluency of speech for accuracy of judgment—all these characteristics are positive dangers in statesmanship, and lead the politician into a quagmire of errors, which, in public affairs, may be the means of producing inmeasurable injury and uncountable misfortunes to the body-politic, in whose concerns such a politician takes part.

To read correctly the remote history of man, so as to be able to deduce from it useful lessons for application to modern events, necessitates also a knowledge of the broad principles of philosophy, and some conception of the scientific evolution of the human race; to read correctly ancient and modern history, as recorded in literature, and to be able to take from it no more and no less than is helpful, as throwing light on current events, necessitates also some knowledge of the relative merits of the writers of history, and their accuracy as to authorities, their normality in using their facts, and their freedom from mere literary ostentation in presenting them to their readers.

Few men, who occupy themselves over practical politics, are able to devote sufficient time to the careful study of this important aspect of statesmanship; and of those who could afford the time, a large proportion are seduced by the showier side of political life, on account of its contributing more to their immediate popularity than does the quiet and careful sagacity that results from the deeper reading of political history and philosophy.

A review of the names of the men of the past, who have,

in their time, enjoyed political prominence, will show that the deeper students of history, with the sounder political judgment that resulted, have left behind them more abiding reputations, than have those who adopted more superficial and *ad captandum* methods of commending themselves to the particular generations in which they lived.

If, as there is good reason to believe, human affairs are gradually, though slowly, improving, through such influences as a wider spread of education, a further cheapening of the better kinds of literature, and the consequent infusion of a better sense of the value of political science ; it may be that, in the future, the advantages of historical studies, as a light to the people's feet in darker roads, will be more clearly appreciated, and that they will look more and more insistently for a larger measure of such knowledge in their public men.

CHAPTER II.

PREHISTORIC DATA
Their Teachings

PREHISTORIC data consist of a variety of materials and traditions from which we are able to formulate theories of the manner of man's life in the world, before he himself had begun to leave behind him, intentionally, anything that recorded his presence in it.

History, in the broader sense of the term, comprehends all those forms of written records, whether on paper, papyrus, leaves, stones, or other more or less lasting material, on which man has attempted to chronicle what he deemed to be important events—of what he did, tried to do, hoped, feared, imagined, believed, or suspected.

The preserved records of this kind do not date back beyond an infinitesimal portion of the period over which man, in a primitive or civilised condition, has lived on the globe.

The history of man, from the remote time in which he emerged from the animal or the barbaric form, up to that stage in which he was capable of depicting, in some way or other, so as to be transmissible to others, the records of his thoughts, hopes, fears, desires, imaginings, or doings, can only be ascertained in our own day by scientifically tracing the evolution of language, or by studying a variety of material objects, the existence and

nature of which mark man's presence on the earth, and indicate to some extent his nature, whereabouts, and manner of living, *i.e.*, his own bones, or other remains deposited with his own, his weapons, his boats, his habitations. These archæological remains indicate, in the view of recognised scientists, that man, as man, in however primitive a form, has lived on the earth at least hundreds of thousands of years.

The variety of material employed in these various objects, shows that, in the earliest stages at which man first supplemented his own bodily powers, by using other objects as tools or weapons, he resorted to stone, wood, or shells, which he found at first hand about him; and thatit was not till subsequent ages that he discovered the art of shaping stone to suit his purposes better; and still later that he discovered the secret of producing metals for similar purposes.

Many of the earliest records of the later periods of man's life on the earth, which themselves come under the head of "Written History," show that, ages before those written records begin to appear, he must have domesticated various animals and birds for his use, and discovered the possibilities of cultivating the soil for what it would produce.

Many of the earliest records indicating man's presence on the earth show that he did, at a much earlier period, acquire the practice of propitiating the forces and phenomena of nature—as "gods"—which he was unable yet to understand; and that the then unexplained and unexplainable phenomena formed the basis of human wonder, fear, and superstition, which lay at the root of most of the primitive religions of the world.

There is another acknowledged sidelight in regard to primitive and unrecorded human history; for it is recognised by all the leading writers on anthropology, archæology, and primitive man; viz., that we can safely assume that the original peoples, out of which modern civilised nations have evolved, passed through conditions of social development very similar to, if not identical with, those that we see in existence to-day among primitive peoples, in various parts of the world.

It may therefore be concluded that the different races of the world have advanced along the line of development or evolution at considerably differing ratios of progress, but, nevertheless, with so much in common in the nature and sequence of their different stages of advancement, that primitive races of our own time may be safely regarded as counterparts of the infant stages of our advanced society of to-day. And thus they serve as educational examples of what men might be forced to revert to, by sacrificing the results of centuries of civilisation, and resolving themselves and their fellows into their elemental conditions.

That this method of ascertaining the nature of our own early social conditions, by studying the existing conditions of primitive tribes of our own time, is a fairly safe guide, is testified by excellent authorities. Sir Edward Tylor, the author of several works on prehistoric man, says: "A fair knowledge may be had of what early rules of property were like by ascertaining what they are like in the uncivilised world still"; and Lord Avebury (then Sir John Lubbock) says in his work on *Primitive Man:* "The condition and habits of existing savages resemble in many ways, though not in all, those of our

ancestors in a period long gone by." Morgan, too, in his *Ancient Society* says: "Since mankind were one in origin, their career has been essentially one; running in different but uniform channels, upon all continents; and similarly in all the tribes and nations of mankind."

The careless or superficial thinker, who "takes things as they come," and gives little heed to the causes by which our twentieth century civilisation was laboriously reached, or is now maintained, would consider such primitive human history devoid of interest or use in his time; but in truth, it is full of lessons for all who value the maintenance of the present social status, and desire to see the community in which they live kept at, or advanced beyond, its present level of order and progress.

In the first place, a study of primitive man will emphasise the important fact, that the difference between barbarism and civilisation, with all the miseries of the one, and all the advantages of the other, has not come to pass by magic, but has been the result of steady, patient growth, through centuries of order, recurring organisation, subdued anarchy, alleviated injustices, and continuous readjustment, where growing abuses were likely to lead to social unrest and possible dismemberment. These adjustments and readjustments, from time to time, during the process of growth, have involved thought and judgment in the rulers for the time being, without which the community would have fallen back, if not entirely out of the race of communities. If these facts are impressed upon the student of primitive history, by dwelling on the conditions of man in his prehistoric stages, much error will be avoided in dealing with modern conditions.

It will be seen, too, that this progress, from primitive to civilised conditions of society, has demanded at all times the encouragement of individual energy, enterprise, and initiative; as a means to which those who exerted themselves had to have secured to them freedom of locomotion, freedom to think how best to do the things they set their hearts upon, freedom to actually do the things they desired, subject to the rights of others; and above all, continuous assurance, guaranteed by the community as a whole, that when they were done, those who did them should enjoy the fruits of the efforts, enterprise, thought, and ingenuity which they had put forth as individual members of the community.

These needs of social progress go to the very root of civilisation, and are now indicated, and often expressed glibly by people who do not realise their full significance, in such phrases as "Liberty, Property, Security." Even the once-notorious "Tom Paine," who was afterwards prosecuted for his revolutionary writings, claimed these advantages for society in his *Rights of Man*. He said: "The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and unprescriptable rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression."

CHAPTER III.

WRITTEN HISTORY

Its Application to the Study of Statecraft

THE written history of man's doings in the world acquaints us with but an infinitesimal portion—in point of time—of his past activities, calamities, doubts, errors, hopes, fears, beliefs, imaginings, superstitions, aspirations.

Written history includes not only that which has been intentionally recorded for strictly historical purposes, in a variety of dead and living languages, but a vast and accumulating mass of pictures and hieroglyphics; of general literature, not intentionally historical; as well as of subsequent attempted dicipherings and interpretations of inscriptions on ancient monuments, and architectural and other remains of bygone, and otherwise unknown peoples.

Written history includes also a large body of writings, which have come down to us from ancient and later times, in which they were written; wherein are described, or reflected, the traditions, manners, customs and circumstances of the writers' contemporaries.

Portions of the written history, which have been intended as records of the past, are inaccurately compiled; in some instances by reason of want of care in

studying or interpreting the original documentary evidence from which its supposed facts are drawn; in other instances, by reason of the historian's relying on hearsay statements, and recording them as authentic.

In a large part of Eastern history, imagination has been substituted for facts; and the conclusions drawn from those imaginings have been little more than the pious aspirations of the writers; for the East has ever been the nursery of legend, and, to a great extent, the burial-ground of many unpalatable facts of human history.

Other portions of written history are practically useless except as works of imagination; because they record events as causes and effects, in regard to which there is no such relationship; or they attribute to supernatural agencies events which never took place, or which obviously resulted from natural causes.

Many portions of carefully compiled history are untrustworthy, on account of the writer having been so biassed in favour of some cause or party, that he has consciously or unconsciously, distorted the facts, or misinterpreted the motives of the persons concerned in his record.

A further, most frequent shortcoming in historical writings, is the tendency of the historian to devote a disproportionate amount of attention to the purely personal or heroic aspects of his subject, in order to interest or excite the popular reader.

The writings of many historians are of little or no value for political purposes, by reason of their want of perspective in presenting the facts of the past in their true proportion to one another.

Many historians, again, fail to present a true picture of the surrounding circumstances of an important event, by means of which to supply to their readers the real reasons which led to its occurrence.

In order, therefore, to obtain from the use of history its highest purpose—that of reading modern events in the light of the economic and sociological laws which the true history of the past illustrates, it is essential to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy records; and this is one of the most difficult tasks confronting the student.

It is essential also, in using the history of the past, as a guide to the present or future, to avoid drawing complete parallels between series of events, and to limit the use of parallel or analogy to the deduction of trends or tendencies in human affairs, or for purposes of political caution in legislation or diplomacy.

A "little knowledge" of history is the most dangerous of all intellectual attainments, in begetting undue political and legislative confidence, and in the careless use of what are hastily supposed to be parallel circumstances.

The supposed teachings of history—even where scientifically written—need therefore to be studied with care and accuracy, and to be used with the utmost caution, in view of its numerous and misleading characteristics.

We have dealt with the subject of history, as if the knowledge of it, for purposes of statecraft, was more particularly applicable to that class of writings which the superficial reader knows by that definite title; but it is necessary to point out that current English literature is prolific in writings of an equally, if not more valuable kind to the political and sociological student. These are

in the nature of systematic generalisations from historical data; which, in fact, use history for the identical purpose for which the student himself does or ought to use it; that is to say: in order to discover the "tendencies" of human activities as recorded in historical works, strictly so called, with a view to their application to present times. And if this work of generalisation has been well done by the writers of this class of works, it is an economy to the student to use them for his purpose; as they gather up available data over a wider area—probably from many more languages and national histories—than the student himself can command, or have access to, or would have time to consult.

Among the notable historical works to which I have referred, as being other than "history" in the popular sense, and yet as affording valuable historical generalisations, from which so much can be learned by the political student, is Buckle's *History of Civilisation in England.* There are a few writers who affect to speak disparagingly of this great work, but they have not ventured to justify their criticism, beyond stating that its writer failed to accomplish even a tithe of the stupendous programme which he announced, when he published his first three volumes. He died quite suddenly, when travelling for his health, but his work had already created an "extraordinary sensation." Buckle enumerated over a thousand comparatively modern works, from which he professed to have drawn the materials for his then remarkable conclusions. In his undoubtedly great work he demonstrated the mechanical character of human activities, because of their being governed by well-known physical and mental laws; and he contended, from those facts,

that both those sets of laws needed to be studied, in order to deal properly with the regulation of human affairs. He drew illustrations from a great variety of countries, in order to show that climate, food, soil, and the aspects of nature, played important parts in forming and influencing national character; and that, while some peoples were governed by their imagination, others were more subject to their understandings: in each case as the result of their natural environment. He showed, by a rich variety of illustrations from history, how the progress of knowledge diminished the tendency to persecution, and the war-like spirit; and how increased knowledge disinclined the leading minds of a community to devote themselves to military occupations. He analysed the influence of religion, literature, and government, upon various peoples, and gave illustrations of his arguments from the histories of Germany, America, France, Spain, and Scotland. He showed that "the accusation which the historian is bound to bring against every government which had hitherto existed, is that it has overstepped its proper functions, and, at each step, done incalculable harm." He contends that "all speculations must be erroneous, that ascribe the progress of Europe to the wisdom of its rulers"; for, he adds, "No government having recognised its proper limits; the result is that every government has inflicted on its subjects great injuries." He arrives at another bold generalisation, which no serious student of statesmanship can afford to ignore, without examining his data and arguments; that "legislators, in every attempt to protect some particular interests, and to uphold some particular principles, have not only failed, but have

brought about results diametrically opposite to those which they proposed." Again, in dealing with the French Revolution, the same writer shows that towards the end of 1750, the French began their celebrated inquiries respecting political economy; and that, in their attempt to raise it to a science, they were led to perceive "the immense injury which the interference of government had produced on the material interests of the country." The result of this inquiry was "a conviction that the authority possessed by the rulers of France was mischievous; since it enabled them, under the notion of protecting commerce, to curtail the freedom of individual action and to prevent trade from running into those profitable channels, which traders are best able to select for themselves." Buckle's work is a monument of research; and, as it is a mass of generalisation, drawn from the whole world's history, and presented in an earnest, impartial, and logical spirit; it affords a veritable magazine of political and sociological material for the student, who seeks to grasp the true principles of statecraft.

Take again Lecky's *Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*. This is a work that takes a sweeping panoramic survey of history, in tracing the gradual application of reason to human affairs; by which touchstone matters of practical worldly importance were slowly but steadily stripped of the cobwebs that had been spun round them by the earlier theologies, and had long discouraged and hampered the logical discussion of the relationship of such matters to man's daily life. He shows, by a wealth of historical illustration, drawn from the histories of almost every European country, how

bigotry and superstition had at one time enveloped and clogged human thought; and how, by slow degrees, their influence had been discarded, as men acquired confidence in their own reasoned judgment.

He shows, too, how the courageous and trenchant writings of the occasional greater intellects of their time had operated upon the more numerous but less-learned classes, and thence filtered down to the masses, who had previously been almost completely governed in their emotional activities by the dogmas of the churches.

Human liberty, as one of the most cherished of human possessions, was here involved; for it required centuries to root out the widespread belief in witchcraft, by which whole peoples were enthralled, and their views distorted, in relation to their fellow beings, who were often mentally in advance of their persecutors. Lecky quotes Lord Bacon, to the effect that it is the duty of every man to suspend his full and resolved assent to the doctrines he had been taught, till he has impartially considered and examined them for himself; which maxim sounds trite enough in the twentieth century; although that apparently self-evident proposition is even to-day widely ignored in regard to many current creeds and their tenets.

In this comprehensive survey, Lecky deals not only with the clarifying influence of reason upon the religious and emotional side of men, but shows its effect in regard to convictions of moral and scientific importance. He traces the history of politics from their being at one time largely under the direction of churchmen, to their being gradually rescued from their control and reposed in monarchs; who, in their turn, were constrained to exer-

cise their governing functions on more worldly and practical lines, or to have that exercise gradually wrested from them, to be wielded by men of the world, who better understood the people and their needs. He shows, too, the growth of a reasoning spirit in its application to industrial history; how political economy, as a science, originating with the Venetians, imparted an intellectual ascendancy to industry; how the Stage began to operate as an educational influence, and as an index of the conditions of civilisation; how this form of amusement and instruction provoked the opposition of the Church, and, in France, led to the condemnation and ostracism of actors. Then came, by the further application of reason, the dispelling of the economic misconception that gold was the only form of wealth; by which misconception undue attention had been devoted to gold mines and gold mining; whilst manufactures had been neglected, as not adding to the national wealth. He shows how this misconception led to the equally benighted embargo on the export of money, and so effected the ruin of certain colonies.

The same work shows the gradual recognition of the belief in manufactures, as a source of national wealth, and traces the invention and growing use of credit, and the development of machinery, with its economic effects on the welfare of the people.

The foregoing is but an outline of the mass of historical knowledge, and the wealth of political and economic illustration, which this work affords to those who seek an easier, if less thorough, method of historical study. Let me now turn to another of these works, in which the student of politics will find a body of historical generalisa-

tion that is full of intellectual food and valuable suggestion, bearing on his study. I refer to Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*, which affords a comprehensive bird's-eye view of the world's history: dealing with the more important steps, some forward, and some backward, in the ever-present tendency of individuals and groups to seek to discover and effect improvements in their sociological condition. In this work are traced the rise and fall of nations and races, extending over centuries and even ages of time, and involving a great variety of movements in religion and morality, leading to wars and cataclysms of every sort and dimension. Human affairs are therein presented in a sort of panoramic view, as if the reader had been taken up into a high mountain and had the whole process of centuries of world-movements passed before him in miniature for his personal edification. Such a work must have involved its writer in a stupendous amount and variety of research, such as seems almost impossible in a single lifetime; but it is obviously the result of a resort to a veritable library of other encyclopædic literature, in which have been gathered up and systematised, science, art, literature, religion, morality, politics, philosophy, and a score of other important branches of human knowledge. Many far-reaching theories in regard to human affairs are advanced and fortified by historical illustrations; and these are not presented in isolated form, but in such a manner as to show the relative effect of one series of events upon another, as well as of the movements in one age upon another age. Underlying this great body of historical matter, the reader is confronted with the problem of determining whether the world in which we live,

with all its physical phenomena, upon which the human race depends, is not a mere particle in a mechanical universe ; and whether, notwithstanding man's apparent volition in shaping his own course of events and destiny, he is not being carried by the undercurrents of nature, in directions which his comparative insignificance in the economy of things prevents him from discerning or appreciating. Historical events are presented in broad outline, in such a way as to show that the progressive stages of nations have their counterparts in analogous stages of growth and development in the individual; and events are passed in review in such a way as to produce the conviction, which the writer puts boldly forward, viz., that everything in the world is undergoing so continuous a change that nothing is permanent or even abiding, when viewed in a broad panoramic spirit. Marked care is taken in the work to draw a careful distinction between philosophy and politics ; in which latter, human affairs are looked at on a closer view. In the former, we are told that "Empires are but sand hills in the hour-glass of Time," whilst, in the latter, we are led to see that the human events of our own time and country are only discernible in detail by joining in them, and, for the time being, losing sight of the greater whirling movements of history as seen from the philosophic outlook. As the writer informs us : "He who is immersed in the turmoil of a crowded city, sees nothing but the acts of men, whilst he who ascends to a sufficient elevation loses sight of passing conflicts, and no longer hears the contentions. If he attain to the truly philosophical, he would fail to discern the slightest indication of man, his free-will or his works."

We are not here so much concerned with the "truly philosophical" view of things ; but the perusal and study of that aspect of this great epitome of human affairs cannot fail to impart to those who pursue them a broad cosmopolitan spirit, and a fine magnanimous fervour that would be a wholesome ingredient in every branch of the world's politics.

There are many generalisations in this work, apart from its philosophical value, which have a distinct bearing on statesmanship ; wherein its author traces the parallel between the characters of nations and individuals —the educated and the illiterate, the idle and the industrious, the rich and the poor, the intelligent or reasoning, and the superstitious. He shows, by historical illustration, how nations rise and fall, as they are successful or unsuccessful, in discovering, and applying to their own affairs, the secrets of good government. He shows how much more easy has been the harmonious commingling of races who have lived and developed east or west of one another, as compared with those who have moved in their migrations down the lines of longitude ; and the general effect of the study of such a mass of historical knowledge, condensed by a broad, tolerant, and impartial authorship, into so panoramic a survey, is to soften the political asperities that are so surely engendered by allowing the mind to dwell exclusively on merely local conditions, and the more microscopic aspirations of small communities. Now, that distances are being encompassed; and nationalities, that seemed far apart, are being brought into closer and more neighbourly contact in the world's mingling ; prejudices have to be overcome ; and a study of the broad and sweeping spirit of

this work should be cherished as in itself humanising, and as the basis of a finer temperament for those who are more and more drawn into international relationships. The attempt at a new world-partnership which has so recently led to the joint signatures of fifteen hundred millions of people in all quarters of the world, in one international league, is an event that demands a wider recognition of this broader spirit in national dealings.

Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, published nearly 150 years ago, is another epoch-making work, which, in its time, changed the whole face of political economy. He had already been Professor of Logic, and of Moral Philosophy, and had made a great stir in the world by the publication of his work on the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. In consequence of the fame of this book, students came from all parts of the country (Scotland) to the University of Glasgow. He subsequently retreated to the country for some years, having already devoted twenty years of work to the study of subjects connected with the science of political economy. Professor Stewart spoke of *The Wealth of Nations* as "the most comprehensive and perfect work that had yet appeared on the general principles of any branch of legislation." The same learned authority said that "a great and leading object of Mr. Adam Smith's speculations was to demonstrate that the most effectual plan for advancing a people to greatness is to maintain that order of things which nature has pointed out, by allowing every man, so long as he observes the rules of justice, to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and his capital into the freest

competition with those of his fellow citizens." Several authors had before written on commercial affairs, but Adam Smith was the first who "reduced the information obtainable on the subject, to regular form and order, and deduced from it the policy which an enlightened commercial nation ought to adopt." It has been said that Adam Smith derived some of his materials from the French economists, which is not denied; and that he obtained some advantage from his personal association with the eminent French statesman Turgot; but Stewart, who himself had published a work on political economy, expressed the opinion that "the general principles of the *Wealth of Nations* were altogether original, and the result of its author's own reflections."

The book begins by dwelling upon the wonderful results of the "division of labour," as distinguished from the more primitive method of each man's attempting to do for himself personally all the things that are required to be done for his own use and comfort; and he demonstrates the extraordinary advantages that naturally follow, in the increase of quantity produced; the perfection of the work performed, because of the acquired skill; and the decreased cost of the commodity produced; in all three of which advantages the whole community benefits. He deals in due course with prices, wages and profits, rent, money, the rise and progress of cities, and the commerce of towns. One of his most instructive chapters is that upon "Restraints upon importation from foreign countries," which strikes a severe blow at all theories of "protection." He says that "to give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or

manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capital, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation" ; and he goes on to show that, by artificial means—hot beds, hot walls, etc.—"good fruit could be raised in Scotland," and "very good wine too," at about thirty times the expense for which, at least, equally good can be brought from foreign countries. This is of course the chief argument which free-traders nowadays use against the system of protection, as practised in many parts of the world ; and it is usually disposed of in protectionist countries by the terms "old fashioned" and similar epithets ; but it is worthy of note that the great majority of those who employ these epithets are personally interested in the "domestic industries" referred to by Adam Smith, or have never been in the independent mental position to investigate the fiscal problem, impartially or thoroughly, so as to give any value to their economic opinions. Adam Smith makes, at this stage of his inquiry, the following pertinent remark, to which it would be difficult to find a logical answer, viz., that "what is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom"; and it is notable that no protectionist has yet been discovered who applies to his own domestic affairs the doctrine that he advocates for his country.

Adam Smith proves his impartiality by making some careful exceptions in the cases of materials required for defence and in shipping. This chapter on "Restraints" would be profitable, if unpalatable reading, to all who have been beguiled by the superficial attractions of "protection." It is notable, too, that Adam Smith

clearly anticipated the arguments of the more modern "Fair Traders," and disposed of them somewhat effectually. He deals at length with "Bounties," and, in so doing, affords a veritable storehouse of practical illustrations, as he does on "Restraints." This same work contains a most enlightening chapter on Colonies, of which there were few great examples at the time when he wrote, such as are now embraced under the term "Dominions." He comments upon the tendency, which is now very patent, of Colonial legislatures losing sight of larger questions concerning the Empire, by reason of their narrower vision, which results from their too great concentration on their own local affairs. Some of his observations on the effects of the narrower outlook of the legislators of colonies are more severe than just, as applied to modern British possessions ; for they were written with reference to the American Colonies, at a time when feeling ran high in regard to the relative taxing rights of the Mother Country and her offshoots.

It has been well said that this remarkable work is written with "an air of simplicity and truth"; and its writer certainly fortifies his arguments with a great treasure of practical illustration, drawn from the business workaday world, that lay around him when he wrote, and which is not altered in principle, though it may be in volume, at this time, nearly 140 years later. To read it is to undergo an economic education, not only in facts of history, but also in the quiet, cool and normal spirit in which it is written. *The Times* spoke of Adam Smith on the occasion of his centenary in 1876 as "the first systematic exponent of the science of political economy,

in which both Englishmen and Frenchmen had laboured"; and it expressed the views, in its leading columns on that occasion, that "his genius enabled him to grasp, out of vast materials around, certain bold principles, which lifted to the rank of a science pursuits which, up to 1776, were regarded as more or less desultory inquiries."

The last regular treatise to which I shall refer, as affording a body of historical generalisations, the perusal and study of which cannot fail to be of great service to the political student, is Herbert Spencer's *Study of Sociology*. It is in the nature of an introduction to that writer's system of philosophy, which, in greater detail, fills many volumes of close and highly abstract reading, that only a limited number of students attempt to digest. This *Study of Sociology* is in itself a mass of practical and scientific material, carefully arranged and classified, so as to demonstrate, in regular sequence, the different subjects which need to be considered by all who approach the work of legislation in the true spirit, and with a reasonable prospect of usefulness. The author begins by defining sociology as the science of society; that is, the logical and accurate consideration of all the elements or factors that require to be taken into account in the political regulation of a community's affairs. It is spoken of as a science; because it presupposes that the regulation of society, at which it aims, will be approached in an accurate, unbiassed, and scientific spirit. The book opens with an inquiry as to whether there is such a science? And the author shows, by an abundance of illustration, that if only "society" be looked at in that spirit of accuracy; the regulation of its affairs can be made the subject of

fixed and definite principles, so as to do justice to each individual, and secure completeness and stability in its composition and activities. He shows the "need" for such a science by enumerating a long series of instances, in which the want of scientific treatment of matters of public interest leads to injustice, individual and class injury, and considerable waste of human effort. He then proceeds to demonstrate the "nature" of the social science, by showing how communities of men are built up; and how much their successful regulation depends upon the recognition of the true relationship of the individual to the community of which he or she is a unit. In the course of this discussion, the reader is constantly reminded of the parallel that exists between the structure of human institutions, and their successful conduct, and that of living organisms in the animal world. Then follows an account, again copiously illustrated by historical generalisation, of the "difficulties" of the social science, in which the shortcomings of men as observers, and their limited knowledge of certain subjects, are emphasised, including among "difficulties" their prejudices, likings, superstitions and personal interests, as disturbing factors in the process of working out the problems that present themselves. Spencer then deals with the difficulties in detail; the "intellectual" and the "emotional" in man himself, as prime factors in the study, co-ordination and active agency, in the various mental operations involved in dealing with sociological phenomena. He then proceeds, in still greater detail to consider the various forms of prejudice or "bias" that prevent men from taking a normal and balanced view of the facts and forces that are called into play in dealing

with political problems. He treats separately of the "educational bias," the "bias of patriotism," the "class bias," the "political bias," the "theological bias"; and again he illustrates his contentions with generalised historical data, in such a manner as to afford invaluable assistance to his readers.

He next demonstrates the necessity for a course of educational "discipline," in order to qualify those who desire to deal with matters of public interest in a scientific spirit; and he enumerates two branches of science, a knowledge of which he deems to be essential to effect such a discipline. They are the study of biology and psychology. He himself had, during his earlier career, written exhaustive treatises on these two sciences, as portion of his system of philosophy, and as contributions to the science of sociology. Under these heads, he shows, in the smaller work now under examination, how indispensable it is for political thinkers to understand at least the general principles of the science of life (biology) as well as the general principles of the science of mind (psychology); and he concludes by saying: "There can be no understanding of social actions without some knowledge of human nature; there can be no deep knowledge of human nature without some knowledge of the laws of mind; there can be no adequate knowledge of the laws of mind without some knowledge of the laws of life. And in order that knowledge of the laws of life, as exhibited in man, may be properly grasped, attention must be given to the laws of life in general."

These are only examples of a few of the works of historical generalisation that our English literature affords to those who seriously desire to follow up the

study of political science, which is so intimately bound up with statecraft or statesmanship.

There is still open to the historical student a great body of useful data which, though the fact is not generally recognised, throws a highly valuable light on present-day politics, and political principles generally. I refer to the better-known fiction of the later half of the eighteenth century and of the whole of the nineteenth century. The writings of Richardson, Jane Austen, Maria Edgeworth, Mrs. Gaskell, Trollope, Bulwer Lytton, Thackeray, Disraeli, and Dickens. These instructive works are replete with illustrations of the legislative blunders of the times in which they were written, as well as of the direful results and abuses which flowed from those blunders. Each of the writers named, consciously or unconsciously exposed social conditions, in which those abuses and errors were humorously and entertainingly revealed; and the chief value of those exposures is the fact that they were vividly portrayed by incident and dialogue, that in their probability and feasibility tested the soundness of the various propositions they sought to enforce.

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY
Its True Use in the Art of Statecraft

MAN'S happiness or misery in the world depends upon his knowledge of, and his ability to utilise, the laws of nature which are beneficial, and to avoid those that are inimical, to his welfare; and the same principle, which applies to the individual, applies to communities made up of individual men and women.

The art of human government—involving a knowledge of the sciences of economics and political philosophy—centres round human nature; for, in the absence of human nature—as already pointed out—there would be no such subject as politics, and political philosophy, and no such institution as human government.

The study of man's nature is one of the most inscrutable of sciences, involving, as already submitted, a more or less complete knowledge of his mind and his body, as well as of their physiological relationship to one another.

A complete knowledge of human nature involves a study of man's real, as distinguished from his supposed needs; and the conditions of his more abiding welfare, as distinguished from what he believes to be for his immediate good.

Wise government, or the art of regulating a community of men and women, so as to secure the maximum aggre-

gate of human happiness—immediate and ultimate—for all its units, involves a wide knowledge of human history, under all known conditions; for, as Sir John Seeley says: "Politics are vulgar when they are not liberalised by history; and history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to practical politics."

True statesmanship—the province of the statesman—may be distinguished from mere politics—the province of the mere politician—as a matter of proportion and perspective; for whilst the latter is local, or parochial, or only narrowly national in his outlook, the former has the longer vision, sees the international effects of a policy, and has regard for dangers beyond the sight or the ken of the narrower type of mind.

As an interesting illustration of this difference, Congreve, in his learned work on *Aristotle*, says: '*The Roman Empire*, as an incorporation of the civilised world, was not within Cicero's ken; and, naturally, still less within that of Aristotle"; and he adds: "*Rome* as a *city*, governing the world for its own narrow interests, was to Cicero . . . the limit of his vision; and hence his failure as a statesman." And this mental weakness of a contracted vision and imagination is at the root of many failures among public men; who know, but fail to realise vividly, in their circumscribed political activities, the existence, and the claim, for equal consideration, of the wider domain of their own nation, outside the immediate area which absorbs their attention.

The study of human nature is twofold in another sense—in one case relating to the individual; in the other to the group or community, upon the successful

government of which the happiness of the individual largely depends.

A wide knowledge of man in the group, involving an equally wide knowledge of the individual, as a social unit, (together with a wide knowledge of his individual and collective activities), has come to be known as the science of sociology.

And such a wide knowledge of human nature, individually and collectively, involves a study of man in all stages of his development, from primitive to civilised times, under all climatic and racial conditions, and in all the transitional circumstances of his social evolution.

Lord Bolingbroke, in his work on *The True Use of History*, says that "history is philosophy teaching by example."

Although the world contains, and has contained, innumerable races that have lived apart through many ages; close study shows that, beneath the veneer; underneath all their varying stages, nationalities and creeds, there are to be found the same fundamental native characteristics.

The records of man, of the immediate and the remote past, of all races and nationalities, in all stages of human evolution, constitute the most important and useful parts of the world's history.

Human history, properly understood, is not confined to the records of naval and military warfare, the rise and fall of monarchs or of states and principalities; nor yet to the scandals and personalities of courts or nobles—although even these are useful, as illustrating certain weaknesses of human nature—but includes every kind of literature, of art, of traditions, of material remains that

throw light on the origin, nature and evolution of ordinary men and women, as they have lived and died at different times, and in different parts of the world.

History, for political use in perfecting the art of government, is a record of what man has attempted and done, or failed to do, in the past: a record of his experiments with the unchangeable laws of nature, and the slowly changing characteristics of human nature; affording, where possible, a clue to his successes and failures in the contact and the struggle.

As will be shown hereafter, caution is necessary in its interpretation; for as Macaulay says: "Facts are the mere dross of history. It is from the abstract truth which interpenetrates them, and lies latent among them, like gold in the ore, that the mass derives its value."

History, if properly studied, apart from the various forms of bias in the mind of the historian, the reader, the interpreter or the observer, should be the most useful of all guides for the future, in saving man from palpably useless and wasteful repetitions of past errors, and political miscalculations; and for enabling him to avail himself of the past successes of his predecessors in history, in experimental government.

The man or woman who gains no advantage from his or her own, or his neighbour's, experiences in life, has failed to grasp the lessons that nature has afforded him; and, in the same way, the nation that fails, through its political guides, to utilise the advantage of its own or any other community's national experiences, as recorded in the histories of their past, has likewise failed to grasp the same lessons which nature has afforded on a larger scale.

History, in this sense, is therefore an essential study for all men and women who essay to take part in the political guidance or guardianship of the nation or community in which they live. For, as Lord Acton says, in his *Study of History:* "The science of politics is the one science that is deposited by the stream of history, like grains of gold in the sand of a river; and the knowledge of the past, the record of truths revealed by experience, is eminently practical, as an instrument of action, and a power that goes to the making of the future."

The politician, then, who is ignorant of history is an ever-present danger to the State, in the management of which he takes part; because, as the result of that ignorance, he invariably seeks to retry experiments upon his fellows, without knowing whether they have been previously attempted and failed; and he thereby also misses or ignores, in many instances, the lessons involved in human activities, which history shows to have previously produced benefits for those who practised them.

It would be an abuse of the adage that "history repeats itself" to look for exact parallels in the events of the past and those of the present day, with a view to applying the outcome in the former, to the circumstances of the latter; for probably no exact parallel has ever existed between the circumstances of any historical event and any juxtaposition of facts in another time. If such parallels are looked for by the student, he will be disappointed; and history, as a guide to the higher politics, will be unproductive. The true use of history is the lesson it affords in trends or tendencies, rather than in exact parallels; and in this respect the past is full of finger posts, pointing the way to success or failure, accord-

ing to the road that is chosen out of the many that commend themselves to the minds of men of different degrees of knowledge; of different temperaments; and of different forms of prejudice or leaning.

As Buckle has said, in his *History of Civilisation:* "The real history of the human race is the history of tendencies, which are perceived by the mind, and not of events, which are discerned by the senses . . . the death of a prince, the loss of a battle, and the change of a dynasty are matters which fall entirely within the province of the senses; and the movement in which they happen can be recorded by the most ordinary observers. But those great intellectual revolutions, upon which all other revolutions are based, cannot be measured by so simple a standard. To trace the movements of the human mind, it is necessary to contemplate it under several aspects, and then co-ordinate the results of what we have separately studied. By this means we arrive at certain general conclusions, which, like the ordinary estimate of averages, increase in value, in proportion as we increase the number of instances from which they are collected."

And as John Stuart Mill says, in his well-known *Inaugural Address:* "All true political science is, in one sense of the phrase, deduced from the tendencies of things: tendencies known, either through our general experience of human nature, or as the result of an analysis of the course of history, considered as a progressive evolution."

Unquestionably, man will never be in a position to say that no further records are needed; for, whatever be the future heights attained in human culture, there

will always be scope for further progress; as each progressive stage will lead to new and unsuspected intellectual characteristics, as subjects for study, and so reveal possibilities of society reaching still higher planes. Although Aristotle took a very wide view of human nature and human possibilities; strangely enough, he nevertheless considered that the historical data at his own disposal (nearly five centuries before the Christian era) were enough on which to rear a permanent system of social organisation, provided they were properly marshalled and co-ordinated.

This also must be borne in mind—that in seeking to use the observed "trends" or "tendencies" of history in the past, as guides to an estimate of the probabilities of the present or the future, the operation must entirely fail, unless we take into careful consideration, also, a number of incidental circumstances; as, for instance, the state of organisation and civilisation existing in the past, as compared with those of the present time; the national characteristics of both communities; the geographical circumstances of the two societies, between which the parallel is sought to be drawn; as also the sociological readiness of the peoples of to-day or to-morrow to submit to any particular legislative change, which is sought to be based on the supposed parallel. In short, it would be an error to use history as a guide, or as a reason for any hard and fast application of past conditions to the present, without considering this great variety of circumstances, that themselves can only have been registered in the legislator's mind by an already acquired wide knowledge of political affairs.

BOOK III.

HUMAN NEEDS

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CHAPTER I.

HUMAN NEEDS
Their Bearing on the Art of Statecraft

THE primary aims of all true statecraft, whether in relation to a tribe or a nation, are to preserve order and good will among the units or classes of the community; to facilitate the growth and development of its commercial and industrial activities; to encourage personal culture and elevating ideals; and to secure its permanent corporate existence as a community or body-politic.

In order to produce these desirable and in some respects indispensable results, there must be—in addition to the recognition of a fixed and stable form of social organisation—some common understanding, actual or implied, among all its units as to the necessity for respecting one another's rights, recognising one another's limitations, and, corporately, insisting on and enforcing the fulfilment of one another's obligations.

In ordinary animal life, brute force or cunning are the ultimate tests of supremacy; and the survival of the "fittest" (in one or other, or both, of these respects) is the dominating law; but, in human affairs, one of man's first "needs," as a member of a community, is the disallowance of these primitive tests as standards, and the substitution of a mutual recognition, between its units, of a "give-and-take" and "live-and-let-live" spirit, by the practice of which political society is made possible.

The struggle for existence, in a world in which nature —though responsive and even generous where intelligence and energy are expended upon it—is nevertheless unrelenting, and in which bodily wants have to be provided for, presupposes the freedom of each unit to move about, and therefore to enjoy what is known as liberty of locomotion. The continuous guarantee of that form of freedom, thereafter, becomes in a civilised community one of man's first needs.

The need for self-preservation involves the acquisition of food, clothing, and shelter; and, when these are obtained, a further need arises, viz., that of each unit being guaranteed the full and, if essential, the exclusive enjoyment of the things so acquired, in accordance with the rules or laws of the community.

The right of individual liberty, and the right to have one's private property respected and vindicated by one's fellows, are then the first and most vital needs of the members of both civilised and primitive communities.

The observance of these two rights—liberty and private property—by all the units of a community, satisfy the needs of primitive and progressive human nature; since, by that observance, men are encouraged and enabled to formulate their aims, and put all their activities into motion, in any direction they may think fit, subject only to limitations at those points, and in those directions, in which they would, if unchecked, intrench upon the equal personal liberty, or the equal enjoyment of private property, of another unit or other units.

Intimidation, whether of a physical, moral or spiritual nature, is one of the most dangerous and

destructive forms of infringement, and should be unceasingly deprecated and condemned, as striking at the root of liberty and free citizenship.

These two needs—liberty and security—presuppose the existence of some authority, empowered by the community, and fortified by it, if need be, to enforce their observance by each and all, and to require the other units of the community, where necessary, to support corporately the authority named, in insisting upon that observance.

With the establishment of such an authority, and the enforcement of the two principles named, internal harmony can be sufficiently preserved; but there may still be danger of disintegration from the aggression of other outside communities; so that a further need arises, in order to secure a permanence of society: that is, the provision for co-operation among the units, for purposes of defence against outside destructive or aggressive forces.

The work of organising a community, so as to lead to and enforce the recognition of these several needs, and the securing of their continued observance and true limitation in all the myriad forms which they take in a modern community, constitute the work of the statesman and the art of statecraft, and result in the establishment and maintenance of what is known as "civilisation."

What are human "needs" in general, as distinguished from human "wants," will be treated of in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

HUMAN NEEDS DEFINED

MAN'S "needs" must be carefully distinguished from his "wants."

A child "wants" to eat a green apple, but what it "needs" is wholesome food.

The reader can draw many parallels for himself from this homely but simple and instructive illustration; for the air is full, nowadays, of the clamourings of thoughtless individuals and classes, for parliamentary activities, which are freely advocated, without consideration as to the social wholesomeness of what they are crying for, or as to the justice of requiring their demands to be satisfied at the expense of their tax-paying fellow citizens.

The child, having no knowledge of the constituents of foods, or their effects on the body, is not as good a judge of its real needs, in that respect, as an intelligent parent or a physician; and, likewise, however much the average man or woman may want to have certain laws passed; neither he nor she is always the most competent judge of what is best for his own or the people's ultimate political good; since neither may have closely studied the probable unseen and unexpected operations of various forms of legislation, nor be aware of the effects—immediate and remote—which any particular law or regulation may have upon the varied interests of a mixed community.

The first real "need" of a human being is the fullest opportunity for securing direct and indirect self-preservation for himself, as well as for those dependent upon him.

The power of securing direct self-preservation presupposes the possession of physical liberty to pursue his vocation, and to defend himself and others dependent upon him, in the event of their being menaced.

The power of securing indirect self-preservation presupposes the enjoyment of an extended liberty, to procure food for the maintenance of himself and his family, and, if required, to enjoy the exclusive use of it.

The possession of this liberty, and of these powers of securing food, and enjoying the use of that which has been secured, presupposes a check being exercised over others, who may be of superior physical strength or cunning, enabling them to overcome him, and thus able to appropriate that which he had legitimately acquired for himself.

A system of checks and limitations upon one another, among the units of a group of men and women, for their mutual protection and welfare, presupposes the existence of some form of social organisation, which can only be established, and made secure and permanent, by a general agreement to submit to restrictions and limitations in the general interests of the whole community.

Such a social organisation being established, with power of limitation over the activities of all units, in the interest of the whole group; it becomes necessary not only to secure but to encourage the fullest measure of individual liberty to each, by restricting the remainder, only at that point at which their liberties are equally secured in the general interests.

By that process, each unit has guaranteed to him the fullest enjoyment of the fruits of his individual enterprise (known as the rights of "private enterprise" and of "private property"), and the fullest liberty to pursue his own methods of work or other vocation, to live his own life in his own way, in all respects, so long as he does not, in doing so, interfere with the equal rights of others.

In addition to enterprise and property, each individual has his or her own ideas of happiness, and, by this means, would be allowed to pursue it in any desired direction, so long as, in its pursuit, he or she respected the equal rights of others.

Subject to these limitations—which become universal and indispensable stipulations or restrictions—the largest amount of liberty, guaranteed to each, is the most effectual means of inducing men to put forth their best efforts, their highest skill, and their most mature judgment, in the hope of reward; to develop their individuality, to make discoveries which contribute to the general welfare, and to draw out of life the largest amount of happiness for themselves and those dependent upon them.

The careful distinction between legitimate "needs" and thoughtless "wants," as also of the ever-present necessity for observing and providing for the limitation referred to, are in the nature of axioms, in the study of statecraft.

CHAPTER III.

SOCIAL ORGANISATION

A MERE aggregation of human beings, coming together spontaneously, or driven together by some common aim or trouble, and without mutual arrangement as to how they were going to conduct themselves toward one another, would be, or would rapidly become, a mere "mob." As already explained, might would dominate over right; the strongest would prevail; the weak would be at the mercy of the more powerful; the simple and confiding would become the victim of the rogue; and the inevitable result would be a state of anarchy, chaos, and ultimate disintegration.

The first essential, therefore, in the formation and continuation of a social community is some binding mutual understanding as to the relationship of the units to one another, and of each unit towards the community as a whole.

Mr. Leslie Stephen, in his *Science of Ethics*, says: "A full perception of the truth that society is not a mere aggregate, but an organic growth; that it forms a whole, the laws of whose growth can be studied apart from those of the individual atom, supplies the most characteristic postulate of modern speculation."

Since the advent or recognised establishment of what is called "Society"—that is, political society—human beings have consciously grown under co-operation, or

been drawn together in systematic groups or communities, for mutual protection against the forces of nature, or other aggressive groups or communities.

Such groups or communities have been more or less successful in their organisation, and more or less permanent in their corporate existence, according to their ability to preserve harmony amongst the units; to defend themselves against the forces of nature, or against the aggression of other groups; and to make sufficient provision for their continued support. And, as Mr. Thorold Rogers says, in his *Political Economy*: "A nation is civilised in proportion to the fulness with which the several persons who compose it render mutual benefits and services, have reciprocal interests, and multiply such benefits, services, and interests."

What is known as "Society," is therefore not a ready-made institution, but a growth, which has been gradually evolved by a process of slow and steady development; in other words, built up out of the units, as would be so many bricks in a building.

Herbert Spencer says: "What is it that we call the State? Men politically associated, voluntarily, for mutual protection."

Everyone who is born in, or received into, a growing community, impliedly agrees to abide by the code of rules or laws by which its units are controlled or regulated, and its general interests protected against outside aggression. The machinery of organisation of a society or community consists of a labyrinth of observances, regulations, and restrictions, which have been from time to time imposed upon, and impliedly agreed to by, those who compose it, and by which each is bound.

These regulations began in primitive society in the form of simple customs, which in time became traditions ; and, as society advances, new regulations are made from time to time by those in authority, till they are grown to be a sort of network of limitations or restrictions, which would bewilder the average man and woman, if they had to suddenly acquire a knowledge of, and observe them all, instead of having become gradually accustomed to them throughout life.

Again and again, in the unrecorded and recorded history of man, groups or communities have been formed, and become disintegrated, by reason of their incomplete organisation ; by consequent internal dissension ; by being overwhelmed by nature, in the form of famine or disease ; or by the aggression of some more powerful outside group.

Many human groups, which have been, for the time, highly successful in providing against these several disintegrating forces, have survived, until they, in turn, have met with external forces or internal weaknesses—resulting from a lack of statesmanship—which have led to their ultimate disintegration and destruction.

The history of communities, much of which is buried from human knowledge, is therefore a long record of successes and failures of groups of men and women, who have tried again and again to solve the problem of human government ; that is, the art of living simultaneously, as individuals, and as groups of individuals, with a view to the permanent maintenance of a homogeneous community.

An excellent scientific but homely parallel has been drawn between an organised community and an ordinary

sponge; which, when living, consists of a multitude of separate organisms, each living its separate life in the framework of the whole, yet all deriving nourishment and vitality by virtue of the parent growth, in which they live.

The increase of the world's population has caused the struggle for existence, in communities in which the units are thrown on their own individual resources, to become more and more complicated and strenuous; and in each case, in which a conflict has taken place between the community and some cataclysm of nature, or with other groups, the so-called "fittest" for the struggle have survived.

As already explained, the greatest communities of the world, of to-day, are, themselves, only the "survivals," in the racial struggle of the world's history; and the fact that such communities have so survived that struggle, justifies the conclusion that they have, from time to time, discovered and travelled along a true or sound way, and do now embody in their several schemes of social organisation many of the more sound principles of the art of government, which have been the means of saving them from the vicissitudes which, from time to time, sooner or later, menace all communities.

There is therefore, as we have already seen, a "science" of government, which can be learned from a study of the history of the national life of other communities, in the near or remote past; and there is an "art" of government, which consists of the true application of the lessons which the science of government teaches.

The following may be taken as a general and summarised history of the several stages of development, as generally accepted by well-known authorities on "primi-

tive man." In small primitive communities, the beginnings of the social organisation spring out of the decrees of the *paterfamilias* or head of the family, who has, in such communities, unlimited power over the members of his tribe or circle. Later, in the history of such a community, there is a chief or group of chiefs, who, in the course of adjudicating upon the disputes that arise in the tribe or clan, lay down certain observances, which, by repetition, become customs, and have to be obeyed by the units or inner groups of the community.

As time goes on, fresh differences arise, and are settled by some such recognised authority; and the principles observed from time to time, in such settlements, become additions to the growing code of traditions, that serve to regulate the activities, the rights, and the obligations, of those who constitute the community.

Interferences with the individual liberty of the units of the community are checked and probably punished by the authoritative heads or the governing power; and, in due time, the right of individual liberty ceases to be challenged by those who, by reason of their superior strength, might otherwise have become a constant menace to those of less physical power.

There comes a time in such a community's history, when the danger to the group from famine, in consequence of the insufficiency of the food-supply over immediate needs, is recognised; and, thereafter, if the community is to succeed, efforts are made to obtain and store a surplus of the necessities of life, as provision against a repetition of the scourge of famine.

For a greater or less period in the history of new tribes, the surplus has been regarded as the property of the

community; so that, in the event of scarcity of food, all the units are regarded as having an equal right to participate.

But, a further occasion arises in which certain members of the community fail or refuse to exert themselves, as much as the other units, in the production or procuring of those necessities; and, in such case, some corporate action of the community is exercised to compel increased activity.

At a later stage, individual members of the group conceive and put into practice the idea of individual exertion for individual advantage. The planting of a patch of corn, the planting of a group of fruit-producing trees, the pursuit of game, followed by an individual claim to the result of this special individual or family effort, comes to be recognised as just; and thereafter, there arises a recognition of the rights of individual or group property.

These primitive rights go on increasing and elaborating from time to time; and, as they are established, they come to be generally recognised as the traditional laws and regulations of the tribe.

In this way the community becomes increasingly organised; and the labyrinth of laws and regulations, which make it so, are accumulated in the minds and memories of the people, until they discover and adopt the practice of recording them in some permanent form.

It was by this gradual process that the "Common" or, as it is called, "Customary" Law of England was built up; that Courts of law were established for the interpretation and enforcement of those laws; that Parliament become an established institution for the purpose of

making fresh laws to meet the ever-changing conditions of society. And to-day, in every civilised community, the doctrines of individual freedom, and of private property, are recognised as fundamental principles; though, nowadays, the principles themselves are again and again ignored by politicians, who are ignorant or reckless as to the principles upon which society was so built up.

Parliament has become a permanent institution for the making of new, and the modification or repeal of old, laws; Municipal Councils have become the permanent institutions for the making of laws or by-laws in regard to purely local requirements; and Courts of law have become the permanent institutions for the interpretation of all laws, over which the units of the community, or citizens of the State, may have differences: the executive being the established authority for enforcing the judgments or decrees of the Courts.

This labyrinth of laws regulates the relationship of individual citizens, one to the other, and acts as a series of checks upon possible abuse of power, such as would operate if no such social organisation existed.

In order to maintain the whole of these judicial and law-making institutions, in their higher or lower forms, and to provide for the execution of the laws, through the medium of the executive; the citizens of a community are called upon from time to time to contribute to public funds for the purpose; and this form of levy on citizens is known by the term "taxation."

The same process has to be resorted to in order to maintain special forces—naval and military—for the defence of the community against possible aggression from without.

The taxation of the members of a community is, admittedly, an encroachment on the long-established right of every responsible unit to exercise his individual judgment in the disposal of his own private or personal property. It is, however, an unavoidable encroachment; because, without it, the community would be unable to provide the necessary defence force to protect itself from external aggression; and it would be equally unable, without some such impost, to maintain the several institutions by which the peace, order, and good government of the community is maintained within itself.

How, and when, and to what extent, that unavoidable breach of the established right should be resorted to, is a matter of scientific nicety; because of the ease with which the line of justice may be overstepped; for it will be always regarded as a great historic fact, that the United States became separated from her original mother-country, as the result of alleged unjust taxation. Taxation, and its just principles, will form the subject of a later chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

LIBERTY is, in the abstract, freedom from restraint or restriction.

What is known as "Liberalism," in its true sense, is that political doctrine which has for its ideal the maximum of individual liberty, limited only by the equal liberty of others. It represents the line of compromise between unlimited freedom, which is "anarchy," and unlimited restriction, which would amount to slavery.

A Liberal is one who advocates individual freedom in politics, and not—as is popularly supposed—one who is "liberal" in the sense of being generous, with the taxpayers' money. All limitations of individual liberty are hindrances to human activity; but certain restrictions become necessary, where two or more human beings are associated together, so as to involve the danger of conflict, in the pursuit of their respective interests.

Without limitations on individual liberty, political society would be impossible; for unchecked liberty would become license, and so produce conflict, antagonism, and, ultimately, social disintegration.

The earliest limitations on individual freedom constitute the beginnings of the institution of government, because they deter people, who would otherwise dis-

regard the interests of others, from exceeding their just rights.

A human being, living alone on an island, as in the case of Robinson Crusoe, would have no need to observe any such limitations; because, in such circumstances, there would be no possibility of a conflict of interests; but the addition of a second inhabitant would—presuming harmony is to prevail—immediately necessitate such a limitation on both, and so create the germ of the institution of government.

A third inhabitant would necessitate further limitations on all three, in their own individual interest; and the number and extent of these necessary restrictions would increase with the increasing number of the community.

In a closely-populated community, the necessary limitations on individual liberty become more and more complex and detailed; and their observance becomes a matter of habit, among what are called "law-abiding" citizens. To enforce these limitations, it becomes necessary to impose punishments and penalties for their non-observance or breach.

In primitive communities, these limitations are unwritten; but, as already explained, they become traditions; and their observance is ultimately enforced by tribal customs.

In civilised communities, the limitations take the form of regulations or laws; and their observance is enforced by definite penalties and punishments.

In some primitive communities, breaches of tribal customs have been, and are, regarded as offences against the person injured or prejudiced, and most frequently left to be punished at the hands, and in the discretion,

of the individual who is affected by the breach; but in civilised communities, breaches of the law are regarded as offences against the governing power, and the community as a whole, and, theoretically, are punished by the whole community, acting through judges, magistrates, and police; for it is now an established maxim that "citizens are not allowed to take the law into their own hands."

Laws which limit individual liberty are, in one sense, "necessary evils," but it is upon those limits that the order, progress, and stability of political society depend. It follows that individual liberty should be restricted in as few directions as possible, so long as the equal liberties of others are sufficiently safeguarded.

The first and most essential form of individual liberty is that of unfettered bodily movement; that is, liberty of locomotion; for, without that, life would be intolerable, if not almost impossible.

It is an important tribute to the growth of organised society that this elementary right, which we now regard as fundamental, was denied to the slaves of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, which, in some other respects, were in possession of advanced forms of government.

The liberty to go unmolested is among the most elementary and essential of human rights; for, without it, no individual, associated with others, could pursue the necessary activities for maintaining the life of himself and those who depend upon him.

The liberty to enjoy the fruits or rewards of one's own mental or bodily activities or skill is, likewise, among the most primary and essential of human rights, in a community which seeks to become progressive; for, with-

out its being secured, men would not exert themselves beyond the minimum effort requisite to obtain a bare existence.

No two men or women are born into the world with absolutely identical personalities; since heredity, environment, and individuality are factors in determining the resultant personality. The progress of the world has been mainly produced by a series of important and far-reaching discoveries and movements, originating in individual minds, and resulting from this diversity of characteristics.

It is in the interests of, if not essential to, human welfare, that the freest possible play and development should be afforded to individual thought, effort, and inventive genius; and a wise governing power will, therefore, avoid all limitations on such individual thought, effort, and inventiveness, where their free exercise does not have the effect of curtailing the equal liberties of others in the same or any other directions.

A wise governing power will also avoid all unnecessary or unavoidable limitations on the originality and versatility of thought in those whom they govern; all interference with the character and scope of their various occupations; all restrictions on the uses to which they apply the fruits of their efforts or skill; provided those several forms of activity and originality do not lead to interference with the enjoyment of similar liberties by their fellow citizens.

The history of the British race, for the last thousand years, will be found, if carefully analysed, to have been a slow but gradual freeing of the people from a great variety of wrongly-conceived restrictions, ignorantly and

unjustly imposed by early and despotic rulers, on their civil and religious liberties.

The latter part of the nineteenth, and the beginning of the twentieth, century, have witnessed a reaction from this liberalising process ; and there is now a growing and injurious tendency to attempt to put into practice the popular fallacy, that social conditions can be equalised, so as to be beneficial to the least capable and least intelligent, by curtailing the activities of the more capable and successful in the struggle for existence, thus to restrict them to the standards of skill, of speed, and of ability of the least competent. This tendency, if allowed to develop beyond certain limits, would mark "the beginning of the end" of any community, however well established it might have been originally.

CHAPTER V.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

PROPERTY, in its primitive form, is "saved-labour," embodied in some useful or exchangeable shape.

Probably, the first permanent form which saved-labour took, was in the making of primitive weapons or tools, with which to secure more successfully the means of subsistence. Another of the earliest forms in which saved-labour was embodied was a surplus of the means of subsistence, beyond immediate needs.

In the earliest stages of primitive man, at a time when he had scarcely emerged from the barbarous phase, saved-labour, in the form of surplus means of subsistence, was claimed by him or them who had acquired or produced it, and, sometimes, adversely—thus leading to conflict—by those who were physically strong enough to dispossess the original claimant.

At a later stage, when men had learned, by experience, the advantage of family or tribal organisation; saved-labour, in the form of surplus over immediate needs, came to be regarded, first, as the property of the family or tribe, and, at a later stage, of him or them who had personally saved it. And, thus, the right of private property in the individual or group came to be recognised.

The regular and systematic provision of a super-abundance of production over immediate needs, probably originated in the varying conditions of nature having

frequently resulted in famine and its dire consequences, and so permanently impressed the survivors.

Saved-labour or property, in the form of weapons or tools, seems to have been almost always regarded, in primitive life, as personal to the maker, or to the possessor by exchange, and, in many cases, to have been buried with him after death.

It would be out of place here, except by a passing reference, to recount the numerous recorded instances in which the right of property is recognised even by various classes of animal life, and in which attempts to question it are resented and punished.

In some tribal societies of primitive man, the land was regarded as common property, and subdivided from time to time as members increased in number; while in others it became personal, and was passed on, among the members of the separate families who composed the tribe.

At a later stage in social evolution, the inequalities of men, in energy, skill, and enterprise, led to the recognition of divided interests in production, and therefore to the recognition of individual and personal rights in the fruits of such energy, skill, and enterprise: thus originating the institution of private, as distinguished from tribal or communal, property. The causes which probably led to this change, in regarding property or saved-labour, are dealt with under "Human Nature."

The knowledge that the fruits of one's efforts will be recognised as such, and safeguarded as one's own individual property, by the group or community, is one of the chief incentives to the expenditure of human energy, the cultivation of skill, and the development of the spirit of enterprise in man. By affording men this incentive of

self-interest—limited always, as has been pointed out—and by this social guarantee, accumulation is fostered, and national wealth—that is, the aggregate wealth of a community's or nation's citizens—is created and built up.

Accumulation by individual citizens leads to exchange of commodities, which is practised even among uncivilised races, where one tribe enjoys local facilities for one class of production, and another for a different kind.

The practice of exchanging products leads, by degrees, to the adoption and recognition of a currency of some kind of medium of exchange; which, among some tribes, takes the form of rare shells, or other objects, equally difficult to obtain, but, in more advanced communities, of some rare metals, which involve much labour in the getting, or, in still more advanced communities, of notes of credit, backed by a binding promise, as equivalents for saved-labour.

Accumulation of products, or, at a later stage, of a recognised medium of exchange, or its equivalent in credit, coupled with the social or community's guarantee of its quiet enjoyment, enables those who own it to enjoy the leisure resulting from the cessation of the struggle for existence. Leisure from the struggle for existence enables men to apply their minds, or, by means of patronage (in the forms of universities and scholarships), to encourage other men to apply their minds, to purposes which qualify and prepare them for important, valuable, and exchangeable social services, such as the giving of medical, legal or other scientific or professional advice, devotion to inventive pursuits, such as research for, and the discovery of, world-benefiting antidotes, or to the production of works of art or literature.

Such artistic, scientific, inventive, or learned attainments are ultimately exchangeable—with those who desire the special knowledge—for the circulating medium.

Accumulation, and protection by the community, of private property, assures to men the leisure to pursue many useful objects of study, which do not produce any immediate means of subsistence, but frequently afford to the community, and the world, scientific knowledge. This knowledge, when revealed, saves society from the ravages of virulent diseases; creates a practical medical science and class of practitioners; leads to the wide circulation of artistic, scientific, and literary productions; and so spreads culture of various kinds among the masses of the people.

It is by the recognition and social safeguarding of private property or individual wealth that there have resulted the building of ships, the intercourse between nations, the interchange of the varied commodities of different parts of the world, the facilities of travel, and the acquisition of a wider knowledge of the world's peoples and affairs; thus leading to a gradual dissemination of knowledge, culture, and tolerance, contributing to the uplifting of human needs and social conditions.

All these results to civilised mankind are in the nature of an edifice of saved and safeguarded human effort and enterprise, reared upon a foundation of encouragement, and protection from internal and external aggression by the community at large.

The removal of this foundation, or a greater or smaller interference with the guarantee of stability to individual human rights in property, would endanger the whole superstructure of society, just as surely as would any

tampering with the foundations of a building imperil its structural soundness.

The vicissitudes of nations, looked at over great periods of time, show that they rise into power and prominence, and fall back into subordinate place, as do the waves of the sea; and that the law of "the survival of the fittest" applies to the rise and fall of nations, as surely as it does to the merest insect-life in nature.

In all the long-drawn-out history of nation-building there have arisen, at different times, communities under every conceivable form of constitution, some written, some traditional, some based on more or less definite custom; but, among those that have survived the struggle for existence, there is not in existence to-day, or recorded in history, one single recognised, self-supporting community in which the institutions of liberty and private property have not formed the very basis or foundation: the veritable "corner stone" of the social structure.

The long-established recognition of private property, in all civilised and progressive nations, has led to the creation of distinct branches of the law, applicable and essential to its maintenance and vindication; as, for instance, the laws of trespass, theft, ejectment, etc., by which encroachments, of every kind and degree, are resented and punished by the whole community, acting through the medium of the national courts of justice.

The right to the unmolested enjoyment of private property, acquired in conformity with the laws or customs of the community, is not confined to individuals; but may now be enjoyed by groups of citizens, co-operating in various enterprises in the form of business firms or public companies.

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

CHAPTER VI.

THE STATE IN RELATION TO INDUSTRY

THE twentieth century has witnessed the wide circulation of many extraordinary theories or doctrines—one might fairly call them "nostrums"—in regard to the relationship of capital and labour, and as to the relative rights of each of these economic elements, as factors in the industrial and commercial activities of our time. There is undoubtedly a general and growing disposition, on the part of those who do not possess a substantial share of the accumulation of the wealth of the world—which disposition is being emphasised by systematic agitation—to question the right and title of those who do possess more or less wealth. They, who do not possess means of their own, question the right of those who do, by claiming the wealth for themselves, and by using a number of arguments, as specious as they are illogical and dishonest, in support of their claim. Many offensive epithets are being hurled by these claimants, or their champions, at the more fortunate of their fellow-citizens, because of their owning something, the possession of which enables them to dispense with manual labour, and to indulge in what the world calls "pleasure." And all these advantages are condemned, as if they were in the nature of offences to society. Yet, in looking into the manifestos of these

disturbing citizens and their fluent champions, one finds that they are simultaneously claiming, for the benefit of their own class, the identical things that they vehemently condemn when enjoyed by others. For instance: one finds, in communistic publications, frequent repetition of the demand for "more leisure, treasure, and pleasure" for the so-called "Proletariat"; and, as a rule, these manifestos are framed and phrased by men who are not themselves physical workers, but who receive payment, from the members of various organisations, of an amount that would be condemned as a "fat salary" or a "fat income" in classes outside these organisations. These claims, and the arguments used to support them, would truly astonish the shades of some of the older recognised economists, such as Adam Smith, Mill, Fawcett, McCulloch, Senior, and Bastiat, who, in their time, held the scales of economic justice between the different sections of society, and whose disinterested dicta were once regarded as beyond criticism.

It has now become necessary, in political discussion, to go back to first principles; in order to understand clearly to what extent public men, in high and authoritative places, are going to bend to these truly revolutionary influences, and to allow their minds and consciences to be diverted from the straight line of duty, where it seems to be more profitable, in a political or personal sense, to do so.

One is permitted to ask: What extent of knowledge of history or economics, or even of human nature and human affairs, is possessed by the authors of these new and loosely-expressed doctrines? They certainly present no evidence of either, in the promulgation of their new

creed; and, unfortunately, the majority of those to whom they address their message are as disinclined to question their knowledge and capacity, as they themselves are to put it to the test.

The great danger to modern States is that influential public men, of character and self-respect, such as have hitherto acted in controlling positions, will soon not be numerous enough to meet the incoming tide of another class, who make of politics a lucrative profession, and thus find it convenient and profitable to follow, instead of trying to lead, public opinion.

In order to understand correctly the relationship of the State to industry, it is essential to realise clearly the true relative positions of capital and labour—as evidenced by the success or failure of other communities—and to learn from practical experience the real and varying nature of both.

If there exist any good reasons against these time-honoured, workaday principles, of "mine" and "thine": of a man's right to the use and disposal of the things he has produced for himself; of the obligation on the other members of a community to guarantee these old-fashioned rights to their fellow citizens; then they have never been stated by those champions, who advocate their subversion. Until those new doctrines are forthcoming, with logic to sustain them, we must keep hold of the old sheet-anchors of civilisation.

"Labour," in an industrial sense, is the expenditure of human energy; and it may be embodied in a variety of forms, useful or useless to man; whereas capital is saved-labour, stored up in the shape of money or some other exchangeable form, useful to men.

"Saved-labour" may take the form of personal knowledge or skill, acquired and stored in the mind; and that is obviously the property of him who acquired and stored it; and it may, afterwards, be embodied in the form of some artificial work, or appliance for future use. Saved-labour (or capital), which has been embodied in a man's mind, in the form of personal knowledge or skill, ready to be applied, or that has been already incorporated in the material form of property, such as furniture, goods, ships, houses, etc., is, in the first place, the property of him who has owned the material, and expended the labour to turn it into a useful form.

If, in the production of anything of economic value, the labourer has used material which was previously obtained by the labour of others; then the result is the property of both, in the proportions represented by the labour required for each part of the total result.

The owner of any implement, by which, or building in which, he has used material of his own, and the labour of others, for which he has paid those others, is entitled to use that implement or building for his own benefit, or to dispose of it, by gift or exchange, for what he believes to be its equivalent in some other form.

The owner of a skilled or inventive mind is equally entitled to use that skill or inventive ability (as capital) for his own benefit, or to dispose of it to others for an equivalent in some other form.

Capital, then, may consist of *personal skill*, acquired by previous labour or study, and stored up in the mind, in the form of personal experience. It may consist of *inventive genius*, sometimes intuitive, and sometimes the result of a course of mental effort or of bodily labour,

expended in experiment, and ultimately embodied in the form of special knowledge—possibly embodied in patent rights—as a further form of capital.

Capital, again, may consist of a man's *credit;* that is, the confidence and reputation that he has established, in the estimation of others, in regard to himself, by a course of approved conduct, which affords a guarantee that he can be entrusted with the use of the capital of others.

Capital may consist of the *command of money*, which has been originally obtained by others' labour, saved and embodied in the metal itself, or subsequently acquired in exchange for some other form of saved-labour; and it may consist of *any other form of saved-labour* which has an exchangeable value.

An *unskilled labourer* is one who can contribute nothing but his present unskilled manual or physical energy towards the production of any work upon which he is occupied. But a *skilled labourer* is one who can contribute both his present energy (labour), as well as his saved energy, in the form of his special skill (capital), upon any work on which he is occupied.

A *capitalist* is one who has, and continues to possess, (acquired in accordance with the laws of his country), a right or title to any form of property or saved-labour.

Labour, without capital of some kind, in the form of skill, tools, instruments, or machinery, with which to apply it, is of comparatively small value, and then only for the most primitive purposes.

Labour with capital (in the form of skill, tools, instruments, or machinery) can produce additional capital in varying quantities, according to the skill of the labourer,

and the nature and extent of the capital or tools, with which the labour is operated.

The results of labour alone naturally belong to the labourer.

When something of value has been produced by the labour of one person, and the material of another; then, as already stated, the thing produced is the property of both, in proportion to the value of the material used, and of the labour expended; but, for the convenience of both, the two persons interested generally enter into an arrangement, by which the owner of the material pays the person who contributes the labour a sum of money agreed upon, called "wages," to compensate him for his share in the production; and then the owner of the material becomes the sole owner of the thing produced. The above truisms are necessarily stated here; because there are many extraordinary doctrines being widely taught, according to which all forms of capital are being claimed as justly belonging to the labourer, inasmuch as they were originally all produced by labour; but the use, for the time being, of the capital, in the shape of tools, materials, buildings, plus the use of the capital, while the value of the capital and labour have been co-operating, is apparently forgotten.

The subject of wages is one that is inextricably connected with the subject of industry. In a primitive condition, man expended his labour upon material of his own, and then naturally claimed the total result as belonging to himself. In modern times, under civilised conditions, men are employed to use the material of other people, to work with the tools or machinery of other people, and to expend their labour in forms which are

sometimes not immediately completed, or, if completed, not immediately realisable. The owner of the labour is called the labourer; and he may be either skilled or unskilled. The owner of the raw material used, of the tools, of the machinery, or of the buildings, in which the work is done, is called the capitalist; and the relationship of the one to the other involves many questions, upon which men hold various, and more or less correct, opinions, for the most part biassed, in many cases by the position occupied.

It is, as already stated, a growing practice, under modern political conditions, for the labourer to be told, by interested persons, that all capital belongs to him and his class; because the material, the machinery, the tools, or the buildings in which he works, have, in past times, been the result of the labour of other people, possibly long since dead and unknown to him. In accordance with this fallacy, the labourer of to-day—generally by his champion—confidently claims, for political purposes, that he and his class are entitled to everything upon which past workers have expended labour; although the proportion of value of their labour to the material of others, upon which it has been expended; to the machinery which has been used in the manufacture; to the tools requisite for the work, and to the building necessary to protect the workman and the industry from the weather—quite irrespective of the brain power of the organising capitalist, without which, possibly, no result would have been obtained—may be only infinitesimal.

If such an argument for the claims of the labourer were carried to its extreme, some truly ridiculous results might follow; since it might be contended that the man,

who was putting the ready-prepared materials of a house together, owned the house!

The subject of wages, too, requires to be carefully considered, in order to arrive at a just view as to their relation to the material upon which they are expended, and in order to clearly understand the extent of the share which the labourer has in the value of the thing manufactured. It is sometimes claimed that the workmen upon a building, constructed under contract, have a right to participate in the profit which the contractor may make, in addition to their wages; although those who make the claim would indignantly reject the theory that, if the contract ends in a loss, the workmen should share it or have nothing. The truth is, that the wage-earner, under ordinary circumstances, has no partnership claim in the result of his work; for, if he had, he would have to take the risk of the profit or the loss in the venture, as the case might be. A wage-earner impliedly gives up all claim to any profit which is made out of the work upon which he has been engaged; and the employer, correspondingly, has no claim upon the wage-earner to forego any part of his wages, if the same work results in a loss. There is, in fact, no partnership of any kind; and what are called wages are a *commutation* or adjustment of possible profit, based on the current wages or market value of labour of the kind for which the wages are paid. It is obvious, therefore, that the wage-earner cannot be entitled to anything beyond the wages agreed upon, unless he is also prepared and arranges to share any loss, as well as any profit, which may result. Moreover, wages are paid on the spot, or at a very short period, whether the owner of the material worked upon makes a

profit or not; and that same owner may have to wait for weeks or months or years, or even for all time, before he ever gets back the money he has expended in wages. Sometimes, as in the case of a non-paying gold or silver mine, he may never get any return whatever for his expenditure.

The subject of strikes and lock-outs is, too, closely related to the subject of industry. A "strike" is a sudden and simultaneous refusal, by a larger or smaller body of men, to continue the work they have been performing; and a "lock-out" is a sudden stoppage of the work of an industry, by an employer, by dismissing all or a large portion of the workmen engaged in the industry, because of some differences between employer and employees. Both the workmen and the employer have, according to the common law, a perfect right to put an end to the relationship of employer and workmen, provided the term already agreed upon has been brought to an end; but the two terms, "strike" and "lock-out," are more usually applied to circumstances in which there is, in existence, an actual or implied undertaking to continue. Many workmen seem to be under the impression that when they have suddenly ceased to work in any industry, they have the right to prevent other workmen from taking their places. This view is not founded on just principles, and is, moreover, quite contrary to law, as well as opposed to the principle of equal liberty for all.

Just as one body of labourers has the right to stop work; so the other body has an equal right to continue to work; and the law, where there is such an attempt on the part of the one class to stop the other class, applies to their action the term "intimidation."

The State has not (in the opinions of the recognised thinkers on political science) any inherent right to interfere between the capitalist and the workmen, unless there has been a breach of some actual or implied contract entered into between them, or some breach of the criminal law. The common law regards them as at liberty to make what arrangements they choose, one with the other; and the settlement of wages and hours, and conditions of labour, in most of the civilised communities of the world, is generally arranged according to the market value and custom of the locality in which the work is performed.

In certain younger countries, such as New Zealand and Australia, an attempt has been made to avoid sudden and extensive dislocations of commerce and industry, and to avert the loss and suffering that follow in the train of widespread stoppages of employment, by referring all disputes, between employers and workmen, in regard to wages, hours, and conditions of labour, to statutory tribunals, under a system of "compulsory arbitration." The original purpose of this system, involving, as it does, so serious a departure from the principles of commercial and industrial freedom, was to investigate the merits in all such disputes, in the light of a judicial and impartial mind, and to lead to the adoption of the Court's recommendations, by both parties, as to what was fair and reasonable.

It was, of course, assumed that whatever was decided by such a tribunal, chosen, in effect, by the two parties concerned in any dispute, would be readily adopted by both, so as to save time, trouble, financial loss, and class bitterness.

In the absence of such a compact, and of a readiness to abide by the results, when fairly arrived at, the whole departure from the principles of commercial and industrial freedom becomes inexpedient and wasteful. The most prominent representatives of labour in the United States, of which Mr. Gompers is a just example, have always been opposed to this system; and the results seem to confirm their objection; for in the two Dominions named, more especially in the Australian Commonwealth, the system seems to have broken down; and it has now been much discredited, since it has become a common practice for the employees to ignore the Court's decisions, where they do not approve of them.

There seems to be much misunderstanding among the working classes, in the countries mentioned, as to the obligations which are created by this modern tribunal.

If two citizens agree between themselves in regard to any matter of mutual concern, the agreement is binding, legally and morally; and he who attempts to "go back" on, or to ignore his bargain or compact, would become liable legally, and, moreover, deserves the severest condemnation by his fellow men; for an extension, by frequent repetition, of such a practice of repudiation, would make civilisation impracticable, lead to anarchy, and, in extreme cases, produce revolution.

Where two citizens fail to agree personally, and refer any question in dispute to a third citizen; agreeing to abide by his decision, as in arbitration: that decision, as pointed out, is as binding, legally and morally, as if the parties had agreed between themselves; and a repudiation of such a decision is as deserving of condemnation

as if the decision itself had been personally arrived at and then ignored.

Where a tribunal, established in the public interest, for the purpose of effecting compulsory arbitration, has had the parties of a dispute before it, either individually or by their duly-authorised representatives, and a decision has been arrived at; that decision is, and should be made, as legally and morally enforceable as if it had been the result of a personal arrangement between any two individual members of the disputing bodies.

In each of the three cases mentioned, the refusal to abide loyally and heartily by the decision arrived at, calls for the most drastic condemnation and denunciation by the whole community; since such a refusal strikes at the very tap root of social organisation and civilisation, and, if universally emulated, would resolve what we call "society" into its elements of primitive and barbaric units.

Laws are useless for the purpose of regulating and disciplining the rougher and lawless types of men and women, unless the strict observance of them is insisted upon, and the whole community heartily supports that insistence; and no steps should be neglected, by those who are in charge of the executive of a community, to make this insistence their most urgent obligation, as guardians of the people's welfare.

Those public men who fail to do their duty, by upholding and vindicating the law—and many have so failed—are thereby demonstrating their unfitness for any position of authority in a modern community; since they are thus tampering with the very foundations of civilisation, and helping to destroy the social organisation, which they have been appointed to protect and maintain.

The logical effect of allowing workmen, who have been parties to compulsory arbitration, to ignore the decisions of the tribunal to which they have actually or impliedly submitted their differences, whilst holding the employer bound to accept the finding of the same tribunal, is as if the State had handcuffed the employer, and allowed the workman to be free to assault him in his commercial and industrial interests. The effect upon the commerce and industry of a community, in which this license were widely permitted, would be either to destroy completely both interests, or to cause the prices of the commodities produced to rise to a point which would afford compensation to the employer, whilst penalising the quiet and law-abiding citizens, who were the consumers of such commodities, and innocent of the law-breaking offence. And if such a system, or want of system, were extensively observed by governments, it would endanger the harmony of the community, and possibly lead to a breach of the peace among citizens. Australian and New Zealand communities, especially the former, have been frequently concerned in these discreditable incidents.

CHAPTER VII.

NATIONAL DEFENCE

THE twentieth century has been, so far, an age of racial competition and national aggregation; and those communities which, either from want of racial-stamina, or from unskilful statesmanship: such as false economy, want of thought, or want of foresight, fail to "keep abreast" in the contest for supremacy, must fall into the background, or run the risk of being absorbed by some larger and more powerful body-politic, which may require additional territory for its own national expansion, sea frontage for its growing commerce, or more extensive area for its increasing population.

All the greater nations of the world are, or were, till quite recently, aspiring to found empires, and, in order to effect their purpose, are, or were, seeking to acquire "possessions" in different parts of the world, either by purchase, exchange, or appropriation; the ultimate object being to establish colonies for their own people, who would be expected to acknowledge and bear allegiance to the parent nation.

The five years of war, which is now at an end, has considerably sobered the more extreme forms of this "earth-hunger"; and the establishment of the League of Nations promises to lead to the adoption of less aggressive methods of national acquisition of territory than have hitherto been observed.

The safety of the smaller communities of the world from absorption will not, it is hoped, now depend so much upon their individual power to successfully meet aggression; or upon their protection from invasion by a parent nation to which they are attached; nor even upon the objection on the part of some stronger nation to their being so absorbed, lest it may lead to the upsetting of some international "balance."

The outlying possessions of a powerful nation may remain for a long time wholly dependent upon the parent body-politic, as has been the case in regard to German and French Colonies; and, if the parent body-politic be far distant, such colonies may even become a substantial drain on its defensive resources, by requiring to be guarded at a distance, or supported by funds, for sentimental reasons.

On the other hand, subordinate communities or colonies may, as in the cases of certain of the British Dominions, by means of rich resources, rapid growth, the enjoyment of freedom, and the good judgment of local statesmanship, provide themselves with means of warfare beyond their own immediate local needs, and so develop into valuable adjuncts, and even become aids to the means of defence of the parent nation.

The lowering of the stamina of the individual citizens of a State has the effect of lowering the corporate stamina of the State itself; and, by parity of reasoning, the neglect by subordinate States, Dominions, or "possessions," to keep themselves effectively equipped for warfare, in proportion to their means, has the effect of lowering the aggregate defensive power of the Empire or corporate group of communities of which they are

constituent parts, and so, of increasing their own chances of being attacked, and possibly conquered, as part of such an Empire or group of communities.

Similarly, the neglect of a subordinate community to maintain, in an efficient state, a system of defence, which it has already established, is not only a failure in its duty to itself and its citizens, but a cause of weakness to the Empire or group of communities to which it belongs.

The progress of a community or nation presupposes the continuance of its independence, and the maintenance of its powers of development, in all the channels of activity, which make for the national progress and security, and the consequent happiness of its people; and the neglect, by its statesmen, of its powers of defence, is an obstacle to progress of the first importance, and a proof that the statecraft of those who have conducted its affairs has been found wanting.

Taxation is now the substituted form for the old feudal obligation of personal service, which, therefore, every citizen is considered liable to contribute to the order and progress of the community.

In primitive society, every member of a tribe is expected to co-operate, personally, in the defence of its existence, rights, and possessions; but as a community grows, and its members become more absorbed in industrial and other pursuits, which are deemed to contribute to its national welfare, as well as to the personal welfare of each citizen; they are permitted to substitute a money contribution for the former personal service, and thereby to assist in maintaining a body of specially-trained persons, as well as in providing the community with specially-designed means for ensuring its national safety.

An important problem of statesmanship in regard to national defence, for which it is difficult to lay down any general principle applicable in all cases, is the decision as to how far a nation should go, in expenditure, and in what direction, in providing means of defence against outside aggression.

The progress of the art of warfare is so rapid that what is considered "up to date" to-day, may be considered by the same authorities entirely out of date within a few years, or even a few months; and this is convincingly demonstrated in relation to such weapons as rifles, field guns, gun-carriages, naval guns, ships' hulls, in size, form, weight, or speed, mode of construction or motion, in submarines, or aerial means of attack or defence.

Everything depends upon the progress of other possibly antagonistic communities; and it therefore becomes necessary for those, who are prominent in the governing of a community, to make a wide and careful study of the world's progress, as a guide to their own deliberations.

It is quite impossible for any but the very ablest experts to express an opinion, which is of value, on these heads; and frequent consultation with such experts, who keep themselves familiar with the progress of other nations in these respects, is essential, where it is desired to avoid absolute waste of national funds.

As to how far a country is justified in going, in its expenditure on defence of any kind, is a question that depends upon its own means; upon the geographical position, and the attractive character of its own territory and possessions in the eyes of other nations; and upon its dependence upon itself.

It is often said, that a certain percentage of a citizen's income should be observed in the expenditure upon house rent; but there is no such guide in regard to a country's expenditure on defence.

Experts do not, and cannot be expected to, consider this aspect of statecraft; for they are naturally and necessarily bent upon providing the most modern and perfect equipment for the community in which they are called upon to exercise their knowledge and skill in matters of defence; and they are so prone to make defeat impossible, that they almost invariably lean to a fulness of expenditure that those who have to provide the means may easily consider extravagant.

It seems more than probable that one of the beneficial economical effects of the new order of international affairs, produced by the League of Nations, will be the ultimate all-round reduction of armaments; for, although the first impulse and tendency will be to establish and maintain a more extensive and costly means of defence than is absolutely necessary in the altered circumstances of the world; reflection will soon convince the larger communities that to do so will involve needless waste of the people's money; and the general tendency will then be towards a widespread economy in this particular department of national expenditure.

CHAPTER VIII.

TAXATION

TAXATION is one of the necessary and unavoidable consequences of social organisation in what are called civilised countries. Every such community, as a whole, has forced upon it a variety of forms of expenditure, among which the following are the most important and legitimate :—Naval and military defence against possible aggression from without; the policing of the community from within, in order to prevent or check internal disturbances among citizens; providing and remunerating judges, magistrates, and other judicial officials, and defraying the cost of Court incidentals; providing and maintaining a Parliament House and public departments, and remunerating Ministers of the Crown, Members of Parliament, and Civil Servants outside the judiciary, etc.

In many young communities, and in some old ones, it has become the practice to use public moneys for a great variety of purposes, outside the more legitimate functions of government, as they are deemed to be and so defined, by recognised economic writers.

And it must be remembered that politicians themselves are not the best, or even good, authorities as to what is wisest in this regard; especially where they are, for political purposes, advocating some particular expenditure, the economic propriety of which is doubtful. The

economic authority, who writes independently of Parliament, has no constituency to serve, and can look at and judge such a question with a quiet unbiassed eye; for he is, as a rule, considering the public welfare only, in forming and passing his judgment.

In some countries the building of railways and tramways has been undertaken in the public interest, and out of public funds; and as this involves a departure from the stricter principles of limiting the State to necessary functions, and leaving such enterprises to private effort; its wisdom or unwisdom is still a subject of controversy among more thoughtful public men.

There are many well-known economic thinkers who consider that the Government should leave all such work to private enterprise, which can always be trusted to undertake work of any kind from which a reasonable return may be obtained on the capital sum invested; and they base their objections on the ground that the appropriation of the people's money for any purpose, except to protect them from outside attack and internal disturbance, is a breach of the people's right or liberty to do as they choose with their own money; inasmuch as State enterprises of any kind involve a sort of compulsory share contribution by the people to every such venture, by requiring the citizens to pay taxes for purposes they may disapprove, and thus be involved in loss, where the ventures do not prove self-supporting.

The grounds upon which, what is called State ownership of railways and tramways, is justified by its advocates is, in the case of young countries: that the railways may be run to districts, the traffic of which is not immediately sufficient to pay for the investment, so as to induce

private enterprise to undertake it; and, in the case of old countries, that railways become monopolies in the hands of private persons or public companies, and so subject to abuse, in the shape of exorbitant charges for their services.

Whether railways and tramways should be left to private enterprise or undertaken by the State in the interests of the whole community is, and will remain, a debatable problem: according to the age of the country; the financial means of the community that desires it; and the character of the country, and its population.

However this may be, there is a great preponderance of opinion among the best-known thinkers and writers, that the general principle should be carefully observed; viz., that all enforced expenditure, beyond that essential for the country's safety, from without and within, and that necessary for the quiet maintenance of the institution of government, should be avoided by the State, on the grounds that enforced contributions from the people for such purposes constitute a breach of the fundamental principle of government.

Experience shows that the majority of the people, who have not devoted much attention to the study of the most economical management of a State, do not recognise the wisdom of fixing any limit whatever to the functions of the State, as against the interests or rights of the individual citizen, but conclude, in an unscientific or rough-and-ready way, that the State is justified in accumulating and using public moneys in any manner which the majority may desire, and which will afford some temporary satisfaction to those who personally

benefit by the expenditure. Such persons regard the State as a sort of foster-parent, whose function it is to "get" money out of the well-to-do, irrespective of the just principle referred to, and to scatter it in a variety of forms of expenditure, which will placate or please, or mollify, certain classes—generally those who have contributed least towards the consolidated revenue, out of which the expenditure is taken.

This lax method of appropriating and distributing the tax-paying citizens' money—not in accordance with their contributions, but irrespective of principles, and in such a way as to bring temporary popularity to a government, or a political party, or to certain parliamentary representatives—is one of the most serious blots on the political institutions of our time.

The question of taxation, or, in other words, of the imposition of contributions to the public funds, out of which to pay the expenses of a government, is, in truth, a matter of the greatest national importance : to the community as a whole, and to the individual taxpayer, who has to pay for the advantages. For, if there is no limit to the right of the government, or of the majority of the people, represented in a parliament, to levy taxes upon individual citizens ; a government could make so many, and such large demands, that it would take from them the whole, or the greater part, of their capital or "saved-labour," and, in fact, involve confiscation ; and, in such a case, they would be defeating the whole purpose of social organisation, which is to co-operate in securing to each citizen his or her individual liberty and that "saved-labour," or what is called private property, which should be considered sacred, as a public trust.

This scientific or logical aspect of political society is so little considered by the average citizen, that the abuse of majority-rule goes on, without being checked or widely exposed in its most injurious aspects.

As a fact, the most eminent economic authorities on the science of government are practically unanimous in regard to the principle which—in the broad interests of every community—should be observed in imposing taxation upon the members of any modern and civilised community.

The distinction between what are considered legitimate, and what are regarded by economists as unjustifiable, subjects of public expenditure, is a scientific one. The people themselves are not at all accurate or just judges, in regard to this distinction; because, to correctly determine it, involves a careful consideration of the true purposes of the institution of government, and the cumulative effect which would be produced if this distinction were wholly disregarded. In careless or unprincipled political hands, public moneys could be expended upon so many popular purposes, that citizens usually do, and should be required to do, for themselves, that their spirit of self-help and independence would be seriously sapped, and their moral sense lowered; and the expense of these services would, if unchecked, become so great, that the taxes levied to defray them would drain the resources of the more enterprising citizens, who by their care and providence, and, in many cases, by their own self-denial, had saved enough to make them thus liable as taxpayers.

This abuse, by enervating the class who do not pay their just proportion of taxes, and by impoverishing the

class who are forced to pay more than their just proportion, would defeat the one purpose of government, as was done in France, prior to the Revolution ; and, sooner or later, if the abuse were carried to extremes, the people of large means would either leave such a community, and place their capital for investment elsewhere, where taxation was more just and moderate, or the body-politic would undergo an upheaval or revolution.

Hence this authoritatively recognised line, at which the State ceases—according to true statesmanship—to be justified in the expenditure of moneys belonging to its citizens.

Leading economists, although they have differed in detail, as to the exact points upon which that line should be drawn, are nevertheless agreed on a general principle in regard to the true limits of taxation, out of which State expenditure should be defrayed.

The father of the Science of Political Economy was Adam Smith, who wrote his *Wealth of Nations* about 140 years ago. The "man in the street" may have heard of his name, but he has not familiarised himself with his writings. Adam Smith's book is not only what is termed a classic ; but it constitutes a landmark in political thought and literature ; and his writings, already referred to at length, have been spoken of by Professor Sidgwick, in his own *Principles of Political Economy*, as "epoch making." Sidgwick devotes almost the whole of his own introduction to a discussion on Adam Smith's work, and the fire of criticism through which it has passed during nearly a century and a half, which has elapsed since its publication. He admits, too, that "English economists have, speaking broadly,

adhered to Adam Smith's limitations of the sphere of government."

Another great authority (Professor Stewart) has used the following words in regard to Adam Smith :—"A great and leading object of Adam Smith's speculations is, to demonstrate that the most effectual plan for advancing a people to greatness is to maintain that order of things which nature has pointed out, by allowing every man, as long as he observed the rules of justice, to pursue his own interests in his own way, and to bring both his industry and his capital into the freest competition with those of his fellow citizens."

Adam Smith, himself, laid down three propositions in regard to the State, and the forms of expenditure of the citizens' money, in which it was justified in indulging. He said :—"The first duty of the Sovereign (which in modern times may be taken to mean the government) is that of defending the society (by which he means the community) from the violence and injustice of other societies."

"The second duty is that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society, from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing the exact administration of justice."

"The third duty is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals."

Apart from these three broad principles in regard to the duties of the State, Adam Smith laid down four

distinct "maxims" in regard to taxes in general, and the first three are as follow :—

1. "The subjects of every State ought to contribute always towards the support of the government, *as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities:* that is, *in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State.*

2. "The expense of government to the individuals of a great nation is like the expense of management to the tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute *in proportion to their respective interests in the estate.*

3. "In the observation or neglect of this 'maxim' consists what is called *equality or inequality of taxation.*"

It is the fashion nowadays for "practical" politicians to brush aside these maxims, and the general teachings of Adam Smith, by applying to them such glib phrases as "out of date," "old fashioned," "exploded," and thus dismissing them from *their own* consideration; but it will almost invariably be found that these "practical" authorities have never even looked inside the covers of that great writer, but preferred their own empirical and superficial dicta, as better suited to the *ad captandum* purposes of popular politics. It is only fair to say, that such criticism does not call for serious answer, any more than would that class of critics who doubt the existence of the equator, or dismiss the law of gravitation, if either fact stands in the way of political expediency.

Ricardo, who wrote his well-known treatise on *Political Economy* just a century ago, readily adopted Adam Smith's views and principles, and made them the basis of his own criticism, as to taxation being "equal" or "unequal."

Malthus, also, who wrote his book on Political Economy a year after that of Ricardo, adopted the reasoning and classification of Adam Smith as practically final.

John Stuart Mill, whose name is yet a household word, on the subject of Political Economy; and who was, besides, one of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century in regard to "logic," "liberty," and "representative government," said:—"The qualities desirable, economically speaking, in a system of taxation, have been embodied by Adam Smith in his four 'maxims' or principles, which have been generally concurred in by subsequent writers, and may be said to have *become classical*."

He continues: "Setting out from the 'maxim,' that equal sacrifices should be demanded from all," and then reviews the several arguments for a graduated property tax; finally condemning it, as based on conditions "according to which no government should shape its course." He adds: "Government should set an example of rating all things at their true value, and ought not to sanction the vulgarity of prizing them for the pitiful vanity of being known to possess them, or the paltry shame of being supposed to be without them." He then proceeds to say:—"To tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the smaller, is to lay a tax on industry and economy: to impose a penalty on people for having worked harder and saved more than their neighbours."

Passing from Mill to Professor Henry Fawcett, whose work on *Political Economy* appeared in 1883, we find him saying:—"The State must possess a revenue . . . a government cannot possibly exist unless it possesses a

revenue . . . This revenue may be obtained by rapine or pillage; but, if such means are resorted to, the revenue is not raised by taxes, for taxation implies that the right to levy a tax is given by law . . . The question, therefore, is at once suggested: Are there any principles which will enable us to decide whether any particular tax is just or unjust—defensible or indefensible?" And he adds: "Adam Smith considered that all the principles of taxation might be deduced from the four rules or precepts, which have been termed 'Canons of Taxation.'"

This well-known statesman and economist discusses, at some length, several difficulties as applied to any particular tax, but concludes with the opinion that "The aggregate amount which each individual pays in taxes ought to be in proportion to his ability to contribute to the revenue of the State."

I have now referred at length, but as briefly as practicable, consistent with clearness, to this galaxy of economic authority, in order to show to those readers who cannot see their way to adopt this view, that at least the greatest unbiassed minds which have been devoted to the subject of State taxation, extending over a century and a half, accept the "maxims" of Adam Smith, as a sort of final authority; as, in fact, embodying the last word on the subject.

In order to impress readers, I may quote the testimony of a man whose reputation was two-fold: as a statesman and an economist. I refer to Robert Lowe (afterwards Lord Sherbrooke). He said, "I think that Adam Smith is entitled to the merit, and the unique merit, among all men who ever lived in the world, of having founded a

deductive and demonstrative science of human actions and conduct."

Notwithstanding this overwhelming consensus of scientific authority, there are, and will be, many who contend that there should be no limit to taxation, or to State activities. Such persons are Socialists; and, in order to reason with them, one would have to go back to the first principle of sociology, and discuss the whole purpose of State organisation in greater detail than I have done or could find space for.

I have already commented upon the tendency of modern legislatures, where they are inclined to go to extremes in taxation, to lose sight, altogether, of the dividing line between legitimate taxing methods and veritable confiscation. That tendency had not become so marked in the times in which the older economic authorities laid down what they considered honest and sound principles; but such later writers as Mill, Fawcett, and Spencer did not fail to put their mark against it, as a protest. It is now becoming more accentuated, under ultra-democratic rule, in the activities of which there are observable less and lower moral standards. One of the most courageous and sound politicians of our day, in the practical politics of the British Empire—Lord Robert Cecil—has recently expressed some valuable economic opinions concerning the morality and expediency of the latest death duty proposals, in which the true principles of taxation are involved; and I consider some of his observations worthy of being taken from the columns of *The Times*, and given a more permanent record, for the benefit of those who are interested in the true principles of taxation. He first protests against the

proposed increase, on the ground that "the amount proposed to be levied—40 per cent. on a total inheritance of £2,000,000; not reckoning succession and legacy duty—seems to be plainly confiscatory." He shows the difficulty of realisation of so large a sum to provide funds for payment, and then takes exception to the fact that the element of consent is absent, where the impost falls on so few citizens; although it exists "where a numerous class is taxed." He further contends that, where there is no consent, "the great principle of no taxation without representation is violated; and the fundamentals of liberty are imperilled"; and he argues, from this, that "if it were wrong for a powerful king and a powerful nobility to tax the Commons in the year 1295, without their consent; it is not right for a Parliament, elected on a low franchise, to tax enormously a very small number of very rich people." He adds: "Power, rather than consent, seems to be the basis of all such taxation, whether of commoners or millionaires." Taking up another stand; Lord Robert Cecil argues: "One can indeed say, as I say, that we must not steal from a man, however rich; and if a tax of 40 per cent. be not stealing from a fortune of £2,000,000, it is not easy to see why it should be deemed objectionable from a fortune of £200,000." There is, indeed, a great danger in the inconsistency thus pointed out; for, as the writer says: "There is no greater folly than in supposing that you can invade the principles of property, in respect to very rich people, and keep them intact for the benefit of moderately-rich people." And it would be well for those who unhesitatingly assent to these stupendous levies on very large fortunes, to consider whether, in thus

setting aside principle, they are not laying down a precedent and a practice that, before long, may be claimed to be applicable to much more moderate fortunes; for, as Lord Robert Cecil points out, "It is difficult, from the point of view of the ordinary wage-earner, to draw any intelligible distinction between the treatment due to a fortune of two millions, and one of two hundred thousands." He pronounces these taxes to be "ethically unjustifiable, as well as inexpedient." With that protest, economic writers must be content; for the power to tax, being in the majority; it seems as useless to talk to a Parliament about moral standards, as it would be for the lamb of fable to appeal to the lion, on the parallel ground of "fair play."

It would, obviously, be out of place in this small work, and especially in this chapter, to attempt to deal at greater length with the question of State rights and their proper limits. It may, however, be said, generally, that in the hands of most writers who have dealt with this subject in a scientific spirit, there is comparative unanimity; for they all recognise that, primarily, there is no clear right to tax at all, as it involves taking from a citizen that which the State professes to guarantee to him by virtue of his citizenship; and that the breach of that primary purpose is only justified on the ground that the community cannot preserve the State, as a State, and so protect each of its citizens, unless it first obtain all-round contributions from those who compose it, by which to provide protection for it from outside aggression and internal disturbance.

If this be taken as the starting point in the question, the "burden of proof" is placed upon the shoulders of

those who claim that this or that expenditure should be incurred "by the State." For, again, it may be argued that a modern community is not, and should not be, sought to be converted into, a charitable institution, in which "those who have" shall spend their substance to benefit "those who have not." Such a grouping of individuals as that, in which no limit to taxation or confiscation is recognised, is a Commune; for, under such a regime, there would be no limits to the extent to which the majority, who own or preserve little or nothing, could prey upon the minority, who possess means beyond their immediate needs. Mill, and other modern economists, who saw the beginning of the later tendency of politicians to exceed all reasonable limits in the scope of State expenditure, recognised, and attempted to fix, a distinct limit to the scientific right. Unfortunately, politics have, of late years, drifted from their higher moral standards; and many unprincipled men in high places, and self-seeking journals, bidding for "circulation," have introduced an auctioneering element into the arena of political policy, by seeking to outbid one another in suggestions to spend the taxpayers' money, in directions which, emulating the largess of ancient times, would reduce public expenditure to a dishonest scramble of money belonging to other people. With such men, the question becomes one of expediency, rather than of political principle or morality. Every man, nowadays, who is called to fill a high post in practical politics, has sooner or later to ask himself whether he will be guided by principle, and so refuse to associate himself with such administrative irregularities, or drift into one or other of the numerous currents of political and popular expediency that present themselves

to him in his career. The theoretical "down stream" conduct is easy, and beguiling, to a slack political conscience; and the "up stream" course, of honest duty, is sometimes hard and strenuous; but the man who chooses the latter more regular course, and has good and sound reasons for his rectitude in principle, as he goes, will be able, at a later stage, to look back upon his political course, and see what boatmen call a "straight wake" behind him, and feel that, as Nelson said, he has "done his duty."

BOOK IV.

AIDS AND OBSTACLES TO HUMAN PROGRESS

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CHAPTER I.

AIDS AND OBSTACLES TO HUMAN PROGRESS

Their Bearing on the Art of Statecraft

I HAVE shown in previous chapters, what is man's nature, from a civic standpoint, and what are his characteristics and true "needs," as distinguished from his "wants"; and I have endeavoured to demonstrate that, in order to enable groups of humanity to live together in a community, in such a way as to avoid conflict and disorder, it is indispensable to establish a governing body; to make rules and to enforce them, with the co-operative aid of all the citizens who comprise it. The art of managing such a community, and of conducting its affairs, so as to secure its legitimate objects, without needlessly curtailing the energies of its individual members, or unnecessarily restricting their freedom, I have called "statecraft," or "statesmanship"; and I now propose to consider certain features and circumstances, which aid the governing power, or obstruct it, in its legitimate purpose of attaining to true and lasting progress.

Opinions differ considerably as to the correct definition of what is called "Progress," as applied to human affairs; and it will be necessary, in a subsequent chapter, to discuss the several aspects of that term, with a view to determining what constitutes true and lasting

progress. In the meantime, it is essential to consider, in detail, the bearing of the various aids and hindrances to the attainment of the highest standards of success in a modern civilised community, and, the means to that end in the government of such a community, as portions of the proper study of statecraft.

Human progress necessarily presupposes the continued existence of organised society; in which all citizens are co-operating for their mutual interest; and that continuance cannot be assured, unless its people and its institutions be first safeguarded from external aggression; and also be so regulated in regard to individual conduct as to be proof against a variety of disintegrating forces, such as may arise within its own borders, and among its own individual citizens.

If those two needs be provided for; then it becomes necessary for those who undertake the practice of the art of statecraft, in connection with its affairs, to study and understand the best means of keeping the community ever prepared to resist all possible, as well as probable, attacks from without, which may be inimical to its continued existence; and this will require the units of the community to co-operate, directly or indirectly, in some scheme for maintaining a sufficient force for effective defence purposes. It will thus involve the maintenance of an expert class, whose special province it will be to study the aggressive powers and methods of outside communities, and adopt, from time to time, the most effectual means of maintaining or modifying a defence force equal or superior to any probable foe or combination of foes, by which their own community may be attacked.

A further necessity will arise, to keep organised and maintained, and to confer authority on, some competent body, to lay down and enforce obedience to the approved rules and regulations in regard to the personal conduct of citizens; so that they may be forced to observe the true limits of their own individual rights and liberties, and respect the equal rights of their fellow citizens; thus to avoid friction, conflict, and social discord.

The establishment and separation, and the keeping distinct, the several constituted authorities (Parliament, municipal bodies, etc.) by which social regulations (laws, by-laws, etc.) are made, from those by which they are interpreted (courts of law), only arises, as a general rule, at the inception of a community, or on its reaching some higher stage of organisation, or at its complete or partial reconstruction. But the occasional changes required to be made in the powers of those several authorities; and the more frequent changes required to be made in the social regulations (laws), by means of which the community is governed, demand, if wisely effected, a comprehensive knowledge of human nature, human history, human needs, and the best traditions of human progress.

It will be obvious, therefore, that the various "aids and obstacles to human progress," which may come from without, or which may arise within, a community, are not only fit, but essential, subjects of study, for all who aspire to take a patriotic part in the practice of statecraft, by means of which their community is governed.

The factors that work for or against sound statesmanship, or that constitute powerful aids or obstacles to progress, are so numerous, that one could devote a bulky volume to their detailed exposition. In a little work like

the present, one can only deal with the more salient of them.

Every politician, whose aims are truly patriotic, and not prompted by some form of self-interest, such as a desire for some ministerial office, or official position for himself, or for the attainment of some political advantages for his own particular constituency, which he thinks will render his next election more certain, or more easy—every such statesman, if he wishes to check bad legislation, or help on that which is desirable, must be prepared to meet with many disappointments, which may discourage him in his patriotic aims. They will afford a test of the depth of his patriotism. He will have to "possess himself in patience," and do the best he can; availing himself of the good opportunities—as a mariner does with fair winds—and doing his best to counteract the many obstacles—as the mariner attempts to lessen the effect of adverse winds and currents—so that, in the end, he may, even if he does not always succeed, at least feel that he has "done his best"; and that, as a still less distinguished result, possibly, by retaining his representative position, kept a less patriotic citizen out of Parliament. The obstacles are numerous; for they include all the forms of ignorance, prejudice, and selfishness to which flesh is heir: operating inside and outside Parliament through various persons, who are endeavouring to use that institution for the purpose of gaining some profit, or some advantage that can be turned into profit, for themselves individually, or for some class who may help them in their political career. The following chapters will, accordingly, attempt to explain in detail what the most salient

of those many aids and obstacles are, and examine the various ways in which they run with or counter to the public good, and in some cases effect positive harm to the people. I shall also endeavour to enumerate some good influences that play around the institution of Parliament, and which may, with care and opportune action, be "taken at the flood" in the people's interest.

The personal factors that work for or against sound statesmanship are, as I have said, numerous and necessarily involved; and, therefore, one of the first requisites of the qualified politician, next to that of a knowledge of statecraft itself, as an art, is the study of his fellow legislators, in all their varieties; for every law which has to pass through the fire of Parliament has to be approved by a majority of his kind; and, therefore, it is indispensable that those who have the introduction or the criticism of measures for the community's good or ill, should be able to attach the appropriate weight and influence to the comments and criticism of their fellows, by possessing a just estimate of the personal, or party, or class, interests, by which each of them is allowing himself to be moved. For it is astonishing how easily and how soon a partisan comes to believe that he is patriotic; and that the narrow interests by which he is allowing himself to be moved or checked, are wide and far-reaching, as well as directly contributing to the progress of the community!

CHAPTER II.

TRUE PROGRESS DEFINED

IT would be an obvious mistake to suppose that the progress of man depends, even largely, on Parliaments. True progress must come from the moral evolution of human nature; but Parliaments will ever play an important part in checking the conduct of selfish and lawless men, who are indifferent to progress, and would, if allowed to do so, even check progress, to gain their own ends.

If the majority of citizens were to be guided, or beguiled, into enthusiasm, by the multifarious ideals of social and political progress that are formulated by many "practical" politicians, and some political writers —principally journalists—who, from time to time, seek to influence public opinion; then any definite and practicable scheme of organised society would become impossible, even of conception; for the theories would counteract one another, render one another impossible in practice, and produce, when jointly set in motion, nothing short of civil disturbance and social chaos. Those who are habitually idle, would desire to have a community in which all the needs, and even the luxuries, of life were perpetually plentiful; whilst they, and the rest of the world, enjoyed a continuous career of leisure; those who are sufficiently energetic bodily, but for want of knowledge or ability, unsuccessful in life, would have

all the world put back, periodically, to a fresh starting point, and, at a later stage, kept back, till they and other incompetents had caught up to the competent and provident; those who have no foresight to make provision for the future would, if they had their way, restrict everybody else to a limited income, and allow no one to accumulate, even for prudential reasons; those who have no personality or individuality, and, metaphorically, "lean against every post" they meet with, would have leaning posts provided by the community, and make it difficult for everybody else to stand erect upon his own feet; those who have become affluent by inheritance, and never done any work for a livelihood, would have everybody else kept poor and dependent, so as to be ever subservient to them; those who are obsessed with the idea of some form of self-denial would arrange the world so that everybody else should share their obsession; those who had no taste for anything but money-making would, if they had their way, place an embargo on all kinds of recreation, that were not "productive"; those, whose minds had become distorted with a narrow sense of religious duty, would abolish all forms of pleasure and personal vanity, even though they might have a "tonic" effect on those who would indulge in them; those who had been severely trained to regard all forms of intoxicants as the root of all forms of evil, and believed they were, would prohibit a whole community from a rational use of them; because some infinitesimal percentage of its people could not taste them without losing their balance. Then there are those, who are so convinced that their particular creed is heaven-sent, that they would, if they were able, force others to believe what

they believed, or be prevented from believing anything at all, and undergo some form of persecution as a punishment.

One must, in fact, go back to first principles, in the search for a true guide to rational happiness for all; so as to discover a form of government which, whilst being generous and indulgent to no one in particular, will be just and equitable to all. For the world is not ideal, and does not yet contain even the materials for a millennium. The question is not: what mankind would like, but what it can have, under all the circumstances of the particular community in which we are destined to live.

Reading the story of Robinson Crusoe in book form, with "coloured illustrations," and as written "after the event"; we are inclined to regard that boys' hero as having enjoyed an uncommonly happy existence, until he left the island; but we are apt to forget the dangers, the trials, the hardships, and the struggles of his early days, before he had, by hard work, hard thinking, native ingenuity, and tremendous courage and perseverance, made his island a safe and habitable home.

There is one feature of such a community, which consists of one person living alone on a sea-girt island; that he (the one person) cannot quarrel with his neighbours! A second occupant would completely alter the situation; unless, like "Friday," that second person at once surrendered unconditionally to the original occupant, and obeyed him in all things, as was the case. A second occupant, of the more egoistic type, who might have subsequently come to the island, would have raised the whole question of social organisation; for each of the occupants would

have to agree to a mutual arrangement of "give and take," "live and let live," so as to make existence bearable. With the advent of the second occupant, who claimed equal rights, there would arise the necessity for some such arrangement; and if we can imagine each of the two occupants enjoying such equal rights, as represented in the concrete form of a circle; that arrangement would only work amicably, so long as the two circles did not overlap one another at any point. On a large island, the two circles, representing in their outer rims, the limits of their occupant's respective rights, could and would be large, leaving each of these occupants ample scope for the exercise of his freedom or rights; but, as soon as a third permanent occupant of the island arrived, the circles would require to be reduced, if overlapping were not to take place, with its consequent conflict or dispute.

Bearing this concrete figure or illustration in mind; it will be at once seen that the more the occupants increased in number, the smaller would become the allowable circles; and the extreme form of this illustration would be found in a great city, where the circles would be so exceedingly small, to admit of everybody enjoying the same or equal rights, that each occupant or citizen would become like a person with his arms metaphorically tied by his side. Yet, such is the true condition of each citizen, in a very closely-peopled community, having regard to the body of laws, by-laws, regulations, traditions, conventions, customs, and social observances by which every well-conducted citizen is guided.

It will be noted, also, that in this method of picturing the scope of each man's or woman's rights, no question

of conflict or discord could arise, until some one citizen allowed the circle of his rights and liberties, or in other words, his activities, mental or bodily, to overlap those of one or more of his neighbours; for, in such a system, each would do as he wished, think as he wished, and believe as he wished, so long as he did not trespass beyond the circle of his own rights, and so impinge on the circle of his neighbour.

This parallel or analogy appears to me to throw some light on, and to be some aid to, the working out of a scheme or principle in connection with social organisation. It allows what such "individualistic" thinkers, as Herbert Spencer, demand: "the fullest freedom for each, compatible with the equal freedom of all."

In such a simple set of circumstances as those of the life of Defoe's hero, questions concerning liberty and its curtailment never arose; and the rights of property never called for adjudication in such a state of existence. But the outlook of the big, outer world is very different, under its now much altered conditions; especially since population is gradually filling up all its once empty places, and since the gregariousness and desire for safety from attacks by other groups have prompted men and women to live together in towns and cities and nations, for mutual advantage and safety. Man has grown, too, in his knowledge of the natural forces that ever played around him in the world, and that once he feared, and invested with mysterious personalities and individualities. His increased knowledge of, and familiarity with, nature's laws, has given him courage to treat them with confidence, and to use them, one against another, for his own purpose; to employ one or other of those laws of

nature to do for him work that previously seemed humanly impossible; so that to-day he seems to be, to some extent, in control of a world in which he at one time figured as a timid and helpless atom.

Man has, in fact, by reason of this knowledge, changed the face of the world in many respects; he has "moved mountains," and pierced them through and through in order to obtain "short cuts." He has run one ocean into another, and diverted seas and rivers from their natural beds and courses, for his own economic convenience. He has learned to travel in the air from one country to another, and not only traversed oceans, but accomplished long journeys beneath their ever-changing surfaces; he has subdued the animal kingdom and the vegetable kingdom, denuded forests, and planted fresh ones for his own purposes. All this has been done by a careful study of nature's laws, and in accordance with certain recognised and acknowledged man-made regulations, conceived with the object of avoiding human conflict in the carrying out of these great conquests of mind over matter.

It has all been the work, not merely of many life-times, but of many centuries, and even ages; for the knowledge of nature's laws, and the courage to utilise that knowledge, have only been acquired by a slow and steady process of painful experience, extending back to a time when man was little more intelligent than, if as intelligent as, many of the animals around us in this twentieth century; and the history of the earliest stages in this progress goes beyond existing written records; so that, to a great extent, we can only conjecture as to its earliest stages from the use of analogy and a variety of

other more direct data, which themselves require much experience to decipher and understand. That progress spans a period from the early presence of man in the world, in a primitive and barbaric state, to the century in which we are now living; when many of the most advanced communities have reached a high state of civilisation, and built up parliamentary institutions, in which the rights of men, and the wisest methods of dealing with them, are intended or professed to be carefully discussed and settled by mutual agreement, so as to give the fullest scope to each unit, whilst guarding against conflict and confusion, such as would jeopardise the comfort, convenience, and good will of the whole.

The conduct of those institutions, and the making of laws for the regulation of the activities of the millions of units who claim to have a voice in that conduct, has become a scientific study, as already pointed out; and as its study calls for a wide knowledge of its subject-matter: man, his origin, nature, characteristics and needs; the accurate knowledge of all its branches has, not only a direct, but an indispensable, bearing on the subject with which this little work is concerned.

The question is, what is "true progress" in a community; what is the ideal towards which the thinking politician or statesman should look, in all his efforts to fulfil his true province? We hear and read a great deal about the necessity for "progressive" legislation, for laws of an "advanced" character; but the users of these terms are by no means clear as to their real meaning, and, as a rule, do not follow up their demands or "yearnings," by what one may justly term scientific definitions.

A great many superficial thinkers on political subjects speak carelessly, and unscientifically, and loosely, of these terms: "advanced" and "progressive," in their application to the public affairs of their country; as if mere "movement" or "change" were synonymous with "improvement." As a fact, frequent material alterations in the constitution, the laws, the administration, or the social conditions of a community, are undesirable, unless urgently required; and in some cases, where they may be carelessly, ignorantly, or abruptly, effected; the community, as a whole, may be distinctly thrown back in its development, and its people deteriorated or demoralised, in their standards of civil conduct, as compared with those of other communities.

A great English judge once went so far as to say that it was "more important that the law should be certain, than it should be right," in view of the primary advantage of the people knowing definitely how the law stood, and where they stood.

In regard to mere change for change's sake, it has been well said—in a metaphorical sense—that a community may "progress"—down hill, or "advance"—over a precipice.

The "decline and fall" of the Roman Empire was, for instance, the long-drawn-out result of a series of political activities on the part of the governing class of the Roman people, which, no doubt, at the time, seemed to those who promoted them, both "progressive," and of an "advanced" character; but we now know that many of those movements or changes, in later Roman history, were, in their direct or indirect effect, of a retrograde character, in leading to the gradual demoralisation and

"decline" of the Empire, to a condition of less efficient standards in the character and composite calibre of its citizens.

One of the greatest authorities on the art of political government has said that the national character of a community is most accurately gauged by the law-abiding character, the vigour, and self-helping independence of the units who compose it.

The national characteristics of strength, self-reliance, independence, self-help, and moral fibre—the old-time "Viking" attributes, through which nearly all great and dominating European nations have originally reached their ideals, and by virtue of which they have attained to an established footing in the world's history—these can only be acquired through the medium of the units of a community possessing and practising those attributes as individual citizens.

These personal qualifications in individual citizens give power and permanence to the nation to which they belong, and help to attune the units, in their corporate spirit, to a higher pitch of national aims and achievement; to ensure and prolong their existence as a body-politic, and exalt a nation's destiny in the racial struggle for existence, to which all the world's peoples must be sooner or later subjected.

The relative histories of nations, viewed in a sufficiently extensive perspective, are as changeable as the ever-undulating surface of the ocean. In one age, certain of them may be lifted on to the very crest of the waves; exhibiting such buoyant qualities as strength, vigour, and prowess, combined with such civil virtues as the love of freedom, self-reliance, and morale, in their

organisation and development, enabling them to become the worthy objects of a world's admiration; yet, in a subsequent age, the same nations may, by the demoralisation and decadence of their units, fall back to the level of the trough of the sea, and come to be regarded as among the communities of a bygone age.

The attributes, then, which are connoted by the words "progress" and "advance," when used in their accurate sense, in relation to a race, nation, or smaller community, are not the desire for movement, followed by *mere change*, irrespective of ultimate effects, but the effort to reach higher standards of citizenship, leading to increased stability, to an improved morale, and to a finer spirit of industry in its people; to a greater corporate power to resist aggression from without, as well as to prevent discord within; and, in addition, to more established and secure rights, under its laws, for all its units to exercise their energies and tastes in any direction they may think fit, so long as, in such exercise, they do not unduly interfere with the like freedom being enjoyed by each and all of their fellow citizens. Whilst these national and individual qualities or characteristics are maintained; the community, being well and truly founded, must, of necessity, develop by natural enterprise and growth; and, by increasing enlightenment in regard to the productive industries, the art of government, and the numerous other problems incidental to an evolving civilisation, the units must become prosperous and contented, and the community as a whole be progressive.

The period of time over which we are able to review the histories of peoples of the past, through written records, is, in comparison with the whole process of

human evolution, no more than the blink of a camera would be in contrast with a man's lifetime; yet that brief period of history is prolific in sociological examples and illustrations, if thinking men and women will but read history, and apply its lessons to the events of to-day.

The test of a nation's true progress is, in truth, as the test of a man's real success in life. In the case of the individual, wealth alone, though almost universally regarded as the loadstone of human happiness, may prove to be absolute Dead Sea fruit in the sum total of a great or a happy career. Similarly, national wealth, though correctly regarded as the true objective of a community, on its purely economic side, may be attained at the expense of moral decadence. With the individual, a healthy body and a contented mind, combined with a clean record and a consciousness of having done justice to others, as well as to oneself, go far to make up the sum of true happiness. Similarly, with a community, national stability in power of defence, and in a sufficiency of means to meet its engagements, are all-important factors in true national progress, even without super-abundant national wealth; and that nation may be adjudged happy and successful that possesses these qualities, provided it have a clean record or history as a body-politic: having dealt fairly and equitably with all its citizens; and provided also its population be healthy, enlightened, liberal, and tolerant, in regard to other peoples, and sufficiently free from national vanity to be able and willing to engage from time to time in national introspection, so as to discover and correct the shortcomings that naturally arise with the growth and development of every organism.

The world, in emerging from its five-years' war, has come to see that nations themselves, however far they may be geographically separated, must have ever before them the question of their respective rights and their national freedom.

CHAPTER III.

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

THERE is no more fruitful source of political errors of judgment, not only in the framing of laws, but generally, in the art of administering the governmental affairs of a country to the best advantage, than want of knowledge of human history. And this applies to both ancient and modern history, including the records of one's own generation, and the history of one's own life; the facts of which are stored up or recorded in one's own memory, in the form of "personal experience"; for that is as much "history" as that which is recorded in books; and, in the mind that is unbiassed and "balanced," it is even more trustworthy, though it is possibly spread over too short a period to justify over-confident generalisations. For the earliest efforts to regulate man in his activities, based on the then available history, were quite as productive of blunders, and as disappointing, as are those of our own day, based on a wider range of experience.

As already noted, history involves a record of sociological experience or experiments in matters affecting the public welfare; and, if properly read and wisely interpreted, in the light of more modern events of a similar or analogous character; it serves, as does the chart of the navigator, to show the way by the deeper and safer waters, and to reveal the shoals and shallows about and around his course.

As the experience of the past, when intelligently recorded, and carefully diagnosed and interpreted, reveals, also, the relation of events, as cause and effect, where tendencies, rather than single results, are studied in the search for parallels; the lessons involved, when applied to present legislative proposals, will frequently save a repetition of past blunders, or facilitate the reproduction of similar beneficial consequences, as the case may be, for the guidance of those who properly apply the historical lessons.

To be entirely ignorant of history, involves the loss of the lessons of such experience as it records; and even to be indifferent to history's obvious lessons, after we have read them, produces similar results.

It must be readily admitted that no two experiences, such as history may record, are exactly parallel in every particular and circumstance; but, to the careful student of such events as it relates, some general principle or tendency will always be revealed; which, if not affording an exact precedent in cause and effect, will at least supply a note of warning or a suggestion, that may be of substantial service, in enabling the student-politician to foresee the probable effect of some administrative activity or legislative proposal.

Lord Bolingbroke, in his little-known work on *The Study and Use of History*, observed that "history is philosophy teaching by example": and the plain and obvious meaning of such an aphorism is, that the events of history are a series of examples of cause and effect in public affairs, from which experiments, a body of practical philosophy or political science can be built up.

It is, for instance, impossible that history should afford a complete parallel to the whole series of events in early North American colonial history, which culminated in England's losing her young colonies, by insisting, among other things, on the payment of duties and other taxes towards the maintenance of the mother country, in the imposition of which the widely-separated colonists had no voice; yet that lesson in statesmanship, involving a recognition of the spirit of independence and of resentment, at those unjust imposts, by a body of Anglo-Saxon colonists, established in a new and distant country, has now been crystallised in the phrase, "No taxation without representation"; and the effect of that lesson, or maxim, is frequently observable, nowadays, in the almost excessive care with which British statesmen avoid the temptation to impose the mother-will upon any body of colonists, in the forms of taxes or restraints, which are calculated to arouse that same spirit of protest.

Again, it is generally acknowledged, by students of history, that the French Revolution was the collapse of a sociological organisation, which had been allowed to drift into conditions of gross class-preference and privilege, that even the then "cowed" human nature of its people, in a last resort, would not tolerate; and in which the governing classes forgot, or clearly ignored, the principle of equal rights for all, and abused the patience and submission of the masses of the people, at one time accustomed to freedom and juster political treatment.

The "example" in political philosophy that has been drawn from that volcanic page in history, is that there is a breaking point in the process of abusing the control of a community, made up of men and women, who have

once known what it is to be free, and to be justly governed.

These are only two of the well-known instances of the lessons, or "examples," which are to be learned from human history, as properly recorded in modern centuries; but its "pages," which extend beyond written records, into the earlier periods of hieroglyphic and tradition, contain numberless equally patent teachings for those who do not read it all as a mere duty, or by "rule of thumb," but are able to contemplate human nature in its more panoramic aspects, and to extract broad principles, and trace distinct tendencies, in the stories of the rising and the falling of nations; in the ebbing and flowing of empires, and in the one-time full glow and subsequent eclipse of whole races of men.

No one, who neglects, or fails, from other causes, to study and understand these and other aspects of human nature and human affairs, can claim to be fully equipped to play the important rôle of law-maker, or social organiser, as involved in the art of statesmanship.

There are many so-called "practical" politicians, who consider the knowledge of general principles, drawn from their own personal experience of life, sufficient to equip them as legislators for their own and future generations; but a moment's serious reflection should convince them that, in ignoring the experience of hundreds of thousands of at least equally clever men, whose experience is incorporated, and, as it were, stored for their benefit, in what may be regarded as national diaries, in the form of history, they are ignoring a whole magazine of valuable material. There are, moreover, notable writings of men, who have devoted themselves

to the study of what may be termed universal history, which it would be impossible to induce "the man in the street" to peruse and understand, but which literally teem with valuable teachings, in their various general branches of human knowledge, and which form a sort of royal road to historical generalisations.

There is an equally fertile source of political error, that results from the one-sided reading of history, or historical literature, as presented from a purely social-class standpoint. There is, too, a large body of political literature and journalism being published in our own time, in which the various aspects of the people's rights and liabilities are presented in a distinctly prejudiced and distorted political form; and the reading of these is, if possible, even more calculated to disqualify men for taking the statesmanlike view of human affairs, than absolute ignorance of the events of the world, as they actually happened, and of the lessons which could be drawn from them. This prejudiced class of literature, or journalism, is often the means of not only producing a one-sided view, but also of leading to an unfair and unjust outlook in regard to legislative activities, generally, in dealing with affairs as they affect the various classes and interests of a modern community.

A statesmanlike attitude in relation to public affairs, generally, presupposes and demands a just, impartial, and "balanced" view of the problems which, from time to time, present themselves for solution in a modern state; and, therefore, in order to effect the cultivation of a statesmanlike outlook, and the setting up of statesmanlike ideals, a public man would need to have subjected his personality to a variety of processes of study

and discipline, so that he may be able to take a judicial view of human affairs, to free himself, as much as political conditions will admit, from all class leanings, and, whilst making the welfare of his own community his first national care, to remember that no nation can afford to systematically ignore the rights of other nations, whose interests may be intimately connected with, and possibly at some future time may even clash with, those of his own country.

The statesman is ever surrounded by a sea of self-interested effort, based on the essential law of self-preservation, but too often pushed to the extremes of abuse, which would disregard the rights and interests of others; and it is in the checking and neutralising of these attempted abuses that a great part of his most trying and valuable work is found to lie. The philosopher will tell us that the possession of wealth, beyond a certain point, is not only of little real use, but entails untold responsibility upon its possessor, which becomes a life-work in itself; nevertheless, men, in their endeavour to obtain "enough" to satisfy the real wants of life, lose their sense of proportion, allow their pursuit of a "means" to become the pursuit of an "end," and, in time, become obsessed with the fever of accumulation: losing sight of, or forgetting, the higher and more abiding pleasures, which their sufficiency would enable them to enjoy, if they could but throw off the less elevating ambition of merely "making more."

This "will o' the wisp" enterprise, to become "richer than one's neighbour," causes men to forget the interests of their fellow beings, and to pursue the selfish search, up to a point at which the legislature has to be frequently

invoked to compel those who engage in it to have due regard for others with equal rights. And it is in the watching and "checkmating" of this everlasting struggle and scramble; and in the devising of rational legislative means to prevent or neutralise the abuses produced by it, that the statesman is required to bring his wider knowledge to bear. He is called upon to exercise his knowledge of men; of their rights and limitations; of their weaknesses; of their cunning, and their greediness; as well as to keep prominent in his mind the attempts in the past, to prevent it all; many of which history shows to have been futile, and even, in some cases, to have produced effects diametrically opposite to those intended.

On the other hand, there are, for ever obtruding themselves on public attention, the journalist; the writer of pamphlets and books, as well as the "practical" politician, who attempts to win converts, and to make political capital for himself, by professing to sympathise with the less successful and less fortunate in life, and to persuade them that their worldly disadvantages are the result of injustice and inequality in the distribution of the world's wealth. These writers and speakers, whilst decrying "wealth" and "affluence" in the more fortunate of their fellow citizens, are, in most cases, endeavouring—even strenuously endeavouring—to acquire a competency for themselves; so that their teachings are for the most part to be taken at their true value, as hypocritical and self-seeking, and dealt with accordingly.

It is in the watching of all these influences that the statesman has to differentiate himself from the time-servers of his day; from the army of empirics, who offer covert bribes, in the shape of fair promises, in return for

their own selection as representatives ; and who advise a course, not according to what they know to be just and right, but of the kind that will meet with the approval of their constituents.

Among the political obstacles with which would-be statesmen are confronted, and by which their course of duty is rendered more and more complex and exacting, is the resort to various extreme and rigid forms of party combination, which have the effect of shackling men in both their speech and their judgment, and making less and less possible the realisation of a Parliament in which the people's representatives shall be free to give expression to their honest judgment, irrespective of sectional interests. Such disturbing factors make it almost impossible to secure the consideration of national questions on their merits ; and, not infrequently, in certain classes of political combination, the ultimate decision arrived at, by means of those methods, is diametrically opposite to that which would have eventuated, if the whole matter had been discussed and decided by an entirely free assembly.

As illustrating this anomalous state of things, many cases could be quoted in connection with democratic Parliaments, in which the minority in a political party whose block vote has ultimately carried a measure, would, if added to the actual and open opposition to the measure, constitute the majority of the Parliament ; so that the actual passing of the measure had resulted from a caucus minority vote.

The ideal of true statesmanship is, of course, wise legislation ; that is, legislation which is most conducive to the welfare of the whole community, who are all equally

entitled to be considered ; and the possibility of securing such an end, presupposes a body of legislators who are sufficiently well informed in history and practical statesmanship, to be capable of reaching a really wise result. The practical outcome of adult suffrage, or, in other words, popular government, where representatives do what they consider will please their constituents, may be said, even under the freest circumstances, to be equivalent to the judgment of the average man; or, where female suffrage obtains, the average voter ; and no one will seriously contend that such an average type possesses either the historical knowledge, or the practical ability, to reach truly wise conclusions on complex questions.

Wise statesmanship, therefore, becomes, in the face of all these political obstacles—even of those only which result from errors of judgment, bias of party, and the disturbance resulting from sectional combination—almost an impossibility ; and he, who would keep before him so impossible an ideal, must learn to be satisfied with small results, in the form of an approximation towards his objective. The true statesman recognises this fact as one of the axioms of his vocation. He learns to be satisfied with the modification of what might otherwise lead to even grosser injustice, and with the saving of a situation that would, without such efforts, end in still more serious consequences to the people ; but the facts and circumstances referred to, so numerous and varied as they are, nevertheless constitute obstacles to be counted with ; and their inevitable continuance, under twentieth century conditions, only serves to render the province of the statesman, who seeks to pursue a just course, more and more difficult, if not heroic.

We have considered history, hitherto, as a more particular record of the public activities of a country, duly recorded in relation to one or other of the nations which have had regular historical writers. But it would be a mistake to limit study to such particular records; for the most instructive forms of history are those which partake of a universal character; inasmuch as they afford a comparative picture of different peoples, acting, in public matters, far apart, with similar or nearly similar ideals, swayed by similar class and religious prejudices, and falling into similar or analogous blunders in regard to the most successful method of governing peoples, with a view to their present and future welfare.

Such universal histories encourage a broader outlook in their readers; deal with human affairs in a more tolerant and comparative spirit; and present more vividly the false steps that have, in the past, been taken by monarchs or other rulers, in their efforts to govern their particular peoples.

It is worth while noticing that this form of universal and comparative history—so useful to the student-politician—is, with a few notable exceptions, peculiar to later times—one might almost say to the nineteenth century—for, prior to that period, national bias, as the outcome of insular interests, made no intellectual demand for such writings; and, as a consequence, that class of literature was not often obtainable. Herodotus stands out among universal historians of classical times; and Adam Smith broke some fresh ground in the same direction, in the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century saw a wider spread of comparative knowledge of other countries and other peoples, such as now serves for

this form of generalised commentary; and to-day libraries contain many treatises of the character in question.

Take, for instance, a work—already referred to at length—like Buckle's *History of Civilisation*, in which there are recorded the blunders of statesmen, monarchs, and whole nations, spread over many generations, and even centuries; wherein each, in his or their turn, considered themselves wise and enlightened; yet whose activities, looked at in the light of to-day, reveal the grossest miscalculations, possibly with the best intentions, as well as, in some cases, deliberate and glaring injustices, in regard to the lives and interests of the peoples affected.

Referring to graver instances of misgovernment, Buckle says that "among the active authors of these cruelties (speaking of instances of religious persecution), we find the names of the best men who ever sat on a throne"; and he adds elsewhere, that "it is to the diffusion of knowledge, and to that alone, that we owe the comparative cessation of what is unquestionably the greatest evil men have ever inflicted on their own species."

Or take such a work as Lecky's *History of Rationalism* —also referred to previously—in which that writer has collected innumerable instances, spread over a wide expanse of European history, in which worthily-motived men, in positions of authority, but with minds distorted out of all balance and perspective by religious fervour, have exercised that authority, to the detriment, ruin, cruelty, and even bloodshed, of thousands of their fellow men and women, who had been born into the world

entitled to equal rights with those of their persecutors, but without the power or influence to insist on their recognition. The stake, the gallows, and the executioner's block, used to condemn the causes of science, freedom of thought, superstition, magic, and witchcraft, have each played, in their turn, their bloody and barbarous part in the destruction of good and useful citizens; in many cases merely because some zealot of fermented brain was invested with religious authority to decimate hundreds and thousands of his fellows, in the equally fallacious cause of an idea, or a religious distinction, possibly of microscopic bearing on the sober logic of life, not infrequently with a view to the preservation of some equally distorted conception of the Almighty, and in the hope of propitiating that Divine Embodiment for that same zealot's own hereafter.

It will be seen that whole generations suffered before amelioration came in the shape of the secularisation of politics. Here are the concluding and comprehensive words of Lecky, in closing his *History of Rationalism*:— "The destruction of the belief in witchcraft and of religious persecution; the decay of those ghastly notions concerning future punishments, which for centuries diseased the imagination and embittered the characters of men; the emancipation of suffering nationalities; the abolition of the belief in the guilt of error, which paralysed the intellectual, and of the asceticism which paralysed the material, progress of mankind, may be justly regarded as among the greatest principles of civilisation."

Take, in another direction, the instances of the Egyptian priests and monarchs, whose doings are

recorded in Read's *Martyrdom of Man;* who imagined they were benefiting the human race, in sacrificing millions of lives to the folly of erecting buildings as monuments, and pyramids as mementoes, for the glory of men; whose names and characters, notwithstanding, are to-day so uncertain as to be practically forgotten. A crude and barbarous ideal, born of a distorted mind or disposition, in some cases a childish vanity, was, in various instances, made the pivot on which the lives of millions of worthy and harmless men and women were sacrificed. One has only to look through the pages of Herodotus, to realise that veritable "lists" of emperors, who had, at one time, millions of money at their disposal, and the domination of millions of their fellows in the matter of life or death, have now faded into oblivion, except as "items" in a catalogue. Such is the vanity of human ambition, and such the futility of human attempts to build up an abiding fame, on mere "show," as a foundation. And, be it noted, that, whilst the identity of these monuments to untold wealth and imperial power, has now faded out of sight; the names of poor men, such as Socrates and Æsop, who treated wealth as dross, still live, as if they were of only yesterday.

Although the moral and logical miscalculations of men in "high places" have not always directly produced the actual destruction of their fellows; they have, by their blundering laws and regulations, wasted the industry and efforts of millions, which might, if not so misdirected, have produced more rational results, and spread plenty and contentment, over broad areas of human welfare.

Superstition, bigotry, and arrogated authority, have served as misdirecting finger-posts for whole nations:

all victims of the failure to apply the test of equal rights, operating by means of a quiet rational intelligence, applied to human affairs. Draper's *Conflict of Religion and Science* (another work in the category of universal history) epitomises the long struggle which spread itself over centuries of human evolution, in which truth, quietly and repeatedly asserting and re-asserting herself, at every interval of history, from the dawn of man's early struggle with nature, till the advent of scientific light, in regard to the true proportion and true relation of the world to the universe, finds herself repeatedly and persistently thwarted by self-interested men. Everywhere were engendered and cultivated superstition and mystery, concerning the unseen, and so built up a false antagonism between the true Controller of the universe, who speaks uniformly through his laws of nature, and a counterfeit deity, who denounces those same laws as of evil omen; and there were set up in their place man-made admonitions that will not stand the light of day, or the touchstone of reason.

And, although the fallacies recorded and exposed in such works of universal history may seem to us to-day inconceivable, and not to be of really much practical value to the modern political student in the legislative and administrative affairs of our own time; they are exceedingly useful; as showing how men, in past times, with all the advantages of education and advanced training, such as their age afforded, completely misconceived the true aims of human government. And thus they serve to emphasise the fact that human government is an art depending upon a science—the science of sociology, involving in its turn a knowledge of man, his nature,

his vices, as well as his virtues. It will, thus, be recognised that Edmund Burke did not overstate the case, when he said: "The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity; and, therefore, no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature or to the quality of his affairs."

CHAPTER IV.

ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE

IT is difficult to know where to begin, and where to stop, in attempting to deal with the subject of the general public's indifference, or want of knowledge, concerning Political Economy, as among the "obstacles to human progress," so far as they depend upon, or may be overcome by, statesmanship. Interpreting "economy," in relation to a State, as meaning "the frugal and prudent management" of its affairs; one's mind is bewildered with the thought of the uncountable varieties of waste and extravagance; the absolutely wasteful methods of collecting its revenue and distributing its expenditure; that are presented by a review of its different aspects of management.

Thorold Rogers, in his work on *Political Economy*, speaking of Adam Smith, who has been justly called "the father" of that science, says: "Much of the merit of Adam Smith's great work (*The Wealth of Nations*) is derived from the steady use which that philosopher made of history and statistics."

As these two subjects are generally regarded as among the driest and least "entertaining" in the catalogue of branches of human knowledge; it is hardly to be expected, in an age of hysterical fiction; of spectacular dramatic art; and of many other forms of sensational personal enjoyment; that any study, that depends upon those two abstract subjects, should be clearly under-

stood by, or afford interest to, either the average voter, or the average representative, whom they entrust with the conduct of public affairs.

If, then, the statesman, or widely-informed politician, be familiar with the science of economics; and the politicians around him, as well as the general public, who have elected them, are not even superficially versed or seriously interested in that science, even in its practical aspects; there is at once brought into play "an obstacle" to progress; for, whenever the statesman attempts to make, or direct, necessary laws or administrative regulations, or to oppose injurious ones, with a view to the public welfare; he will not only be opposed, and his efforts frustrated, by the objections of the majority, based on superficial opinions, or on no opinions at all; but ridicule will be freely employed to lessen his influence in politics generally.

There are considerable differences of opinion current among the people in all countries, even as to what "economics" are; though the origin of the word, and its present everyday meaning, are very simple and straightforward, if only investigated with an interested purpose. "Domestic Economy," as we all understand it, is, to the household, what "Political Economy" is to the community or nation. If this simple parallel were only clearly recognised and acted upon; there are many public acts, now tacitly approved, if not applauded, because of their superficial but misleading attractiveness, that would not be tolerated by the people; and there are many arguments, equally fallacious, used with approval among the people of to-day, that would not be patiently listened to with the wider and better knowledge that a

study of political economy would afford. The attractiveness of many forms of spurious legislation lies in the superficial or first-sight advantages that present themselves in connection with it; but these would be scouted, and treated with contempt, if only those, who are allured by them, could see equally clearly, and understand, the *remote* effects that would be produced in other and unseen directions. It is like the case of a child, who is attracted by the rosy cooking apple, and who longs to eat it; because, for want of experience, it fails to realise the after-effects on its little inside, and the ultimate necessity that will arise for a dose of oil, or some other antidote, to correct the unseen consequences of its indulgence.

Just as a good housekeeper will not, as a rule, think of making for herself anything that she can buy in a better quality, and at a cheaper price, in the next street; so, in national politics, men and women of sound knowledge would not think of making for themselves commodities that they could purchase in better quality, and at a cheaper price, in an adjoining and accessible community.

If the mother of a family justified herself, in attempting to sole her own or her children's boots, out of her own time, at twice the cost that she could get them done for in the next street, and vindicated herself on the ground that it "afforded her employment," although, in order to do it, she had to neglect some other form of necessary work in her own house; we should say of her that she had completely failed to economise her efforts: had, in fact, failed in her domestic economy. In the same way, the public men in any community fail to economise its national energies and resources, when they artificially

encourage the local production of commodities at a higher price than the same or better commodities could be purchased for in an adjoining country.

There certainly is a wide difference of opinion among the people of different communities over this question, though it is not based on unbiassed economic reasoning. One side advocates allowing the people their inherent liberty to spend their own money, and to purchase their own requirements, where and when they choose; the other side argues that a restriction should be imposed on the purchasing of goods from other communities, and that the people should be required—whether they wish it or not—to use the commodities that are locally manufactured, even though they cost much more than they could be purchased for from other peoples, and though, also, they may be inferior in quality.

Those who contend that citizens should, in the purchase of commodities, be free to use their own money in whatever way they please, and to obtain the greatest value for their expenditure, are glibly labelled as "free-traders"; and those who deny them that right, and advocate laws of restriction to shut out such purchases as citizens wish to buy for themselves, outside their own community, are equally glibly branded as "protectionists."

In our own personal domestic affairs, those who favoured the "protectionist" doctrine would not be tolerated, and would be characterised as wasteful and improvident; though the identical principle applies in the domestic, as in the national domain.

Let us approach the problem in another way. If a visitor from an unknown country were, for the first

time, to visit the civilised world, possessing a knowledge of the characteristics of our human nature, and of our type of social and political conditions ; he would be able to accurately gauge the economic opinions of ninety-five per cent. of the people, and of the Press, of each community, as being in strict accordance with the particular economic policy in practical operation in the community in which they dwelt. And this would be correct as a judgment, and would not provoke surprise ; although the economic policies of many countries are known to be diametrically opposed to those of others. This is a more remarkable fact, in human affairs, than it seems at first sight. For instance ; it would have been difficult to find five per cent. of the people and press of Great Britain and Ireland assuming even a tolerant attitude towards the doctrine of protection thirty years ago ; that is, before *The Times* newspaper completely changed its attitude from free trade to protection : before the late Joseph Chamberlain sounded the tocsin of "Preferential Trade," and before manufacturers and others, commercially interested, raised the cry of "Fair Trade."

All well-informed persons knew, at that time, that both of these latter "shibboleths" were the work of manufacturers of Great Britain, who were conscious of a falling off in trade, and feared that it was being "stolen" by the manufacturers of other countries. They (or their champions) argued that the suggested remedy—the adoption of protection, and a complete reversal of the whole economic policy of their country—promised a cure, and the "only cure," for their trouble ; but their arguments and statistics on behalf of "Fair Trade" were met and refuted at every turn, and never more conclusively, than

by Professor Fawcett in his little work on *Free Trade and Protection.*

Again, by way of contrast, in regard to the United States, it would be difficult to-day to find in that country five per cent. of the people and Press, who would consider free trade even a rational doctrine. A more striking instance is to be found in the fiscal history of adjoining colonies in Australia; where, prior to Federation, and the consequent blotting out of the State boundaries in regard to fiscal differences, at least ninety-five per cent. of the people and Press of the State of Victoria considered the one-time free-trade policy of New South Wales as evidencing a benighted public opinion; whereas the people of New South Wales, at the same time, considered the people and Press of Victoria "out of their minds" on the subject of protection. In the case of the United States and Great Britain, there was a five or six days' sea journey separating them, as an excuse for their radical difference of opinion; whereas, in the case of the two Australian colonies, referred to, there was merely a river between them. So much and so keenly was this difference felt in regard to the Australian States, that, in the opening policy-speech of the first Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, the people of the new body-politic were assured that the future policy of the Dominion, as a whole, could be neither free trade nor high protection, but would have to be a compromise between the two extremes that had hitherto been in operation. The result of the mingling of the economic opinions of the six States, further confused by the political party huckstering of those who had the ordering of the affairs of the Commonwealth's initial policy, led to the all-round

imposition of the highest-known tariff in the history of the group!

The cry of "Fair Trade" was raised in England in the early 'eighties; and it was plausibly contended that, though the doctrine of "Free Trade" was sound, if reciprocal; it ought not to be extended to the United States, if they continued to tax English manufacturers.

In 1885, Professor Fawcett published his small work (already referred to) to combat the new cry; and in it he said: "Although it may be hoped that there is no danger of England departing from a policy of free trade, yet even here (in England) where a few years since, scarcely a single person could be found to say a word against free trade, a movement in opposition to what is called 'one-sided free trade' is now finding many supporters"; and the same writer speaks of a time when "Protectionists were spoken of as if they were either solely prompted by a desire to sacrifice the welfare of the community, in order to promote their own selfish ends, or when they were derided as the victims of economic fallacies, so transparent that they ought not to mislead a child."

To show, too, how many changes Great Britain herself has gone through, in the fiscal opinions of her people; there is a passage in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, in which he said that "to expect the complete restoration of free trade in Great Britain was as absurd as to expect the establishment of an Oceana or Utopia in it"; yet, almost complete freedom was reached a hundred years after he wrote.

Again, seventy years ago, Lord Melbourne, then Prime Minister, declared in the House of Commons, that,

"during his long life, it had been his lot to hear many mad things proposed, but the maddest of all the mad things to which he had ever had to listen was a proposal to abolish the Corn Laws," which were protective in their nature. Yet, those laws were then abolished; and Great Britain thereupon entered upon a steady career of commercial freedom.

One could multiply quotations and facts beyond available space, in order to show how marked has been the vacillation of public opinion on this question, not merely in different countries, but in the same community, at even short intervals; and one could thus demonstrate that the bulk of the people in each country do not reason on this far-reaching economic issue, but quietly and unthinkingly accept, as gospel, the alleged soundness of the particular fiscal creed which happens to be in operation in the country in which they are born, or which they adopt as their home. Why do they not reason? And why do they quietly adopt whatever economic beliefs they are born into, as if they were the doctrines of a creed, based on a blind faith, or the tenets of an unchallengeable denomination? The answer is simple; Economics are an abstract study, which, to understand, involves more than common mental application; and the great majority of men and women avoid abstract thought of all kinds, where their personal interests are not directly concerned. But there are other personal and interested reasons.

When once a community embarks upon a system of protection; the artificial aid to the local industry, which the embargo on imported goods affords, does two things, which, at a later stage, make a return to free trade diffi-

cult, if not almost impossible. The encouragement, resulting from a duty, brings into existence industries that, otherwise, by reason of their unsuitability, and unequal conditions for competition, would not be even started; and it also affords employment to people who would, otherwise, have to find occupation in industries that do not depend upon the artificial aid of an embargo or protective duty on the imported goods.

In these two ways, citizens are gradually induced to invest their capital in exotic industries, which are, in truth, economic "hot-house plants," depending on the artificial aid which the duty affords. The moment a voice is raised to withdraw this aid, the industrial investor is, naturally, up in arms; and he is able to enlist the support, and the agitation, if need be, of men and women who have found employment in the industry, thus kept on its feet by the State assistance, though at the cost of the rest of the citizens, who are engaged in other and normal industries, or in other and different walks of life; who thus have to pay artificial prices to keep such industries on their feet, or on crutches, as going concerns. The higher the duties imposed, the more effectual and permanent the embargo becomes; and, as a further consequence, the more effectual the embargo becomes, the larger becomes the number of persons employed by this economic hot-house method; and the larger also becomes the number of persons at the disposal of the manufacturer, as conscious or unconscious agitators, to protest against the duties ever being removed.

The subject may be approached in yet another way. Every country is capable of producing some class of goods more economically than others; but individuals, or groups

of citizens wish to place their capital in some industries which, without artificial assistance, cannot stand on their merits, against the competing prices of outside countries. They, therefore, in effect, ask the Government of their country to supply "a crutch" at the expense of other citizens. By means of this crutch, they can stand more firmly; but, as competition from outside increases, and the machinery of the home industries becomes out of date—possibly obsolete—the "crutch" becomes insufficient; and they appeal to the Government to strengthen that "crutch" by further increasing the duties on the imported competing article, and, later, to provide them with one of a still stronger character. And so tariffs creep up, until the duties of a country reach the prohibitory range of a veritable Chinese wall. At such a stage, a tariff becomes a stupendous burden of taxation, diverting the people from their natural pursuits, and making manufacturers wealthy, without adding to the revenue in anything like a commensurate degree.

An intelligent manufacturer can, if he will, see and appreciate this eleemosynary aspect of his position as a dependent. But he has two views. He sees it all from his point of view as a manufacturer, by which the more help or protection he enjoys—even though it be at the expense of his fellow citizens—the more easy or profitable becomes his venture. He sees it, also, as an individual citizen, by which, where other industries are being protected, he, himself, has to pay higher prices to support them also. The writer has more than once heard a manufacturer say—and his view is typical: "I am a free trader—and I admit the soundness of free trade—from a national standpoint; but I am a protectionist

from the point of view of my own business!" One frequently finds in a protectionist country, manufacturers protesting against the imposition of duties on commodities, which happen to form the raw material required for their own industry, whilst quite forgetting that that very duty, against which they protest, is as essential for the artificial support of the manufacturer of that raw material, as their own duty is for the support of their own manufacture of the finished article.

The fact is, the truth in regard to this world-wide question, and the world-wide issues which it involves, will never be clearly seen and appreciated, until it comes to be studied from the international standpoint. And Cobden saw this clearly when he wrote: "Free trade, in the widest definition of the term, means only the division of labour, by which the productive powers of the whole earth are brought into mutual co-operation."

If one examines the economic conditions of a village, one finds the work of the grocer, the butcher, the baker, the ironmonger, the wheelwright, the farrier, the publican and a dozen others, being carried on by means of the division of labour; if one studies the economic workings of a city or a nation, one sees the same economic principle at work. But when we look round the world as a whole, we find, to-day, that, instead of the same principle being allowed to operate, and each country being allowed to produce the commodities to which its climate, its geographical position, its supply and cost of labour, and its seasons, adapt it, so that they may exchange their special products, economically and profitably, with one another; each—at least in regard to some countries—is endeavouring to do for itself those things that the most

intelligent and disinterested of its people know full well other countries can do for them more satisfactorily, in regard to both quality and cost.

One may lay down these general principles, as far as statesmanship is concerned: that, when once a country has embarked upon a policy of protection, however much it may involve its citizens in extra cost to maintain the artificial state of things involved; the chances of its changing that policy are remote; and statesmanship in that respect becomes almost hopeless; for, if the policy be long in existence, so large a proportion of the population will have become dependent upon the fiscal "crutches," that the industries of the community have learned to lean upon, that it will be almost impossible to remove them, without some result, approaching national disaster.

But there are other features of the economic problem that have played, and will still further play, a prominent part in the political world.

I refer to the hope, rather than the belief, of practical men and women, that the widespread interest throughout the world, in regard to capital and labour, will be settled by a sort of partnership between the employer and the employee, which will produce satisfaction to both classes, and create universal content. Compulsory arbitration has been tried, and has failed, in both Australia and New Zealand; but the employees, who clamoured for the establishment of such a tribunal, to prevent what they then called "barbarous movements," such as strikes and lockouts, have systematically failed to respect the decisions of those tribunals, and, where-

ever the Courts have "found," contrary to their demands, have ignored those "findings."

The compulsory arbitration system has, after twenty years' trial, had the effect of tying the hands of the employers; because, in every instance, they possess established and fixed property upon which the Court can operate, by fines and penalties, where they disobey its judgment. But it leaves the employee free to accept or reject it; for he can, individually and jesuitically, prefer to seek a more satisfactory position, and leave his employment, without fear of any consequences; since no executive government has ever yet shown the courage to insist on the fines and penalties which the Arbitration Courts have imposed as punishments.

Employers are now satisfied that the whole institution is one-sided; for the trades unions have systematically used the Courts as a means of claiming more than unionists are receiving for the time being, and taking their chance of securing "something more" than formerly.

It is not too much to predict that, unless some method can be discovered, and put into practice, of compelling the unions, as corporate bodies, to require their members to respect the decisions of the Courts, on pain of heavy penalties accumulated under some enforced provisions; the whole scheme of arbitration, which involves taking the original resort to the economic law of "supply and demand"—as a means of regulating wages—out of the hands of the employers and employees, will completely break down.

For it is generally admitted that the number and serious consequences of industrial disputes are much greater, under the system of arbitration, than formerly,

and that, consequently, the dislocations of trade and commerce, which include shipping, have grown more and more costly and far-reaching, as time goes on.

Another direction in which the economic hopes of "philanthropic" persons are extended, is that of industrial partnership, under which it is hoped, and by some believed, that the industrial "lion and lamb" of fable will lie down together! One can personally name instances of this experiment, going back nearly half a century; and the results of those experiments proved that they were not successful; for, in every case, the employees, who had acquired the interest in the business in which they were employed; so that they drew both wages and dividends, always carefully calculated, when any industrial difference arose, whether the gain by striking, would more than counterbalance the loss, in wages and dividends combined.

Under these conditions, the system, in regard to which so much is now being said and hoped, as if it were being suggested for the first time, proved no better than that which followed. At the base of all these attempted schemes to establish identity of interest between employer and employee, there is a difficulty or obstacle that cannot be surmounted; for the employer, if the truth be ascertained, is always endeavouring, and, in the press of competition, is forced to endeavour, to obtain the largest amount of work possible for the smallest amount of pay; whilst the employee, if the truth be ascertained, is, on his part, always making an equally strenuous endeavour to obtain as much money as possible for the smallest amount of work. The two interests are in the nature of two forces approaching one another, from

different directions; and there is no way of preventing impact—resulting in industrial conflict—but that of mutual moderation in demand, as the result of either "supply and demand," or by amicable arrangement.

The commerce of the world, of Great Britain, of America and Europe, has been built up on this principle of reasoned competition; and it is difficult for a level-headed man of the world, who knows human nature, and the world's work as it is, to see how it is going to be improved upon, whilst human nature remains as it is.

The adoption of compulsory arbitration has failed; and the most powerful labour representative in the United States (Mr. Gompers) has not only advised, but authoritatively asserted, that the working man of that great country will never give up his "freedom to strike," when it suits him, as a citizen of a country that prides itself on its liberty.

The adoption of piece work in the United States, which enables the competent and energetic worker to differentiate himself and his career from that of the incompetent and idle worker, has to some extent solved the problem which obtrudes itself wherever it is attempted to conduct the world's affairs, on the assumption that all men are equal in their capabilities.

The institution of piece work is "a business within a business"; and it enables the industrious workman to benefit to the full, as the result of his superior ability, without risking loss by the incompetent management of the employer.

The millennium is not yet at hand, and it is Utopian to suppose that any economic scheme can be devised, or ought to be devised, that will prevent the workman

from obtaining the highest market price for his commodity—labour. It is equally Utopian to expect, or seek to prevent, the employer from obtaining the best value for his expenditure of capital. This exchange of capital for labour is a perfectly legitimate form of economic dealing, and one that will continue indefinitely, as long as the workman desires *certain* and *prompt* payment for his labour, without having to risk the loss that the capitalist undertakes to set off against his possible profit. The conflict of interests in this class of economic transaction is no keener or more objectionable than that involved in the exchange or sale of a hundred other commodities in the competition of the world; and the plain duty of the statesman is to allow both the employer and the employee to enjoy the fullest freedom, as in the United States, so long as neither the one nor the other attempts to deny the same advantage to his competitor. The philanthropic purpose that can be seen underlying all these schemes for softening the competition of capital and labour, by providing the workman with an interest in the business in which he takes a part, can always be served by his purchasing a greater or smaller interest in that business; and this is now an easy process, in the present almost universal application of the joint stock or "limited company" to commerce; under which a workman can purchase a smaller or larger number of shares in any business in which he earns his regular wages. He will thereby participate in the profits that result, and so satisfy his philanthropic champions; but he may have to share the loss, if there be one in any year; and that possibility may act as an equally potent incentive.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL STANDARDS
(The Elector)

IF one were to tell the average citizen to his face that he had a lax moral sense in relation to political questions, he would be justly offended by the abruptness of the charge; but it is, nevertheless, true as a charge against citizens in the mass, however unfrequently he may be reminded of the fact.

I propose to limit my comments in this chapter to the political moral standards of the average elector, as distinguished from those which more directly bear on the legislative representative, which are reserved for subsequent treatment. But it must, of course, be remembered that the average representative takes his cue or his standard from those whose interests he undertakes to advocate, and to please whom he, as a rule, thinks it allowable to adopt any standard that they may prescribe.

The famous Edmund Burke had the courage to draw a clear and just distinction in this regard, between that which he owed to his constituents, and that which he owed to himself as a representative; and it would be well if the former would take the distinction to heart, in considering the attitude of a member of Parliament towards his constituency on any particular public question. Addressing the electors of Bristol, 150 years ago, when parliamentary institutions were held in higher respect by the people than they are to-day, he said:

"It is the duty of a representative to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs, and, above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interests to his own. But his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you—to any man, or to any living set of men. These he does not derive from your pleasure—no, nor from the law and constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifice it to your opinion."

This relationship between the elector and the representative is more important, if we assume, as we ought to do, and as ought to be the case, that the latter spends more time in considering public questions that are likely to be presented to Parliament, than does the former; and, especially, if we consider the advantages he will enjoy—before committing himself to a final opinion—in hearing in Parliament, all the arguments for and against any measure or motion that may be submitted for its consideration.

Unfortunately, the elector, nowadays—or, at least, many of them—regard the member of Parliament as a sort of delegate, who should ascertain what his constituents want, and at once do it; and, equally unfortunately, a large number of representatives are content to adopt that rôle, and become a mere echo of their constituents.

Those who take the purely theoretical view of statesmanship will, probably, retaliate, by asserting that if only modern public affairs were less complex; so that

everyone, even the least intelligent of citizens, could understand them, and have presented to them a simple and just code of conduct, for the regulation of men's activities, based on equitable standards, all misunderstandings as to government would be at an end, and all such insinuations needless. This would be a palpable error, for experience shows that there are, unfortunately, hundreds and thousands of citizens, in every large community, who do not attach much importance to the consciousness of having done what is termed "the right thing"; and who do not attach any importance at all to abstract justice, if its observance involves some inconvenience to themselves. It is because of considerations of this kind that we are forced to see and recognise the importance of understanding human nature as it is, as distinguished from human nature as it is often assumed to be by enthusiastic reformers, who lean to the more optimistic estimate.

As already explained, true statesmanship, which aims at complete justice to all, in public matters, seeks to secure to every citizen, whether he be rich or poor, the equal right to his individual liberty, and to an equal freedom in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of his own energy, skill, or inventive genius ; but there are hundreds and thousands of citizens, in large population centres, who wholly fail to recognise the fact that, to ensure such rights, there must be corresponding limitations at the point at which men's liberties overlap, when carried to extremes on either side.

The strongest argument that can be offered to the truly selfish citizen in regard to this systematic check on his desired activities, is that everyone must be con-

sidered; and that if he himself has to submit to being checked to-day, some fellow-citizen will have to be checked to-morrow on his behalf.

Here is a simple illustration: The man who "stops work," exercises his undoubted right; but so soon as he claims the additional right to prevent another man from doing what he himself has refused to do, he is attempting to deny to that other the identical form of liberty which he has claimed to exercise for himself. He is, in such a case, claiming for himself greater rights than he is prepared to concede to that other, or others, generally; and, in doing so, he is practically showing his disregard for an unmistakably and palpably just principle of government. Such an attitude is obviously indicative of a lax moral sense in regard to the regulation of our social organisation, and can only be accounted for by remembering primitive man, and his one-time low moral standards, where "self" was concerned, and allowed to be dominant.

In many modern communities—more particularly in the several dominions of the British Empire—there have been frequent extensions of the franchise, by which thousands of additional citizens have had conferred upon them all the rights of citizenship, including a voice in the selection of a parliamentary representative; and in a large proportion of such cases—apart from those who, by reaching the required age, have acquired voting power for the first time—the newly-enfranchised have suddenly realised that they now have a voice in determining what Parliament shall, or shall not, do for the people as a whole. There is no simultaneous event to remind the new voter of the *moral limit* of his newly-acquired power; and it is but natural, however regrettable, that he or she

should come into the new inheritance with the bald conviction that, if only he or she can move Parliament, Parliament itself can do anything, "by law"; and that, whatever it does do will be a justification in itself.

There are hundreds and thousands of citizens in every great community, who would resent the suggestion that the modest house and furniture and other belongings, which they have from time to time purchased out of the savings from their earnings—in some cases by much self-denial—were not in reality theirs, and might justly be used by, or appropriated and distributed among, those who had none of their own. They would, in the event of such a claim being set up, plead that it was a fundamental law of the community, that what they had "saved" was theirs; yet hundreds of this same class of citizens impliedly deny a similar right to those who have been diligent enough, or provident enough, to have accumulated a larger share of the world's belongings, by the same process of "saving," or of enjoying the gifts of others who have so "saved." They will readily assist to advocate and pass legislation which has the effect of forcibly taking from others, by law, a considerably larger proportion of taxation than they themselves pay; thus clearly appropriating or confiscating that unjust proportion of the other person's savings, for purposes of public benefit, in which they, as members of the community, are going to participate.

Taxation, for instance, was, in more primitive times, a personal service, as under the feudal system; where the king demanded service of his nobles, and they, in their turn, demanded it of their tenants; but, even under such a system, it would have been obviously unjust to require

one man to devote three months of the year to the service of the monarch, if another was called upon to devote only a week to the same purpose. The obviously just course, in the event of demanding personal service, would be to treat all equally. In modern and more civilised times, a direct money contribution has been substituted for personal service, and, instead of requiring the man of means to pay only the same *per capita* amount, as those of less means; it has been recognised that, since taxation is primarily for purposes of defence, and the maintenance of order in the community, the taxpayer should contribute according to his means, or according to the value of his possessions, thus protected. This is an obvious departure from the old feudal principle of "equal service": but it is a just departure, provided it be logically applied in the changed circumstances. Yet, it is now thought, or professed to be thought, just, in some communities, to throw the bulk of the burden of taxation on those who have larger means, and allow thousands of those who have small means to escape even a small proportional payment, by a process of "exemption"; and in such cases we see groups of citizens, who admittedly possess in the aggregate thousands of pounds' worth of property, being wholly exempted from contribution, thus making them the recipients of a substantial bribe, to induce them to approve of a system of taxation which falls on others richer than themselves in an unjust and clearly dishonest ratio. In such cases, there is, obviously, a complete disregard of what is fair and honourable.

The lack of the moral sense is observable in another direction, where citizens, enjoying the utmost liberty of

conscience in the matter of their own religion and personal habits and practices, are yet so forgetful or indifferent to the enjoyment of equal liberty by others, that they would go out of their way to deny the same freedom to those others who happen to cherish a different religion, and to prefer different personal habits and practices. These attitudes are simple instances of intolerance, which is another word for injustice; and the persistence with which such one-sided claims are maintained by citizens, who can only see one aspect of one particular phase of liberty, constitutes one of the most irritating obstacles to human progress along the lines of equal freedom and equal consideration for all. And it has another detrimental effect upon the peace and good will of any community; for the members of certain churches are incited by their pastors to conceive a distinct animus against all who decline to embrace their particular creed.

What is termed "law and order" represents an ideal of citizenship, which, if universally recognised, would add materially to the peace and good will of a community; yet we see innumerable instances in the present day, in which groups or organisations of men, who are never tired of emphasising the justice and beneficence of the principle of democracy, arrogate to themselves the right of privileges under it, which they deny, by word and deed, to others; and those same professed democrats go so far as to claim that, by merely combining for their own end, they are entitled to constitute themselves a sort of privileged class or guild, and to exercise a dominion over other men, which neither their personal nor corporate characters, nor their ostensible purposes, give them a particle of title to. While such unjust claims are being

set up and persisted in, it becomes impossible for any community to progress towards a higher plane of civilisation and citizenship, as it might do under a more equitable recognition of the principle of equal rights.

Again, it is in some respects widely supposed that, wherever the legislature is concerned, there is no question of morals involved. It is assumed by certain types of men, that so long as a political project is endorsed by the legislature, that project immediately becomes a just one. The proposition is, on the face of it, devoid of both justice and logic; for, if it were true, it would be allowable for a majority in Parliament to authorise certain privileged persons to do a variety of things that the world now universally condemns as dishonest or criminal.

The history of the growth of liberty and democracy is also the history of privileges wrested from the classes who enjoyed them at the expense of their fellows; and there is a clear and observable tendency for those classes who benefited by the gradual wresting of old class privileges from others, to seek to build up a new body of privileges in their own particular interest. There is no difference between such a contention, and the antiquated and now exploded doctrine of a "divine right" in monarchs. Nothing that Parliament authorises can be made just, unless it is morally right and fair on principle; otherwise the majority of the population of a small community could, by passing a resolution, rob and pillage the minority, and offer as a justification the fact that it had been approved by a majority. As a fact, the truly moral test of right and wrong, of what is just and unjust, of what is honest and dishonest, applies as clearly to the doings by and through Parliament, as it does to any

individual or chance group of citizens; and to contend otherwise is to go back on the whole principle and foundation of civilisation, and attempt to resolve society into its elements, in which brute force becomes the test of civic rights.

The widespread belief in the alleged sanctifying powers of a Parliamentary majority is one of the most potent obstacles to the true progress of a community in the present day.

There is, indeed, a distinctly noticeable decline in the moral tone of modern political discussion; and the ideals of citizenship are also distinctly lowered, as compared with those of half a century ago. Men, as individuals, recognise the moral value of periodically "looking within" on their own individual nature, in order to discipline their character to a higher sense of personal duty; but such a process as national introspection, except in what is disparagingly referred to as "academic literature," is becoming a thing of the past, among a large class of citizens, who speak of public life and public affairs, as if they were a mere scramble for a majority; and as if, when once that were obtained, whatever can be done can be justified. The attitude of such a class seems to be one of blind confidence, and of forgetfulness that what may be done by a bare majority to-day, may be reversed, and even more than reversed, to-morrow. The reflex action of such movements does not seem to be considered; and the "live-and-let-live" spirit bids fair to pass away and to give place to the more doubtful and dangerous doctrine of "spoils to the victors."

Unfortunately, this spirit is being fomented in many of the larger communities of the world by the increasing

body of merely fluent agitators, whose livelihood consists in cultivating a discontented and rebellious spirit, and inducing or compelling—by organised effort—the rank and file of the working classes to contribute a large proportion of their earnings, out of which such "officials" are handsomely paid for their easy but morally questionable services.

"Responsible government," as it was known half a century ago, in adjusting itself by automatic movement to reflect the political feelings of the people outside Parliament, has become a misnomer; for the people in many cases claim the right to treat their representative as a delegate, whose duty is claimed to be, and in many cases recognised by him to be, to merely echo the opinions of the most assertive section of his constituency.

Another fruitful source of a lowered and lowering morale is that which springs out of the misuse of State activities. In countries where the State has taken upon itself the construction and conduct of a railway, and—in some cases—a tramway service; the loosest moral sense exists in regard to the principles that should be observed in the location of these benefactions; by which the districts traversed are enormously benefited, and the private lands, thus brought into closer touch with the population centres, similarly increased in value. The inequality in treatment is sometimes recognised—and to some extent corrected—by the application of the "betterment" principle; but, in the majority of cases, the advocacy of, and the ultimate location of, such public works becomes a political scramble, in many instances associated with party intrigue; and the general public have ceased to look upon such indiscriminate methods of

distributing public moneys as pregnant with danger to the public morale.

I have spoken, elsewhere, of the suspicion that is engendered in the public mind, in a community in which the tariff is the subject of constant tinkering, by which all sorts of opportunites are afforded to corrupt ministers, and heads of departments, to play into the hands of importers or manufacturers, as the case may be, by raising or lowering duties, or altering the classification of goods, so as to play into the hands of those who hold stocks of certain commodities that are subject to varying imposts. In some countries, legislative power is taken to bring about these changes, without submitting the matter directly to Parliament; and the result is that endless opportunity is afforded for every kind of corruption in mercantile dealings. If protection be desired by a majority of the people, through their representatives in Parliament; the steps necessary to afford that protection to industries should be decided "in the open day" in Parliament; and, when once the step is taken, the public as consumers, and the mercantile classes as dealers, should know for a definite period what the imposts are; but the facilities for making constant changes in rates of duty, and in the classification of imported goods, subject to duties, should be severely reprobated as one of the most easy and fruitful sources of "backstair" dishonesty. That the general public of a community allow these practices to continue, without definite protest, is, itself, evidence of a blunted sense of political morality.

In certain of the British dominions, where socialistic and communistic doctrines have enjoyed a period of intermittent favour, and, under certain governments,

taken a bold form in the shape of State industries; much national wealth has been squandered, and much injury has been inflicted on legitimate industrial ventures under private enterprise, by this system of foolish experiments. It would be difficult to discover a single instance in which such ventures have not been associated with "jobbery," by the appointment of friends of ministers as managers, who, in some cases, have had no qualifications for their positions, save as political agitators or "engineers."

One remarkable feature about these ventures has been that it has been found impossible, either in or out of Parliament, to obtain straightforward balance sheets of profit and loss, prepared in accordance with the practice adopted in connection with public companies, so as to afford an opportunity to the tax-paying public to ascertain how the cost of the product of the State industry compares with that of the industry conducted by private enterprise. In almost all cases in which the management of such industries have put forward what purport to be balance sheets, they invariably omit numerous entries on the debit side, that, if provided for, would alter the whole outlook of the so-called "balance sheet."

This wasteful and morally dangerous system has, in some communities, been carried on so long that the taxpayer has ceased to be surprised or to protest; and there has been a sensible decline in moral sensitiveness.

Another result of these experiments has been the lax control of the employees of the State industries; for, where incompetent workmen have been disrated or dismissed, political pressure has been exerted by ministers to replace the employee so disrated or dismissed;

and the managers have thus lost control, lost interest in the venture, and a still lower standard of discipline and business stability has resulted. In some cases, close investigation would reveal startling and shocking waste and economic dissipation.

A further result of these many changes in the political conditions of our time is the growing animosity of the so-called "working" classes, that is, the *manual* working classes, towards the employers, whom they speak of contemptuously, and evidently consider as having ultimate aims inimical to their own, and as having, and pursuing, interests which are incompatible with the welfare of their employees.

This spirit of envy on the part of those who "spend as they go" against those who "save as they make," and so provide against the "rainy day," is a growing spirit, and one which, if fostered, will always engender class animosity, and so render more and more difficult the province of the honourable and informed politician or statesman.

All these instances of a more lax moral sense, in regard to political matters, bid fair to throw back the progress of the communities in which they are so frequently occurring; and it cannot be doubted that they are among the most serious obstacles to the steady progress of every country in which they prevail.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PRESS—AN AID AND AN OBSTACLE

ONE of the most potent factors in the progress or the retrogression of a self-governing community, and, therefore, one to be taken into account in the art of statecraft, is that which is known as the public Press.

The almost universal desire of men and women in civilised communities to be informed as to the public and private sayings and doings of their fellow beings, as well as in regard to other passing events that may arouse their curiosity, or affect their more substantial interests, has led to the widespread establishment of the institution known as "journalism."

Journalism takes a variety of forms, the most universal of which is "the newspaper," wherein the public are informed as to the smallest details of the routine of even the private life of the community in which they live, or with which they are nationally associated; in which every event deemed to be of interest to the general public, even of the most personal, and sometimes scandalous, character, is chronicled; and in which individuals and institutions are criticised with an amount of candour that has never been surpassed in the world's history.

The demand for what is termed "news" is so comprehensive and exacting, that it would be impossible for

any single newspaper to satisfy the requirements of the people in regard to all the forms of information demanded.

As a consequence of this wide and varied demand, journalism covers almost every conceivable subject, even in its newspaper form, including politics, law, finance, commerce, industry, science, art, literature, society, fashion, social scandal, and a variety of other special branches of human activity, too numerous, and in some cases too trivial, to mention.

Almost every newspaper assumes, in what are known as its "leading" columns, the attitude of a guide and counsellor to its readers in regard to subjects of public concern; and by means of impersonal articles, comes, in some cases—where good judgment is uniformly exhibited—to exercise considerable influence on public opinion, in proportion to the soundness, freedom from bias, and general consistency of thought that are revealed in those "leading" columns.

The bulk of the subscribers to daily newspapers are men and women who have not the time, the disposition, or, in some cases, the mental equipment to collect the needful data, or to devote deep thought to great public questions; and one of the natural results of the business aims of those who conduct newspaper ventures, is an ever-present tendency to produce a class of news, a style of writing, and a plane of thought, that seems to those conductors most attractive and satisfactory to the bulk of the class who are likely to purchase its issues; since the success of the advertising portion of a newspaper largely depends upon the nature and scope of its circulation and popularity.

There is a further tendency in the management of a newspaper, resulting, naturally, from the commercial character of journalistic aims, to study the tastes of those who support it; and in any community, or at any particular juncture in which the newspaper-reading public display a preference for sensational news, there is a natural tendency to respond to such a taste, in the selection and arrangement of the contents of the journal in question.

The directing head of a newspaper, sometimes an editor, sometimes a board of directors, almost invariably persuades itself, or, in some other way, comes to believe, that its journal is charged with and animated in the conduct of its leading columns by a philanthropic purpose or trust, supplementary to its commercial object; but, as a rule, it will be found, on close study, where that is possible by those outside the venture, that the supposed philanthropic purpose is never allowed to dominate the commercial aims of the journalistic venture, which, as I shall show later, are its ultimate goal.

In this universal catering for the public favour by newspaper conductors, there is a constant temptation to adopt the advocacy or championship of this or that local political party, which is in most favour with its own regular supporters; and this same purpose acts as an inducement to disapprove or condemn the opposite side of the political institutions of the community.

From this course of criticism there arises, in the minds of the editors or supervisors of well-established newspapers, an assumption of the rôle of censorship of those public men who do not happen to see or act eye to eye with the policy of the journal in question; and this censorship

becomes, in some cases, so strong an influence, that certain newspapers grow into great and powerful political agents, in forcing the hands of the weaker class of public men, who lack the courage and the individuality to act independently of the journalistic criticism, and to persist, notwithstanding, in the line of conduct that their political conscience dictates.

So widespread, and so influential, is the journalism of to-day, throughout great and cosmopolitan communities, that their combined voices become an important factor at international junctures; and there is good reason for stating that their combined influence has sometimes turned the scale in precipitating war or leading to peace in the larger communities in which they have circulated among the people.

It can safely be said, as a tribute to the almost universal preference of the people of civilised communities for honourable standards in abstract public affairs—the recognition of which, by newspaper conductors, in a large measure dictates their own tone—that the great preponderance of the newspapers of the present day are distinctly educational and beneficial in their influence; that they bring to public knowledge information which the people could not, or would not, otherwise obtain; that they disseminate, for the most part, sound views as to the significance of that knowledge, and establish in the minds of the people higher standards of public and private conduct, than the average man or woman would otherwise be led to entertain. In this way the Press becomes an important aid to progress, and a help to the patriotic statesman in his efforts to benefit the community.

On the other hand, there is a growing class of journalism, in almost every large community, that not only has ordinary commercial purposes in view, but that seeks to serve that end, through an extensive and extending circulation, by cultivating a lawless spirit; by creating class dissatisfaction; by raising false and disturbing theories of life and society, which are based on falsehood and anarchical spirit, in their readers, and, generally, by pandering to the most degrading passions in human nature; and this class of journalism is so influential among those whose nature it appeals to, that, if their teachings were widely realised, the civilisation of the twentieth century would be thrown back almost to its primal elements. In this respect journalism is a distinct obstacle to progress, and the influence of this type of journalism is one of the forms of discouragement which a patriotic statesman has to cope with.

The advantages of the beneficial class of journalism are so overwhelming, as compared with the injurious influence of the latter class, that society has in most countries approved generally, again and again, of the freedom of the Press; so that the law has virtually settled down to the doctrine that the responsibility of a newspaper is placed on a level with the responsibility of an individual citizen, in its being allowed the freest criticism, provided the element of malice is not allowed to enter into its comments on individuals or groups of individuals. These remarks apply to normal conditions only; for in time of war, when indiscretions on the part of reckless editors might be beneficial to an enemy, and highly injurious to their own country, a very proper censorship is imposed on all newspapers; as their

business interests are frequently stronger than their patriotism.

Whatever views men and women may take as to the advantages or disadvantages of unrestricted Press criticism generally; there is ample reason for believing that the aggregate educational and moral influence of the great majority of the established newspapers of civilised communities, in the exercise of their freedom of criticism of persons and institutions, is an infinitely greater factor in the furtherance of national progress, than is the opposite influence of the more limited section of journalism which trades on disloyalty, lawlessness, and the anarchical spirit.

Nevertheless, it is desirable to recognise that this demoralising side of journalism exercises a material influence in retarding the raising of the moral standards of the community, as well as in hindering the national progress in many other respects.

The Press of a country, then, taken as a whole, may at once prove an aid or an obstacle to true statesmanship, according to the purpose for which, and the ability with which, it is conducted by its proprietors. It is, however, essential to a proper understanding of the Press, as an influence in public affairs, to remember that, whatever may be the profession of the proprietors, or the conviction of those who conduct them editorially; in almost every instance a journalistic venture is a commercial enterprise; and the object of the proprietors, whether as individuals, firms, or companies, is to make a financial profit for themselves or their shareholders. Superficial observers are frequently led to the conclusion, as a result of reading what are called "leading" columns in a news-

paper, that the Press is a sort of philanthropic institution, established and maintained for the public welfare; and that the aspect of financial profit is far removed from the contemplation of those who direct its policy and general conduct. In order to completely understand the Press and its many gyrations in policy, in attitude, and in treatment of individuals and classes, this fundamental conviction, as to financial profit, should be borne in mind; as it will solve many otherwise perplexing problems.

There are two sources of profit to a newspaper or magazine, the one being income from public advertisements, the other being scope of circulation; and these two aspects operate upon one another: for a large and increasing circulation brings increased and increasing advertisement revenue; and, conversely, increased and increasing advertising columns bring in their wake increased and increasing circulation, on account of the wider information as to markets and business facilities afforded to commercial circles, as well as to private citizens. Newspapers and magazines are adventured for many purposes besides that of profit; but the latter is always kept, or sought to be kept, in view; for, even where the primary purpose of a journal is the furtherance of some doctrine, or theory, or policy, in regard to some special and limited class or circle of citizens, it is always desired that it should "pay its way," so as to continue and, if possible, widen the promulgation of its doctrine, theory, or policy, and so avoid its advocates putting their hands into their own pockets.

The establishment or launching of a large daily newspaper is a venture involving considerable sums of money, much of which would be practically wasted if the venture

should prove a failure ; so that capitalists are extremely careful in launching such an enterprise, without laying all their plans for a successful appeal to the reading and advertising public ; and, having launched their venture, the directing head or heads are equally careful to espouse a policy, and adopt a tone of treatment and criticism, on matters of interest to the general public, which may commend their journal to both advertisers and subscribers or readers.

Where paper is cheap, and the size of a journal is such as to show a substantial profit on the actual sale of the issue, the matter of circulation becomes more important ; and where a journal is large, and paper is dear, so as to leave no profit on the actual sale, the proprietors are disposed to look more to advertising income for their profit : remembering always that advertisers are influenced, in their choice of a journal for reaching the public, by the scope of their circulation. As bearing on this aspect of journalism, it is the practice of many journals to make public announcements of the extent of their circulation, as an inducement to advertisers to use their columns for their purposes, and to inspire confidence as to the truth of those announcements, by having them confirmed by public accountants.

Most of the foregoing comments are axiomatic, and are noted by all experienced public men who aim at statesmanship, and seek to enlist the aid of journalism, or to avoid its opposition in regard to their future policy ; for the newspaper, especially the daily paper, is a factor, which is to be counted with by politicians, according to their (the newspaper's) reputation as a sound and unbiassed guide to public opinion.

Some journals are not only in every way excellent as advertising media, and as news sheets, but are also so influential, on account of the uniform sagacity of their views on different public questions, that the people look to them for guidance, where the data for their articles are not at every one's disposal; and many people thus take their opinions from powerful journals.

Some other journals, though in every way excellent for advertising purposes, and as news sheets, are so wanting in influence, by reason of the lack of ability and courage in their leading columns, that the public, although subscribing to them for their news, and using them as advertising media, attach no importance to their comments on public affairs.

The circulation of a newspaper depends, as I have said, largely upon its merits as a news sheet, and the bulk and variety of its advertisements; unless it be a minor journal, conducted in the interests of some particular doctrines; some particular trade, or some particular organisation; and in such cases the circulation depends upon the number of followers of the doctrines, the number of persons engaged in the trade, or the number of members of the organisation.

There is another aspect of daily newspapers which requires attention by leading politicians. An attempt is often made by an astute editor to cultivate the circulation of his journal, by writing down to the many, in his leading columns, in order to win sympathy with, or acquire power of guidance over, the people; but the politician, who can gauge their value in that respect, will not attach too much value to the aid of such journals in supporting him and his policy, or be

too much influenced by their adverse criticism, as an obstacle.

It may be laid down, with a fair degree of certainty, that where a newspaper is seeking advertising income, which is derived largely from business citizens, it espouses a sound political policy; as that is both desired and appreciated by business men, on account of its steadying influence on the community; but instances are frequently seen in which newspapers, whose advertising interests should lead them to soundness of views in their articles, occasionally break out in unsound, and even reckless, views in their leading columns, with the object of attracting the attention and admiration of some popular and numerous class, and so giving an impetus to their circulation among that class. Such a policy gives a newspaper the appearance of blowing hot and cold on some great public question, so as to help the circulation barometer, without risking the advertising income.

A leading politician or statesman, who is a skilful observer of the political meteorology which surrounds him, will always watch such influences, when bringing forward some large and important legislative project; and he will have measured and gauged the value of this journalistic support, or the opposing force of that opposition, by the character and calibre of the men who, always with a view to their own journal's interests, wield the power of their leading columns. Among the obstacles to sound statesmanship is the fact that, in small or less central communities of the world, where unprincipled men reach prominence, there is much practice of journalistic bribery through the medium of

distributing large sums in Government advertisements, ostensibly for legitimate purposes, but frequently with sinister aims; and, in such circumstances, a high-principled politician, who comes after such men, and after such unjustifiable expenditure, meets with much opposition from newspapers that have enjoyed it, in his endeavour to limit the public outlay of that kind within legitimate and justifiable bounds.

Sound statesmanship suffers in the smaller communities of the world by the narrowness of the editorial outlook, which is shown in the limitation of the columns of their newspapers to views which are in keeping with those of the editorial guide; and in the curtailment of views which are not so palatable, but which would be useful as indications of more informed public opinion. Whereas, in great population centres like London, New York, and Paris; the leading politician has the benefit of seeing any and every outlook expressed in the regular correspondence columns, which serve as a mirror of public opinion; in smaller centres, the editorial mind cannot resist the consideration of what this or that view expressed by his correspondents may have on his class circulation or advertising income. *The Times* is a shining example, though not the only one, of the open column; for, in that great journal, the editor's personal view is unknown and disregarded, except in the leading columns, and in the general propriety of his paper's subject-matter.

No leading politician can recklessly afford to ignore the Press in regard to important public measures; but the leading columns of journals in provincial or less central communities are so often disfigured by obvious partisan-

ship, want of knowledge, flippancy, personalities, careless writing, and inconsistency, that the leading columns have ceased to be trustworthy guides for the people, and are in a large measure regarded as ephemeral and inconsequential.

Looked at, then, from the point of view of the statesman, the Press need not be generally regarded as either an abiding menace, or a far-reaching help; except in regard to some extended line of policy, which continues, for a long time, and in a variety of ways, to be detrimental to the people, and thus produces a sustained criticism and condemnation; for, except in rare instances of great editorial ability, newspapers are too spasmodic in their praise or blame, too changeable in their views, too inconsistent in their conduct, to have great permanent weight attached to their utterances by the more intelligent public, who read leading articles because of the better command of data by their leader-writers, but not often to be convinced. The reputation of a journal is like that of an individual among his fellow citizens, in this respect: that neither of them carries great weight, unless its or his conduct, considered over a long period, and under a great variety of circumstances, has been found to be steadily patriotic or altruistic, and uniformly free from the temptations of expediency. If they are only intermittently steady, and indulge in spasmodic efforts to be influential; they almost invariably fall into the error, illustrated by Æsop's fable of "The Wolf and the Lamb," of crying out so often as to have ceased to command serious and wide attention from the general public.

CHAPTER VII.

PUBLIC AND PARTY INFLUENCE

IN enumerating the several influences which operate, from time to time, on the opinions and political activities of public men, which, therefore, become factors in their statesmanship; one cannot omit the forces of, firstly, what is called "party allegiance," and, secondly, what is known as the "pressure of public opinion." The consideration of these influences at once raises the broad question as to whether a representative of the people, when once elected, becomes a mere delegate for the purpose of voicing the opinions of his party, or of those electors he represents, in regard to subjects which arise in Parliament; or whether he can conclude that he has been elected because of his general knowledge of public affairs, and of his being considered better equipped and more competent than his opponents, to act in the interests of his constituents.

In the consideration of this question one is immediately reminded of the now celebrated utterance of Edmund Burke—already referred to—who was called upon by his Bristol constituents to take a certain political course in regard to a measure that was about to come before Parliament. Burke "stood his ground," in one of the most eloquent speeches on record, and repudiated the doctrine that he was a delegate—a mere mouthpiece of his constituents. He said, in effect, that

he owed them his time, his abilities, his unremitting attention to their interests; but, he added, with fervour, that he also owed them "his judgment," which he regarded as the one thing that gave dignity and honour to the position of a parliamentary representative. Apart from the heroism of such an attitude, with which we have no concern here, he had logic on his side; for it cannot be supposed that he—the greatest philosophic statesman of his time, and, possibly, since his time—could have deliberately suppressed his own mature opinions, and merely echoed those—so far as he could ascertain them—of such of his constituents as could make themselves heard.

The arguments against the delegate theory, on other grounds, not set up by Burke, would now prove convincing to any thinking body of men, and can be laid down as axiomatic in regard to the province and duty of a parliamentary representative. In the first place, we all recognise that a member of Parliament does not represent a portion, but the whole, of his constituents; and that, in accepting the trust which membership reposes in him, he undertakes to act in the interests of all. In any case, the relationship of a member to his constituents is general and vague: for he directly reflects the opinions of a majority only, and is usually elected for a period of years, during which a large number of questions, not at the time of election in actual contemplation, may, and will arise, concerning which he will not be able to ascertain the exact views of his constituents. It may be asked, too, how he can know, where he is elected with authority to speak and act on a great variety of questions, how many are in agreement with him, or in antagonism, on this question

or that. Again, is he to represent those only who come forward at a crucial moment, and loudly voice their opinion; when, probably, at the same time, an equally large, and possibly larger, number are remaining silent on the same question, feeling confidence in their representative's good judgment?

It is morally impossible to lay down, with any degree of accuracy, what the views of a body of people are, when all are not represented at any meeting; for no question ever comes forward which is not affirmed without some modifying words, either in the resolution embodying it, or in the shape of a series of conditions expressed in the accompanying clauses in a Bill, as dealt with in a committee of Parliament.

The touchstone of the whole question lies in the fact of a man's election. In Anglo-Saxon times, citizens, or villagers, met in the fields, and discussed at first hand all proposals of public interest; and it was only in consequence of the rough-and-ready way in which things were dealt with, and because it was inconvenient for everybody to be present when the discussions took place, that the principle of choosing a fellow citizen to represent the people in those discussions was resorted to. If, in those primitive times, it was difficult to ascertain, with accuracy, all the opinions, of all the people, on all the aspects of a question requiring to be dealt with; it must be infinitely more difficult to-day, when human affairs have ceased to be simple and primitive, but have become intricate, involved, and overlapping in their nature and effects on commercial and industrial interests. People will say, to-day, in an off-hand way, that they are in favour of a land tax, or of an old-age pension, and

consider that they have made a definite pronouncement; but, when the question reaches the stage at which either of these policies is embodied in an Act of Parliament, and placed upon the Statute Book, the one may contain fifty or a hundred sections, and the other an equal number, besides an immense number of regulations, in explanation, modification, or qualification of each part of the Act. Each Act may have as many facets as a precious stone, each of which presents a different appearance, according to the age and position in life from which it is viewed; and the definiteness of the whole thing may be further "blurred" by additional considerations as to when, for how long, where, and to what extent the vital principle of each Act shall operate.

Apart from other considerations, therefore, it is absolutely impossible so to arrange political life or political affairs that a member should become a mere delegate; unless—and here lies the danger, even the fatality to public life, of such a theory—members are willing to act as mere automata, and take their orders from some political body outside Parliament, as to what course they shall adopt on each political question, concerning which they are called on to act. That is attempted in some political organisations, with dire results to the individuality and self-respect of the members; for, in such a case, there can be no nearer parallel to such membership than that well-known children's toy, in which a figure is perched on the end of a stick, and moves up and down and over the other side in obedience to the pulling of a string attached to every limb of the automaton.

Turning now to a broader consideration of this question; one may ask what sort of minds would consent to

enter Parliament in such a capacity? As long as there is a substantial remuneration provided for those who accept the position of representative, there will always be found candidates for election; for, in most cases, the remuneration is made sufficient to induce men of small earning power and small means to adopt the position as a means of livelihood, and to live the life, under the glamour of membership, without being conscious of its humiliation. As a rule, such men can, and do, only find fellowship and companionship among others in a similar position. But, assuming that a man has a real ambition to enter Parliament, as an arena in which great public questions are raised for settlement, and discussed on their merits; he will, if he have spirit, individuality, and self-respect, only accept such a trust on condition that he do so as a free man, with the liberty to think for himself, and to use his best judgment in the true interests of the people who elected him as their representative. He will, as Edmund Burke said, devote his time, knowledge, care, and abilities to their interests, but he will stop short at sacrificing his personal judgment, where he considers that there is a call for its honest and independent exercise.

Many years ago, the author of this little work had occasion to take exception to a phrase that stood at the head of part of a chapter in *The Map of Life*, by the well-known historian, Lecky.

That great writer used the phrase "justifiable time-serving"; and, under it, he offered a justification for a politician's varying his opinions on certain public matters at different times, and in different localities, according to circumstances. The present writer took exception to the

phrase, and to the attitude of mind that it seemed to justify. Mr. Lecky was good enough to answer the objection in writing, and said: "It is, I think, correct that a man who is sent into Parliament to represent the opinions of a constituency must—whilst maintaining his own judgment on matters of serious importance—defer, in some degree, to the opinions of those he represents, sometimes upon matters he deems of no great importance; following their judgment rather than his own, more frequently not pushing forward opinions with which he knows they generally disagree. The line between justifiable and unjustifiable compromise is often not susceptible of perfectly precise definition, and my object was to help those who are trying conscientiously to find their way on these matters; remembering their duty to their own convictions, but remembering, also, that they are not, indeed, mere delegates, but trustees, sent in to protect particular interests, and to represent particular opinions. It is, also, obvious that the same measure may be useful at one time, useless or mischievous at another; because in the former case opinion is ripe for it and sustains it; because in the latter case it runs counter to the stream and excites irritation or opposition."

I have set out the whole of Mr. Lecky's letter, in order that the complete context might be seen by my readers.

It will be seen that that writer distinguished between "measures of serious importance" and those of "no great importance"; and that sentence is in keeping with my present contention in which he speaks depreciatingly of the mere delegate. Lecky stands out as one of the highest authorities on the morality of political life.

There are several well-known authors who have dealt with this question of a politician's functions and his obligation to maintain his individuality and self-respect.

The whole question is one of importance, especially nowadays, when certain organisations are choosing men to represent them; who enter the legislative arena metaphorically handcuffed and muzzled, in regard to their own personal opinions, on not merely matters of minor importance, but on great and vital issues, which directly or indirectly go to the very root of a country's existence as a competitor among nations.

The public man who stands up for preserving the higher code of a statesman's duty to himself, and refuses to act the part of what Lecky calls the "mere delegate," may possibly go down in the fight; but experience shows that a constituency of liberal-minded citizens, who love freedom, and understand the blessings it has radiated in our history, will in the end respect and stand by a representative who has the courage to speak his mind, and take broad and enlightened views on the bigger problems of political life.

CHAPTER VIII.

PREJUDICE, AS AN OBSTACLE TO STATESMANSHIP

THERE is nothing more surprising to the experienced politician, in his frequent communion with the people, outside Parliament, than the widespread supposition that that institution is, in actual practice, a body of men who come together in the legislative arena, with no other purpose than the discussion and settlement of public questions, from the single standpoint of the people's welfare. If Parliament were, as many citizens thus suppose, an arena in which disinterested and free men meet to discuss public questions, without reference to constituencies or parties, or other outside influences, consciously or unconsciously operating on the legislative mind, and with no covert hope or prospect of ministerial or other personal rewards, that attitude on the part of the public might be justified; but, unfortunately, the influences I have named, and a hundred others, make the supposed primary purpose of Parliament almost a subordinate one.

It is a severe judgment to pass on so exalted an institution; but it is, nevertheless, true, if the mixture of motives in operation be gauged by their ultimate effect. All Parliaments may not be equally reprehensible; but the effects of the extended franchise, almost everywhere, and the now almost universal adop-

tion of the principle of payment of members, as well as the growing tendency to rigid party discipline, make this verdict applicable to almost all Anglo-Saxon Parliaments. Even experienced politicians are frequently surprised at this unsophisticated expectation on the part of the public; and repetition of disillusioning assurances does not seem to prevent that surprise, when men of the world, men of business, even men of affairs, outside, constantly ask of politicians, "Why do they not do this, or do that, in Parliament?" And, in many cases, the "this" or "that" is something that, if "done," would distinctly cut down the privileges or emoluments of members themselves, and in all cases would involve an "eye to eye" attitude on the part of groups of men who do not, as a fact, and for the most part cannot, agree on anything but routine matters.

It is certainly a fit subject for inquiry why this institution, which should exercise more influence on a community than any other, should have so largely failed to effect the purpose for which it was originally intended, and for a long time served; and which the general public still innocently think it does still effect, notwithstanding their daily experience of its disappointing results. It is not an exaggeration to say that if half a dozen worldly-wise and travelled men, with a wide knowledge of history, in its broader sense, and a varied knowledge of human nature and human affairs, were to sit down for one whole day a week, they could accomplish all the work that is done by Parliament in a month, and produce legislative results much more equitable and beneficial to a community, than those that are now placed on the Statute Book.

Why is this so ? And could a better result be attained by a feasible alteration of the machinery of Parliament ? Bluntly put, Parliaments are to-day a sort of public scramble ; and out of the scores of theories, and aspirations, and personal aims of parties, and groups, and individuals, which are advocated, either straightforwardly, or by side tracks ; the outcome, in the shape of legislation and administration, is a sort of resultant, or compromise, of all the conflicting interests and activities suggested : too varied and too numerous to catalogue.

Many men of worldly experience, who have entered Parliament with lofty ideals of what they would individually do, and of what they would induce the government of the day to do, have borne their disappointment for some time, and, at last, given up the career of politics as a hopeless one. But others, with more patience, have gone on, and done their best as mere "flies on the wheel," satisfied that they have at least kept less desirable men than themselves out of the political arena. The fact that a man attains to ministerial office, and even leadership, does not alter the disappointment that follows ; for such a man, if he possess ideals, must have anticipated that, while in office, he would be able to do much more than a private member.

If all the world, or even the legislators only, who now regulate, or irregulate, the people's affairs, were mentally "balanced," or what is colloquially called "level headed," there would be much less retarding interference with social and individual evolution, and much fewer occasions for dissatisfaction with the institution in which those legislators now exercise their multifarious activities. The late W. R. Gregg, in his very practical work on

Political Problems, said: "There are so few mentally capable of seeing both sides of a question; so few with consciences sensitively alive to the obligation of seeing both sides; so few, placed under conditions either of circumstances or temper, which admit of their seeing both sides."

Of all the "obstacles" to the wise administration of the affairs of a community, so far as they are affected by Parliament and statesmanship, the most potent and all-pervading is that of religion, and its ever actively operating prejudices. Those influences are by no means all on the surface, for they can be traced by experienced observers in a variety of subterranean activities, in the determination of the personnel of ministries; in the courses pursued by members of governments, in response to ecclesiastical promptings from without, with far subtler purposes than the general public even suspect. And, although many of those purposes are false to democratic principles, and of a character which their more active agents would roundly condemn in others, and in other causes; their moral reprehensibility is condoned by those who set them in motion, on the ground that, being conceived in what they regard as a "good cause," or for "a good end," the means by which they are promoted is fully justified. This retrograde influence is the natural result of an attempt to "serve two masters," by endeavouring to act honestly by their fellow man and woman, in worldly affairs, and, at the same time, seeking to placate an omniscient Divinity, by attributing to Him narrow prejudices for a particular form of religion, which, if He entertained them, would place Him on a lower level than that of some of the noblest and most mag-

nanimous of His own creatures. Many such moral anomalies, if carefully and impartially analysed, will prove to be due to a degraded conception of a Supreme Being, and to the equally degrading practice of investing Him with some of the most ignoble of human attributes; for, as Bacon says, "An unworthy opinion of the Creator is contumely."

Lecky's *History of Rationalism*, Draper's *Conflict of Religion and Science*, and Winwood Reade's *Martyrdom of Man* afford eloquent testimony to this species of self-deception and theological degradation.

Herbert Spencer, in his comprehensive "Study" or Introduction to the science of Sociology, has most elaborately analysed all the influences which operate to retard the progress of that branch of knowledge; and he has grouped those influences under different heads, as forms of "bias." For a purely scientific treatise, I think that word preferable to mine; but for a work like the present, which professes to be of a simpler and more educational nature, I prefer to class these hindrances, or obstacles, as "prejudices," against which the statesman or politician has to contend. There is an element of condemnation suggested in the word "prejudice"; and it connotes a more aggressive spirit, which is in keeping with the aim of this chapter.

Sheer political ignorance is, perhaps, one of the most formidable of the many obstacles to just and impartial, and sagacious administration of a community's affairs; for there is no department of human activities in which a "little knowledge" is more "dangerous" and far-reaching than in the making of laws, by which a whole community is to be disciplined, constrained, or forced

into unwonted activity. Pope's advice to "Drink deeply, or not at all," would, indeed, serve as a most apt admonition to all who enter Parliament as law makers. For the inevitable effect of a "little knowledge" in politics, as in any other subject, is to beget confidence; whereas much knowledge begets modesty of intellectual demeanour, because of the fact that every step forward, that we take in attaining it, opens up a new vista of unexplored intellectual territory; and the opening to view of this widening domain causes men to hesitate more and more, when they know what far-reaching injury to others may result from even an apparently innocent false step. There is, in truth, no branch of knowledge, except perhaps the dispensing of drugs, to which the adage of "Fools rushing in" may be more aptly applied than in practical politics, where one clause of an Act of Parliament may start into harmful activity, or call a halt, to a whole nation. The little knowledge, or want of knowledge, may be in the nature of a failure to realise the hidden or remote effects of a legislative activity; for laws operate on human affairs, as does a destructive fire; spreading from one interest to another, in directions never suspected by the ignorant or childish hand that lighted the match. There is, moreover, too strong a tendency, in persons of limited knowledge, to neglect to realise the future and its probable needs; and the result of such short-sighted conduct may be almost inconceivable.

We all remember that Lord Roberts, one of the most sagacious soldiers in modern times, warned English statesmen that their country was unprepared for war, at a time when, if his advice had been followed, it is

possible that Germany would never have risked a war, that has, during the last five years, acted like an earthquake, without precedent, on the world's vital social and economic stability. Probably the cry for "economy" that was then being reiterated in and out of Parliament, by short-sighted agitators, operated on the Government of the hour, in causing such mature advice to be ignored, to the subsequently-proved grave danger of the Empire.

There is another infirmity of mind from which men suffer, in such a way as to unfit them for useful legislative work. That is, in want of mental breadth. We speak of men and women as "insular," or "narrow," when we refer to their inability to see the outlying considerations or probable effects of any particular activity. We speak of certain individuals as being mentally "blinkered," as a horse that cannot be safely trusted to see around him, as well as in front of him. Many people, and certainly many politicians, suffer from this infirmity. In some cases the inability to see any other interest but the one immediately ahead of them is a mental defect, resulting from a narrow training, or from having lived too long in a small and self-sufficient community, where the outside world, or even the next-door community, is not taken into account. In other cases, the "narrowness" is the result of a sort of mental paralysis, forced upon the individual by a "party"—or "caucus"—tie or pledge, entered into as the price of obtaining a seat in the legislature.

We all know the widespread prejudice that normally exists, or is forced upon legislators by fear, in regard to other nationalities than their own; how they regard a person who is a native of another latitude, and who

happens to have a different-coloured skin, as having been intended by the Creator for a lower social level than their own, and as being necessarily of a lower scale of humanity. One may point out to such people in vain, that many Asiatic races were civilised and cultured centuries before their British ancestors were found by Julius Cæsar, clothed in skins, and living as many so-called barbarians do to-day; yet they will continue to plume themselves on their own personal and national superiority. Again, we have all witnessed a similar, and even bitter, prejudice against certain other Eastern nationalities, such as the Japanese; and it will be found futile, as an argument, to point out to such persons that, in regard to many fine human characteristics, the Japanese have proved themselves superior to the Anglo-Saxons. It is, perhaps, not generally known that one of the most cultured Prime Ministers of the Australian Commonwealth publicly confessed, during a debate on the Alien Restriction Bill, that the people of that nationality were being excluded from Australia because of "their virtues," rather than "their vices"—perhaps one of the most humiliating and cowardly admissions ever made by an Anglo-Saxon statesman. Such a prejudice is on a parallel with that of the New Guinea truly barbaric natives, who have been seen to jointly ridicule the personal appearance of Europeans, because of their "bleached" colour, and the "turned-down" nose, to which they were not accustomed.

Then there is another form of prejudice, which results, in some cases, from interested motives, and, in others, from sheer intolerance and narrowness of outlook. Bodies of men and women, formed into organisations for

the furtherance of some foolish obsession, do not hesitate to bring all their influence to bear to return to Parliament one of their particular cult, or one who will agree to prostitute himself for the furtherance of their cult, and the winning of their votes, in the blind belief that the legalising of that particular idiosyncrasy is going to benefit the whole community.

We see, too, particular religious denominations concentrating all their attention and influence in the effort to put into Parliament a man who favours, or pretends to favour, their particular brand of religion, and, by doing so, neglecting to assure themselves that he is capable of taking and espousing sound views on the more general and more important political and social problems of his time.

Then, there is another form of class-prejudice, by which people, who have not, themselves, been blessed with a good and useful education, conceive a dislike, frequently grounded on unreasoned jealousy, for those who, by their manner and speech, reveal the fact that they have had the benefit of a more cultured early training. There are, indeed, many forms of narrow prejudice exhibited at election time, and, so, calculated to influence the voting; although in many, or most of, such cases there is little chance of the narrow cause being benefited; and there is always a chance of an election being turned in a direction which those who so misuse the vote would not, if they could see far enough before them, really desire.

There is, too, a class, in some cases very numerous, who would entirely lose sight of the real purpose and significance of the election of a member for a term of

several years, so long as they felt the satisfaction of supporting a man who espouses their particular kind of narrow cause ; and it may be that that candidate, when he enters Parliament, will never have a chance of helping their particular cause, and may possibly be entirely out of sympathy with those who have supported him, on every other political question but the narrow one which has influenced them in the election.

We now come to an entirely different sort of obstacles to good government. There are men in all Parliaments, who, far from being actuated by patriotic or philanthropic motives, are entering their precincts for the primary purpose of personal gain, sometimes directly, by being prepared to barter their vote, and sometimes indirectly, by obtaining some temporary or permanent post which they would not otherwise be able to secure, and for which, possibly, they are in no way honestly qualified. Such men soon reveal themselves to Ministers of the Crown, by their demeanour, when critical divisions are being approached ; and they are easily discovered by other than Ministers, by their uncertain and hypothetical speeches and professions in regard to approaching questions, and the divisions upon them. And, closely related to this class of man, is the member who is for ever speculating as to the probable views of a majority of his constituents, on the different questions he is about to be called upon to help in deciding. One sees, too, frequently, in Ministers themselves, a tendency to vacillation, in regard to important questions, which are coming to the front in public opinion. One sees a good deal of the "balancing of chances," in the calculations of the party whips, who "count noses" from time to time,

to discover the prospects of a measure; and in many cases governments will be guided, as to their attitude towards a question that is raised in the Press, or in public meetings, by a careful consideration of the effects which the espousal, or the neglect, of that particular question may have upon their party at the next election.

The obstacle arising in connection with political organisations, and their resultant groupings in Parliament, is one of the most difficult and disturbing in its effect on statesmanship. Some of the "biggest" men, in the "biggest" Parliaments of the world, have succumbed to this influence, as modern historical writings show; and the close political student will at once call to mind instances during the last half-century, in Great Britain, and in one or two of her dominions. The earliest home of the "caucus" would be difficult to name; for its rise, as a decadent influence in Parliaments, has been very gradual; it has, in fact, been an evolution. To-day it has reached a stage of development which constitutes it a positive political disease; for it is wielded by men, professing to pride themselves in their love of democratic rule, who yet use it so as to produce government by minority!

Given, for mere illustration, a parliament of one hundred members, made up of one party of sixty, and another of forty, with the party of sixty in power; the following result may, and, in the writer's experience has, more than once, come to pass in a Dominion Parliament. Forty, of the party in power, approve of the introduction of a measure; and twenty of the same party are, in fact, opposed to it. The forty in opposition are also opposed to it. By the adoption of the "caucus" principle, the

twenty of the party in power have bound themselves to vote with the majority of their party; so that the measure has the parliamentary support of the whole sixty, so far as the voting is recorded, as against the forty in opposition. If the twenty who thus voted against their convictions, for caucus purposes, had honestly joined with the opposition party, the measure would have been negatived by sixty to forty; but, by reason of the caucus principle, the measure has been carried by sixty to forty; so that it was actually passed by a minority, and thus realised minority rule! And this has been done, again and again, by a body of men who were for ever professing and preaching "democratic" and "majority" rule, although, in the proceedings of their own organisations, they invariably insisted on an honest majority being required to carry a motion.

There is another disturbing factor to sound statesmanship, less reprehensible than the last mentioned, but, nevertheless, more effectual in its disturbing influence, in proportion to the extent of the domain over which the parliament has control. I refer to the insular perceptions of the small scattered communities embraced in a nation of large area. This shortcoming results from the almost universal lack of a sense of proportion; the inability to consider the interests of people far removed from their own local centre. It is, in fact, the same narrow spirit, though on a larger scale, that was ridiculed by Dickens, half a century ago, and stigmatised as the "parish pump" view of things.

In young countries like Canada, South Africa, and Australia of to-day, and the United States of less than half a century ago, where small communities are, or

were, far removed from one another, and not always within rapid reach by modern means of transit, it is, and was, difficult to bring their inhabitants to understand that, in criticising the action or inaction of a government, they must consider the effect of what they criticise upon hundreds of other communities under the same government, but possibly hundreds, or even thousands of miles away. Such communities almost invariably ask: What effect is this or that activity or inactivity going to have upon us? And, according to the answer, so should be the policy of the government!

For the first half of the nineteenth century there was no sympathy between the early settlers in California and those of the Eastern States; and it was sometimes very difficult to reconcile the primitive and pioneering spirit of the Western population to the federal legislation that was considered desirable by the more advanced people of the Eastern States. In Canada, where the distances are equally great, and the communities were scattered and isolated half a century ago, the same failure to identify their several interests was realised; and, in some cases, emphasised by the two nationalities—French and British. In the Australian Commonwealth, the people of Northern Queensland, with their tropical climate, vegetation, and social surroundings and conditions, have sometimes found it difficult to recognise the identity of interests of citizens of the same Federal Government, living so far apart, in climates and environments of totally different characters.

And even at closer quarters, the same insularity is observable; for much jealousy exists between one State and another, only 500 miles apart; and it is clearly

illustrated in the fact that in the newspapers of one State, which may be reached from the capital of another State in a few hours, there is, probably, very little reference to the events of the sister State, unless the incidents are either "spicy" or apparently menacing to the State that inserts the news.

Though the distances are so much smaller in Great Britain, and there has been much more time to establish identity of interests in the populations at the extreme north and south, there is still something of the same difficulty in regard to legislation which is to affect all the people of Great Britain alike. To avoid this disturbing influence requires a cultivation of the people's imagination, by which they can extend their mental vision, and see with their "mind's eye" far beyond their own local surroundings. If the subject were fully considered as a branch of philosophy, it would be discovered that half the misunderstandings of the world—family, local, national and international—are traceable to a want of imagination, a want of the sense of proportion and perspective, a want of the ability to "see ourselves as others see us."

In addition to all these, there are a score of other disturbing factors, which have to be recognised and counted with, in the statesmanlike conceptions of a political representative of the broader type; and history, as seen in the older and younger countries of the world, shows that it is all a matter of time and national growth.

The community of interests of the Eastern and Western States of America is now more clearly recognised and understood than formerly; and the French and English populations of Canada are nearer to a realisation of their

common interests than they were half a century ago. Likewise, the people of the most distant portions of the Australian Commonwealth are beginning to realise the advantages of a Federal Parliament, which is intended to deal comprehensively with the broader interests of the Australian people as a whole; and they are now more reconciled to the distinction, thus drawn, between those broader interests, and the more local and detailed concerns which have been left in the hands of the several State Parliaments.

Even to-day, however, there are many public men, and some editors of leading journals, who completely misconceive the history and advantages of the Federal principle, as applied to extensive territories; whose political vision has not sufficiently developed to enable them to realise what a chaotic and hopeless state of things would result, if their thoughtless desire for the abolition of State Parliaments were accomplished, and an attempt made to govern a country, as large as Europe, in all its activities, and administrative ramifications, from one political centre!

The ideal of the cosmopolitan is, indeed, as yet but a dream; for the condition of mind which that word connotes, in which men and women can, where necessary, forget their "parish pump"; their suburb; their province or state; their particular nation and nationality—that will only come as a later phase of human evolution. But, although this be a vision; there is no good reason why thoughtful men and women, and journalism that professes to be philanthropic as well as commercial, should not, even now, strive to see for themselves, and teach others to see, human affairs from a broader and more panoramic outlook.

CHAPTER IX.

"OVER-LEGISLATION"

IF it be once admitted, from a sociological point of view, that the more extensive the freedom which a citizen enjoys, the better and fuller opportunities he will have to minister to his own welfare and that of the community; then, the limit within which the legislature should restrain the activities of citizens could be easily and clearly defined. In such an event we should limit the application of the term "over-legislation" to those laws only, that interfere with a citizen, within the circle of his own acknowledged rights, as explained in the previous chapter on "Liberty."

Few people realise what a revolution such a limitation on legislative interference would bring about in the social system, as compared with the existing handcuffed condition of individuals in many Anglo-Saxon communities of to-day. Citizens of the twentieth century would hardly know themselves, if they were suddenly informed, and realised, that they were free to do as they liked, and when they liked, so long as they did not interfere with the equal right of their neighbour to do the same; yet, that is the scientific definition of "Liberalism."

One of a citizen's fundamental rights, under such a state of things, would be the liberty to exchange a portion of his own legitimately-acquired money or other possessions—which are already, professedly, considered sacred as private property—with other citizens, abroad, for

something those others were willing and at liberty to dispose of; in other words, he would be free to import for himself, or to buy from importers, the goods of other countries, without having to pay a penalty or suffer a punishment (in the shape of a duty), for having enjoyed that simple exercise of freedom to exchange one's own property, without being penalised for so doing. We should, in short, find ourselves, for the first time, living in a free-trade community. And if the converse were the case, and the people of other countries were at liberty to buy from the country in which we happened to be; the world would soon, and for the first time, reach the ideal to which Cobden looked forward, under which each country would be able to concentrate itself and its activities on those industries to which its climate and environment best fitted it. The result to the world would mean an economy, which, if computed, would startle even the most phlegmatic citizen.

There is nothing subtle or involved in such an universal policy; for it is no more than the application to the whole world's affairs, of that principle of specialisation that we apply in the economic adjustment of the work within our own homes; within our own municipalities; and within our own separate states or provinces; but which we systematically ignore, and even do our best to subvert, in the adjustment of commercial activities between our own and other nations. Here is Cobden's simple but profound doctrine: of a statesman who lived before his time, and cast the light of his brain on a fiscally-benighted world:

"*Free-trade, in the widest definition of the term, means only the division of labour, by which the productive powers*

of the whole earth are brought into mutual co-operation." (Letter on Blockades, 1862.)

Again, as the result of this general principle of scientific liberalism, we should find ourselves freed from the unequal and unjust incidence of taxation, which is imposed upon citizens in almost every country, contrary to the true principle laid down by all the recognised authorities on taxation; and we should have the satisfaction of knowing that we were only being compelled to contribute to the necessary revenue of our country in true proportion to our income, that is, in true proportion to our just share of the national protection and guardianship which the government of the country afforded.

I have shown elsewhere that, in consequence of the general—one might almost say universal—tendency of politicians everywhere to placate the voters of their various constituencies—irrespective of sound principles—many citizens are, by the adoption of an ascending scale, taxed twenty, or thirty, or even fifty, times their just proportion of the necessary taxation of the country; that is to say, if all the most eminent economic authorities on the subject be acknowledged, as sound and fair judges of what is just in principle.

Another aspect of the new and enlarged liberty which we should enjoy, under such a state of political society as we have assumed, would be the relief of the poorer classes from the unequal and unjust penalty or duty on such commodities of their everyday needs, as are now subject to inequitable imposts, levied in order to "raise revenue," without reference to their inequality and injustice as taxes. This impost on articles of daily use—by reason of their being materials of individual con-

sumption—involves a greater per capita proportion of penalty or duty on a poor than on a well-do-to family, which, considered apart from other taxes, is contrary to the just principle referred to.

Again, a heavy penalty is now imposed, in most countries, on land, in addition to that on the owners' income, which, besides being a tax on industry, is in the nature of a duplication, and therefore an unjust multiplication of the imposts of a community. Having regard to the same fundamental principles of human freedom, as laid down by recognised and non-partisan thinkers and writers on such subjects; one of the most questionable forms of impost introduced in later generations, as a concession by politicians to the masses, and their ever-active champions, who do not attach much importance to the equity or morality of such breaches of principle as are involved, is the imposition of what are termed death duties, or taxes on inheritance. To justify such imposts, it is necessary to contend, as probably the advocates of such taxes would readily do, that the individual citizen of a country should not be entitled to his own earnings or savings, to the extent of being able to dispose of them as he thinks fit; which would certainly involve a serious inroad into the time-honoured principle that the first duty of the State is to protect the liberty and private property of its citizens.

It would be futile in the present age to attempt to stay politically this confiscating tendency of the majority, as represented in Parliament; and it will, no doubt, go on, and enroach more and more; but a time will come, when a higher moral sense will be evolved and applied to such State encroachments; and then it will be seen that,

like all abuses, it produced its remote and indirect effects, which were found to be detrimental to society as a whole, in directions not now suspected.

Still another important form of liberty, enjoyed in some communities, and denied in others, is the right to make what arrangements people may wish, on one side, and the other, in exchanging labour or skilled service for money. Where the laws of a country seek to dragoon citizens, and limit them in this respect to an uniform rate of wages and uniform hours of labour, in return; there is a distinct denial of the right of two citizens to do as they wish with their own money, and their own mental or bodily labours.

It would be out of place here to enter into lengthy comments on the results of compulsory arbitration, where attempted as a professed means of settling such problems, by reference to an impartial tribunal; but this may be said—that that method has proved a signal failure, by either leading to the selection of men as arbiters, who have demonstrated their judicial unfitness, and so failed to "hold the scales" in accordance with the time-honoured tradition, or by the workmen having ignored the tribunal's finding where they disapproved, and so made the method a failure; because, in many cases, the penalties, imposed on the employees for non-observance of the findings, have been winked at by timid or subservient political executives, who could have, and were in duty bound to have, enforced them. The whole system has so obviously failed, where most widely established, that there are frequent proposals for its abolition, and for a resort to the revival of the old right of the employer to dismiss, and of the workman's

right to strike, as upheld by Mr. Gompers—perhaps the most eminent of all labour authorities—in the United States.

Again, under the extended sphere of personal liberty which we are assuming, in a country which is perfectly free; there would be an opportunity for individual or grouped private citizens to enter into competition with the Government, in a variety of enterprises now monopolised by the State, as, for instance, the carriage of letters and parcels. In many countries to-day, those departments of State are not only badly and extravagantly managed; but the work, being the subject of a monopoly, is done imperfectly, and with so little opportunity for redress by the citizens, who are subjected to injury and annoyance by departmental blunders, that those enforced services are highly unpopular. In some countries, such necessary services as the telephones are monopolised by the State; whilst in others they are left to private enterprise, and competition; with the result, that, in the latter there is every encouragement to the modernisation of appliances, and easy redress in the instances of imperfect service; whilst in the former the service is frequently performed by means of antiquated appliances, and the delay and blunders are beyond criticism.

One might go on and enumerate a hundred other more detailed directions, in which the "equal freedom" of citizens is interfered with, as a result of the desire—one might almost call it the craving—of certain classes of people, and, consequently, of certain types of politicians, who are automatically adaptable, to regulate and discipline their fellow citizens in the details of their daily life. Society has, fortunately, escaped from the be-

nighted conditions of early England, when, at the sound of the Curfew bell, every citizen had to put out all his lights at eight o'clock, and go to bed, as boarding school and many other children have to do to-day ; and citizens have escaped from the meddling legislation of Queen Elizabeth's reign, and that of Henry VIII., when, in normal times of peace, prices of commodities, and the movements of workmen, were needlessly and ridiculously controlled, as well as industries alternatively subsidised and discouraged, to suit the ignorant mood of the legislators of the hour.

In those reigns, Parliament went the length of determining the shape and character of the people's clothes, the number of coat buttons to be worn ; the length of the people's boots ; the number of their meals, and even the number of courses in each meal, as well as the character of the food consumed. From all these truly benighted attempts to regulate human nature, and treat citizens as if they were babies, society has partly escaped ; but there are many people of our own day, who would compel us to drink what they prescribe, and abstain from that which they disapproved ; who would tell us when, and how often, we should attend public worship, and what creed it should be under.

Buckle tells us in his *History of Civilisation*, in dealing with Scotland in the sixteenth century, how great a tyranny was exercised over unoffending citizens, if they did not conform to the stilted moral standards laid down by the kirk, which constituted itself a sort of superadded dictatorship. From all these forms of thraldom we have, as I have said, partially escaped, but the fires of superstition and insularity are only "banked," and are

ready to break out into flame at any moment, if only fanned by a sufficient number of zealots.

No one, who has read history with any degree of method and intelligence, can have failed to trace the thread of growing freedom from the Norman Conquest to the middle of the nineteenth century. I fix that last point in history, because the onward wave of liberalism, or freedom, seems to have then realised its high-water mark, and to have been followed by a sort of back-wash of socialism—contemporaneous with an extended franchise—in the shape of short-sighted and meddlesome interferences with the freedom of citizens, on matters which are no one's concern but their own.

Mr. Gladstone (a sufficiently confirmed Liberal for the most captious), in 1887, recognised this remarkable change, and said of the legislative work of the preceding fifty years, "It has been a process of setting free the individual man, that he may work out his own vocation, without wanton hindrance"; and he added: "If, instead of this, Government is to work out his vocation for him, I, for one, am not sanguine as to the result."

It would be difficult even to classify, much more to enumerate, the accumulating instances in some countries, in which the State is even to-day trespassing more and more on the domain of human liberty, which was at one time considered sacred to each individual citizen. Every little body of persons, obsessed with some "fad" or "ism" of its own, seems to be dissatisfied, unless it can find some pliable legislator, who will give prominence to its narrow aspiration, which would run every man and woman into the same mould, by seeking to impose it on the whole community.

Again, various groups, who conclude that some piece of legislation would benefit them as a class, seek to have it passed into law, without knowing, or, apparently, caring, what its effect would be on other classes; and, accordingly, some pliable legislator, who sees the possibility of securing additional votes at a future election, undertakes to set the parliamentary machinery in motion with a view to that end. In that way, Parliament becomes a veritable scrambling ground, in which class advantages are sought to be "slipped through" or "snatched" for the benefit of certain classes. And many of these attempts are both subtle, and indirectly aimed at some commercial profit, or some industrial gain, or some moral or religious advantage to themselves. Such exploiters would do well to take to heart what Lord Hartington once said, in regard to such attempts: "I believe," he said, "that legislation in favour of any particular class is likely to prevent the general prosperity"; but, unfortunately, many of those political attempts at class advantages, by indirect means, are attempted by men who know full well that what they are seeking is injurious and unjust; nevertheless, they make the attempt, in the hope that they may succeed; and the only way in which they could be effectually checked would be by the adoption of that practice of a Greek State —the colony of Lokris—in which, according to Grote's *History of Greece*, everyone, who proposed a new law, had to do so in public, with "a halter round his neck"; and it was laid down as a permanent custom of the same country that, if the proposed law were not adopted by the people, the halter should be tightened! Such a law would effectively prevent this constant tampering—this

meddlesome and irritating interference—with the people's rights and liberties, by making an example of one or two of the delinquents.

No one can doubt that the continued state of injustice and inequality in taxation-assessment, as pointed out in the earlier part of this chapter, and the need for constant watchfulness and vigorous protest in the legislature, by every honestly-motived politician—resulting in every instance in party assaults on himself—constitute substantial "obstacles" to honest statesmanship. And there is this further regrettable feature in connection with taxation—that whenever an honest attempt is made to correct old abuses, or to frustrate those that are new, unprincipled exploiters in the legislature, who maintain the old abuses, and endeavour to create fresh ones, make every effort to discredit the champions of the people's liberties, and to injure them, by endeavouring to hold them up, and to stigmatise them as "Conservatives" and "Tories," in the hope of destroying their influence.

By these means, many new recruits in the political arena, who would uphold just principles, and resist unjust crusades on the equal liberties of citizens, are frequently intimidated and discouraged in their efforts to champion the people's broader interests.

There is yet another form of unjust misappropriation of the citizens' money, which may be properly classified under the term "over-legislation"; although it stands in a more reprehensible category, and on a par with the practice of taking money from the National till, for purposes altogether foreign to the true and legitimate functions of government. I refer to the vicious tendency of Ministers of the Crown, and sometimes of Ministries as

a whole, to "buy" the people's good will and support in the distribution of benefits to certain classes, at the expense of other classes, whose interest in the consolidated funds is at least equal to that of the people benefited. I refer to the building of dwellings for the people, to be let at less than their market value in rent; and the creation of unnecessary public works in normal times, in order to give employment to men at a daily wage, irrespective of their capability to return fair value for the wages paid.

The effect of the first practice is twofold; for, not only does it involve an injustice to those citizens who have ultimately to pay extra taxation to confer an unearned benefit upon those who rent the houses at less than their true rental value; but it makes a pauper of the man who accepts the advantage at less than its market value, to the extent of that difference. It does more; for it inevitably blunts the sense of justice of the politician who lends himself to the misappropriation of the public funds, and so makes a repetition of the vice seem less patent.

The second form of political "largess," also, has a twofold effect; for it pauperises the workmen who perform the work, to the extent of the difference between the true value of the labour done, and the daily wage actually paid; and it further demoralises the men employed, who are disposed to perform an adequate day's work for their daily wage, by inducing them to "slow down" to the pace of the men who do as little as they can for their pay. There have been notorious cases in the Australian Commonwealth, in which Ministers of the Crown have openly accepted the higher

tender for public services; because the tenderer was of the same party as the Minister, and undertook to conform to certain trades union rules, which the Minister considered it politic to espouse. The effect of this action was to involve the taxpayers in an unjustifiably higher expenditure for purely party purposes. Such an act involved a distinct misappropriation of public funds, for party ends.

There is still another class of abuses which could be mentioned in detail, had I space for the purpose; where governments, as a whole, and individual ministers of the vote-catching type, deliberately misuse public moneys to embark upon industries to placate their socialistic supporters, and, if the truth were known, so involve the taxpayers in twice, and sometimes in three times, the cost, for the articles produced, which they could be manufactured for by private enterprise.

In the Australian Commonwealth, where these socialistic enterprises have become common, every effort has been made to obtain truthful and straightforward balance sheets of such industries, in order to demonstrate the gross waste of public moneys; but care has always been taken by those in authority to hide the real facts, by omitting to take into account certain factors which would be required in the balance sheets of public companies. Some reports of select committees and commissions have revealed truly scandalous waste and mismanagement in some of these industries. The Minister, in such cases, is satisfied with the political popularity gained by his venture; and the employees have been satisfied; because, in such State enterprises, they are subjected to less strenuous discipline; and, when a conscientious

manager or foreman insists on better results, and seeks to punish the delinquents, he can be checked and frustrated in his discipline, by an appeal from the manager or foreman to the Minister.

I do not hesitate to say that in many such cases the neglect and waste, and laxity, have been well-nigh criminal in their character.

The problem is: how can a conscientious Minister, who has the courage to try to do his duty, begin upon such an Augean stable as many of these State or National enterprises have become? The "leaks" in the Treasury of many countries, in these truly lax days, are numerous enough to constitute so many scandals, if fully revealed; and until the taxpayers rise, as they some day will do, after some financial cataclysm has forced the facts on public attention, the abuses referred to will continue.

I ought to add, to avoid the charge of being merely theoretical, in what I have said about freedom of commerce, that I clearly recognise the almost insuperable obstacle to a complete return to that form of freedom, in a country where a great variety of industries, to which other countries are infinitely better suited, have been established as "home industries"; for, as I have already pointed out, thousands of citizens have been attracted to employment in connection with them; and the sudden removal of the "economic crutch," which the protective duties on the imported article or commodity are equivalent to, would probably undermine the industry; and employees who were thus thrown out of work would be converted into an army of discontents; and their hardships would lead to serious political disturbance. If such a change were suddenly brought about, there would

follow similar disturbances, such as occurred with the introduction of the spinning-jenny in substitution for the hand loom, in English history. These consequences bear upon the *expediency* of such a change; but they do not affect the soundness of the theories of statecraft which I have enunciated. My humble criticism of the theory of protection is mild, in comparison with its denunciation by the venerable John Bright; who said, in his first speech in the British Parliament: "Crime has often veiled itself under the name of virtue; but of all the crimes against the laws of God, and the true interests of man, none has ever existed more odious and more destructive than that which has assumed the amiable term of 'Protection.'"

CHAPTER X.

THE LEGISLATOR

IT should need no elaborate demonstration here to convince an intelligent reader that the man who enters Parliament, as one of those entrusted with the making of laws, for the compulsion, restriction, and regulation of the members of a civilised community, should be required to possess many personal attributes, and a very wide knowledge of many things. If I am right in my enumeration of the qualifications of the man himself, and of the varieties of knowledge which he should be required to possess, to properly fit him to discharge his duties with ability, with fairness to all classes, and in such a way as to encourage enterprise and individuality, without conferring positive benefits on one class at the expense of another class; then a fully-equipped legislator should be a citizen who stands out from his fellow-citizens, in regard to knowledge, personal attainments, and individuality of character; and, as a result, he should command the political confidence and respect of those whom he represents in the councils of the nation, as well as of those with whom he will be called upon to co-operate in the making of laws.

I am not claiming that he should be a great churchman, or of any particular creed, or that he should be a prominent ornament in society; for many of England's and America's greatest statesmen were cosmopolitans in their types of mind, and could not be identified, even by

their best friends, with any particular creed or denomination; and as to social qualifications—they need none, beyond good manners, and what all nature's gentlemen possess innately: a consideration for the feelings of others. For, as a rule, the men who have acquired the requisite historical and sociological knowledge, and made sufficiently wide observation in regard to the composition of society, and the characteristics and needs of the different classes who compose it—those men have not had, and cannot spare, the time to indulge in purely social or fashionable functions, that have no real bearing on their legislative work. It is possible that this may frequently deprive them of the approval and endorsement of fashionable people, who consider that, as their representative, he should always be at their disposal for what are termed ceremonial occasions; but a little reflection will always satisfy those who entertain such standards, that this is not the true or the legitimate purpose of the man of affairs; who is, like themselves, limited to twenty-four hours in each day, with many more duties to himself in his representative capacity than they contemplate. Moreover, a thoughtful public would not make so many social demands, as they frequently do, upon their representatives, if they took time to consider how much they are called upon to do, directly and indirectly, on behalf of a modern constituency, especially in these times, when the correspondence and the requests made upon a member of Parliament in a democratic community are truly multifarious.

So much as to the more personal qualifications, and the personal movements of a legislator. In small communities, where train travelling is rapid and fre-

quent, and the distances of members' constituencies from the legislative centre are not great, the time occupied in, and the disturbing effects of a man's personal affairs by, constant journeying to and fro, are not of great importance; but in widespread countries or communities, like the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, where a representative, living at a great distance from the legislative centre, has either to establish a separate home for a large part of the year, or to make extensive train journeys covering many months; the inroads upon his time, and opportunities for necessary work, are more than are commonly understood by those who merely "look on."

Then, as to the mental equipment and scope of knowledge, which I have named, as essential in a qualified legislator.

Lecky, the author of *The Eighteenth Century*, says a wise thing in regard to the younger Pitt, whose career was one of the most remarkable ever known for statesmanship. He says: "He saw what was right, but he did not always ensue it. He had to deal, not with angels, but with men, their passions, prejudices, and interests, often sordid and misguided. He, therefore, compromised the ideal, and did, not the best, but the nearest practicable to the best."

I have said before that the statesman must understand human nature. To do that, it is not sufficient that he should have lived all his life in a village or a big town, or even in a large community, far removed from the main stream of life, that flows through the great world. Many comparatively substantial communities, that are not of the great world, or that are far removed from its

cosmopolitan activities and occasional convulsions, are, comparatively speaking, in the nature of "backwaters," that are, as it were, out of the sound of the noisy and turbulent rumblings of humanity. They have their local newspapers, that take their cue from the great journals of the bigger world beyond, and endeavour to imitate their editorial "thunder." Many citizens of those untroubled centres; many local legislators; and many editors, imagine they are "moving mountains," and shaking the foundations of nature, while they are only performing to small local audiences, and wasting their editorial breath in a vain attempt to be heard beyond the limits of their smaller world. All this misconception, and all this disappointment, where disillusionment takes place, is the result of a want of sense of proportion; because they fail to realise the insignificance of their own circumscribed affairs, as compared with the greater and more important problems beyond, in which, nevertheless, their own fate or future is involved: frequently without their realising it. There are parts of the British Dominions, for instance, whose whole future and destiny hung by a thread in the late great war and its outcome, in which, nevertheless, many newspapers, legislators, and party-leaders, remained so self-satisfied, and so locally hypnotised with their immediate surroundings and microscopic outlook, that they were, and continued throughout the struggle to be, unconscious of their own local dependence upon the outcome of the greatest material as well as moral issue the world has ever known.

Such men do not understand human nature or human affairs, in the broadest sense; for to do so involves a

vision wide enough, and far-sighted enough, to see and realise the bearings of local interests on the greater interests of the outer world; for all national interests are now relative, and that fact must be recognised and acknowledged by all public men worthy of the title. A legislator needs to know human nature in more than a cosmopolitan sense; he needs to know man in all his varieties—in nationality, in regard to his various walks in life, and as to his individual leanings; in his religious prejudices, his political bias, and his irrational belief in his own, and dislike of other, classes; and in a hundred other ways—that he may be prepared to shape the legislation in which he takes part, so as to allow scope and freedom for all these extremes, up to the line of freedom at which the equal rights of others impinge. And he needs, further, to have grasped the scientific side of man, so as to be acquainted with the theories, at least, of man's origin and evolution from lower types, in order to be prepared to make allowances for some ugly characteristics, that give undue emphasis to the egoistic side of those lower types of society; for these have not undergone, as much as others, the self-denying influences that operate in social waves in a mixed community.

Travel is an undoubted advantage to a legislator; for one sees everywhere the effect of ocular demonstration upon certain minds, that lack the imagination to acquire such knowledge theoretically. A few generations ago, no man was considered completely educated, though he might have taken the highest university degrees, unless he had made "the grand tour," and travelled round the different countries of Europe, in order to get rid of the narrower conception that his particular locality, his par-

ticular nationality, and his particular class, afforded him in regard to men and women. If a man has not travelled, and personally cleared his mind of such narrow prejudices, he would need to read much, and widely, and realistically, of other peoples and other lands, and other standards of life, and public affairs, to constitute himself a "man of the world" or "a man of affairs."

Every man who puts himself forward as fitted to join intelligently in making laws for a modern democratic community, should be generally well-informed in the history of different peoples now co-operating in the world's progress. He should, if he be of Anglo-Saxon origin, before all things, know the history of his own race, back, at least, to the beginning of the Christian era, when they were not much more advanced in civilisation than the Australian aboriginal. The knowledge that Cæsar so found them at that stage of history—when the people of Rome and Athens had already reached a state of comparative perfection in art, architecture, sculpture, oratory, and philosophy, in no sense inferior, and, in some respects, superior, to that of Great Britain of to-day—would have the wholesome effect of neutralising any spirit of self-sufficiency which frequently results from an insular upbringing.

It is equally essential that a would-be legislator should be made aware, that there is not a theory of legislation, or a scheme for producing a millennium, as formulated in the twentieth century, that had not been attempted and failed to effect the purpose of those who conceived it, at least twenty or twenty-five centuries ago.

This knowledge, when thoroughly drilled into a truly provincial legislator's mind, would free him from

the blandishments of an army of half-informed or wholly-unread theorists, who are for ever promulgating doctrines as to the possibility of obtaining wealth without working for it; of making the present wealth of the world "go round," so as to allow everyone to retire and live a life of leisure; of enabling "the poor" to become rich, and hereafter enjoy a permanent holiday; or of generally distributing the surplus wealth of the world, so as to secure for everybody a good measure of "treasure, leisure, and pleasure"! Such doctrines are being preached everywhere to-day, almost invariably by men and women who have nothing of their own; who dislike physical exertion of any kind; and object to anyone else being in possession of means, such as they, themselves, have tried, but failed, to acquire.

The certain knowledge that all these recipes for universal happiness have, again and again, over many centuries, and in many countries, failed to produce anything but misery, would render such political nostrums unpopular and worthless, even for party purposes.

Another advantage of a course of universal history, for candidates for the legislature, is that it would afford an opportunity of comparing the civilising results of old-fashioned methods of human government with those of countries in which more showy methods have been tried and found wanting, in such aspects as peace, equality, freedom, and the quiet encouragement of the institution of private property.

If all the members of a legislature had gone through this curriculum, statesmanship in such an arena would be a less difficult task; and history would be more properly understood and appreciated as a simple record

of tendencies, sufficiently definite to serve as guides, or of distinct causes and effects, some successful, and some unsuccessful; where social and political experiments had been tried by those who had gone before us, and, without any expense or inconvenience to us, afforded us useful object lessons.

A careful study of human "needs," as distinguished from human "wants," which, as already stated, are quite different things, liable to be mistaken for one another, would show what a prominent place "freedom" occupies in the list of guarantees that the legislature can offer; and would illustrate and emphasise the beneficial results to all, which flow from the whole scheme of social organisation, by which a well-regulated community can be built out of once irresponsible and lawless units, just as a magnificent and stately edifice can be erected, and made stable for a century, out of disorderly heaps of bricks and stones, and bags of sand and lime, that, without organising ability and application, would lie inert and fall to dust.

A judicious course of modern history would do much more, in placing before legislators the splendid examples of personal bravery, not in warfare, nor in physical prowess, but in moral courage, to do the thing that is right, and confront a whole phalanx of trucklers and cowards who had not the strength of mind, and the self-respect, to look error and organised dictatorship in the face; they would learn to abhor the miserable exhibitions of cowardice in which men bend the knee and stifle the spirit of manhood that their mothers had bred in them; and all, because they had, for personal gain, bound themselves body and soul to some political

organisation, and pledged themselves to do what they were told, irrespective of the justice or propriety of the act demanded of them.

The statesman will, as a rule, know what is to be faced in regard to this system of political slavery; and he will have seen, by experience, what inroads it makes upon the integrity of free institutions and the principle of true democracy; but, nevertheless, he will need to count with it; and it will become his duty, from time to time, to make manifest to the people the parallel between such an undermining of human freedom, and, for example, the inroads of the worst pests upon the fair fruits of an otherwise clean and prosperous orchard.

The honest legislator, who seeks to be equitable to the people as a whole, and to hold the scales of justice fairly and honourably between all classes who make up the community, rich and poor alike, old and young, arrogant and modest, those who attempt to force their claims, and those who hold back in genuine modesty: it is his duty, and without it he cannot be true to himself or his office, to watch for, and do his best to check the different forms of political vice and prejudice that he sees operating in the legislative arena; to meet the abuses of party government, to frustrate the aims, where he can, of religious and class bias, to steadfastly refuse to be dictated to by an irresponsible and party Press, that seeks to gain its end for its own ultimately commercial purposes, even at the cost of the individuality of those to whom its dictates are addressed.

A legislator, too, owes it to his constituents and to his country, to become acquainted with the economic principles that prevail among the great and recognised non-

political and non-party authorities on that subject, and to endeavour to put those principles into practice where the circumstances of a country seem to him to make it desirable.

The legislator in a twentieth-century Parliament needs all his courage to be able to do his duty, so that he may, as Polonius advised his son, "be true to himself"; for, like a ship in a chartless sea, or a sea of which there are many and conflicting charts, he is surrounded with shoals and shallows, with alluring islands which are only mirages, with hurrying tides that will carry him in a dozen different directions; and it is only by a cool head, a full store of knowledge, an honest self-respect, and a firm determination to steer a course that an informed judgment dictates, and a tender conscience approves, that he can do justice to the important trust that hundreds and thousands of his constituents have reposed in him. If he should happen to have adopted that "royal road" to Parliament, which consists of handing over his own judgment to the mercy of some political organisation, on the understanding that he is to take his orders from its officers willy nilly; then he is not entitled to be counted among responsible legislators, for he is no longer a brain-centre, but a veritable cog-wheel in a machine, the whole mechanism of which is moved by another or others, but not by the minds to whose judgment the people have handed over their destinies.

As a rule, such men are paid, as the members of almost all Parliaments are, nowadays; but there is this difference—that the moment the member of such an organisation ceases to revolve, in obedience to the gearsman

of the machine, he is compelled to step down from the pedestal of membership and find a livelihood. Such men come within the category of legislators who make politics their career; in regard to whom the late President Roosevelt said: "It is a dreadful misfortune for a man to grow to feel that his whole livelihood and his whole happiness depend upon his staying in office; such a feeling prevents him from being of real service to the people while in office, and always puts him under the heaviest strain of pressure to barter his convictions for the sake of holding office."

However automatically the working classes may fall in line, in concentrating their votes and their interests on a man who consents to espouse "labour" and labour only, and to take his orders as to voting from one of their organisations; many of them dislike the "bargain and sale" element which enters into the system; but they, nevertheless, are individually helpless, and dependent upon the "military square" movement, by which their cause is controlled. We all remember that incident in the life of John Stuart Mill, in which he was asked, at one of his election meetings, whether he had not once said, or written, that the working classes were "mostly liars." Everyone present, who knew that he had done so, thought that he would "fence" the question, and try to escape the consequences of such an admission; but they did not know him! He stood his ground like an honest and brave man, and boldly admitted that he had said so! History tells us that, instead of the whole Westminster audience, made up of working men, turning on him and metaphorically rending him, they cheered vociferously; for, whilst the statement was unpalatable, there was an

honest and courageous ring in the admission; and the admiration dominated the disfavour.

The high moral standards to be hoped for in the people's representatives, however difficult they may be to find in a mixed community, should be kept constantly in mind, as an ideal at which to aim; for it has been well said that, if we aim at the moon, we may fall far short of it, and yet hit a star!

Viscount Morley affords us a standard in describing Gladstone in his *Life*. "Never," he says "did he utter anything that was not inspired by a high moral principle; never did he act on any low or selfish grounds; never did he allow himself to think about himself, and not about those for whom he was labouring. He raised political life altogether to a higher level. . . . He changed his views in many ways, as he went on; yet through every change, whatever it might be, there was still manifest that steady upholding of high principle in walks of life where high principle was sometimes derided as unpractical and foolish."

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